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Introduction
Many situations in life require a decision to be made in order to resolve some issue
that has arisen. Such situations are essentially cases where the decision must be
chosen from a set of possible alternatives. For example, having to choose on a
rainy day whether to take an umbrella, an anorak, or perhaps neither; or having
to choose what to order at a restaurant, just the main course or the three course
meal? How about a drink as well? Of course, the choice outcome in any of these
issues depends on the preferences of the individual that this choice concerns. Some
people do not mind getting a little wet if it rains, so perhaps they might opt to
take neither an umbrella nor an anorak with them on a rainy day. Some other
-very weird- people never have dessert, so for them choosing a three course meal
is out of the question.
However, not all decision choices are made by just one person; some issues
concern a group of people. In this case, a suitable “mechanism” must be used that
will take into account the preferences of all members in the group before reaching
a decision. For example, many countries use plurality voting when electing a new
government. This mechanism chooses the party that received the highest number
of votes, or in other words, the most preferred party according to the preferences
of the plurality. As a second example, consider a book club where members of the
club take turns every week in suggesting a book for everyone in the club to read.
This kind of mechanism, where the decision is made by just one member of the
group, but the decision maker alternates every week, is called serial dictatorship.
In this thesis, both cases where the decision is taken either by a single person or
by a group of people are considered. In the first chapter, we study cases where the
issue concerns a single person, henceforth, agent. Specifically, we are interested
in whether the agent’s preferences, according to the choices he makes, should be
considered “rationalizable”. For a brief (and not completely accurate) explanation
of what is meant by the term rationalizability of preferences, consider the following
example. An agent whose preferences are rationalizable has to decide what to
order from a restaurant’s menu. The available choices are hamburger, salad, beer,
v
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and coffee. The agent decides to order salad and beer; therefore, we can deduce
that he prefers this combination over every other available combination on the
menu (e.g., hamburger and beer or salad and coffee). Nevertheless, just before
placing his order, the waiter informs him of the daily special, steak, which is not
listed in the menu. Perhaps now the agent will change his order to steak and
beer or steak and coffee; after all, neither combination was previously available,
and therefore, such a change would be rational. However, changing his order to
hamburger and beer would not be rational; the combination of hamburger and
beer was also available initially, when the agent chose to order salad and beer, and
we deduced that according to his rationalizable preferences, he prefers salad and
beer over hamburger and beer.
In the second and third chapters, we study cases where the issue concerns
a group of people, henceforth, agents, and a decision mechanism must be im-
plemented in order to consider the preferences of all agents in the group before
reaching a decision. Here, we are interested to find out how this mechanism might
function when certain requirements, henceforth, properties, must be met. For ex-
ample, perhaps it would be useful that all agents declare their true preferences
instead of trying to manipulate (by lying) the decision chosen by the mechanism.
Due to this, we could require that the mechanism does not “reward” liars by
making sure that an agent would always get the same result or a more favor-
able one when telling the truth. Another property of the mechanism could be
that all agents in the group are treated equally, irrespective of gender, race, social
standing, or religious beliefs. Furthermore, in an environment with often-changing
circumstances, a mechanism that would mitigate any positive or negative changes
“fairly” among the group of agents would perhaps be welcome; therefore, the fol-
lowing property would perhaps be in order. Following a positive (negative) change
in the circumstances, all agents get better off (worse off) compared to their initial
situation. However, it is necessary to bear in mind that not all combinations of
properties are always “compatible”. One of the first to point out this incompati-
bility was Kenneth J. Arrow with his famous impossibility theorem that states the
following. In every voting situation with three or more candidates, there exists
no electoral system that can be efficient,1 independent over irrelevant alternatives
1In a typical voting situation, efficiency essentially requires that the elected candidate was
voted for by at least one voter.
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(IIA),2 and be non-dictatorial3 as well (Arrow, 1950).
We proceed by providing a more in-depth summary of each chapter.
Chapter 1: Set and revealed preference axioms for multi-valued choice
The first chapter was written in collaboration with Hans Peters. It is chronologi-
cally the last chapter of this thesis, but is presented first due to its more general
nature of the topic in choice theory, relative to the other two chapters. The main
part of the work in it took place during the six months I spent in Maastricht,
spread over the last three years.
In this chapter, we consider situations where an issue has arisen with a number
of alternative ways to deal with it, and some individual needs to choose one, or
more, of these alternatives in order to deal with this situation. In the sequel, we
refer to all the possible ways to deal with the issue by the term choice set and
to the individual by the term choice correspondence; that is, given a choice set of
alternatives, a choice correspondence will choose a subset of this choice set, the
chosen set.
Specifically, we are interested in choice correspondences satisfying two proper-
ties. First, the property of independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA), as well
as a weaker version of it, and second, the weak axiom of revealed preference for
sets (WARP)4.
We show the existence of connections between these properties and two partic-
ular collections of choice sets, called weak and strong sets, which in turn partially
or completely determine the choice correspondences satisfying the above indepen-
dence properties. In other words, if we were to refer to the restaurant example
on page v, we find that by knowing what an agent will order at some restaurants,
specifically the ones whose menus are included in weak and strong sets, we are
able to determine what this agent will order at every restaurant, assuming the
way he makes his choices is according to the two aforementioned conditions.
2Loosely speaking, IIA requires that the removal of non-winning candidates from an election
should not affect the result. For example, if in an election between candidates a, b, and c, a is
the winner, then IIA requires that in an election between just candidates a and b, a to be the
winner as well, since the removal of non-winning candidate c is irrelevant.
3If in every voting situation a specific voter can dictate the result, then we say that this voter
is a dictator. An electoral system is non-dictatorial if it does not allow the existence of dictators.
4Consider again the restaurant example on page v. Since salad and beer are chosen initially,
the agent reveals his preference for salad and beer over any other available combination in the
menu (e.g., salad and coffee). WARP requires that at some other choice set, where salad an beer
are available, the agent will not select salad and coffee, and thus reveal that he prefers salad and
coffee over salad and beer.
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Chapter 2: Solidarity for public goods under single-peaked preferences:
Characterizing target set correspondences
The second chapter was written in collaboration with Bettina Klaus and is chrono-
logically the first chapter of this thesis. It has been presented in conferences at Is-
tanbul’s Bilgi University, Budapest’s Corvinus University, Tbilisi State University,
Maastricht University, the University of Zurich, Lund University, the University
of Southern Denmark, and the University of Lausanne. Moreover, a poster of it
has been presented at Grenoble Alps University.
Here, we consider the problem that a city planner might face when having to
choose a group of locations where an identical public good will be provided to
the citizens of the city in question. For example, choosing the locations of public
parking positions, or in other words, choosing the location of a public parking zone.
In addition, the city planner’s choice needs to take into account the preferences
of the citizens, who are the ones to use this parking zone. Loosely speaking, said
preferences are single-peaked.5
Similarly to the first chapter, the city planner making the choice will be re-
ferred to as a choice correspondence and we will be interested that this choice
correspondence satisfies certain properties. However, in contrast with the previ-
ous chapter, these properties are now related with the citizens’ preferences and
moreover, two of them require a notion of solidarity among the citizens. Namely,
the three properties are efficiency,6 population-monotonicity,7 and (a version of)
replacement-dominance,8 with the two latter ones requiring the aforementioned
notion of solidarity.
We show that if efficiency and either population-monotonicity or replacement-
dominance are to be satisfied by a choice correspondence, then this choice cor-
respondence belongs to a particular class of correspondences, that of target set
correspondences. Loosely speaking, this result implies the following. If the city
planner’s choice has to satisfy these properties, then he should first choose alone
5Single peakedness of preferences implies the following. Each citizen has a single most favorite
location (his peak) when parking his car, for example, right outside his home; moreover, if this
location is taken, then he would prefer to park as closely as possible to his most favorite location.
6When a parking zone is chosen, efficiency guarantees that no other parking zone could have
been chosen instead and would have made some citizens better off, and no citizen worse off.
7If following the addition of some new citizens, a parking zone change is in order, then all
citizens, excluding the newcomers, must be affected in the same way; either nobody gets worse
off, or nobody gets better off.
8If following a citizen’s change of preferences (e.g., after moving to a new home), a parking
zone change is in order, then all other citizens must be affected in the same way; either nobody
gets worse off, or nobody gets better off.
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where the parkinoneg zone should be, then ask the citizens about their prefer-
ences, and finally, only change his initial choice if all citizens unanimously agree
with this change.
Chapter 3: On strategy-proofness and single-peakedness: median-
voting over intervals
The third chapter was single-authored and was chronologically the second chapter
of this thesis; it was written under the close supervision and guidance of Bettina
Klaus. It has been presented in conferences at the University of Lausanne, the
University of Zurich, the University of York, Paris Dauphine University, and the
University of Innsbruck.
The problem considered here is in some ways similar to the one considered in
the previous chapter. Specifically, the problem is the following. A city planner has
to choose a set of (tax) policies which will affect all citizens/voters, with the possi-
ble choices spanning from extreme left-wing choice to extreme right-wing choices.
For example, the decision to increase the tax rate of high earners and decrease
that of low earners would be a left-wing policy, while on the other hand, abolishing
health-related taxes all together and having citizens pay for their health insurance
through the private sector would be a right-wing policy. All voters have their
own preferences about policy choices, which they announce to the city planner
by voting. These preferences are again “based on” single-peaked preferences; for
example, if a voter’s most favorite policy (peak) is a left-wing one, then he also
prefers policies closer to his peak over policies further away. Therefore, he would
also prefer central policies over right-wing policies.
Similarly to the previous chapter, we will refer to the city planner using the
term choice correspondence and will be interested that this choice correspondence
satisfies certain properties, all of which related with the citizens’ announced pref-
erences, i.e., the citizens’ votes. To be more precise, the main three properties we
are interested in are strategy-proofness,9 peaks-onliness,10 and anonymity.11
Our two main results are as follows. First, if strategy-proofness and peaks-
onliness are to be satisfied by a choice correspondence, then this choice correspon-
dence belongs to a particular class of correspondences, that of generalized median
correspondences. Second, if anonymity is also to be satisfied, then this choice cor-
9When a voter lies and does not announce his true preferences, the result cannot improve in
his favor. In other words, a voter cannot strategize in order to improve the result in his favor.
10All voters are only allowed to declare, by voting, their most favorite policy. They cannot
also declare their second most favorite, third most favorite, etc.
11All voters have equal rights in the decision, in other words, all voters get one vote each.
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respondence belongs to a sub-class of generalized median correspondences, called
the class of median correspondences. Loosely speaking, the second result implies
the following.12 If during an election, the city planner’s choice has to satisfy these
properties, then he should first stuff the ballot box with a number of votes of his
choice, then ask the citizens to cast their votes, and finally after combining all
stuffed and cast votes, choose the policy favored by the median vote (in a sense,
the central vote).
At first, this seems as an unwanted situation giving the voters no say in the
outcome; however, this is not entirely true. Although a high number of stuffed
votes implies that indeed, voters cannot influence the outcome, a low number of
stuffed votes achieves a different effect. Specifically, depending on how “low” this
number is, the voters might have complete control on the outcome, in the case of
zero stuffed votes, or have some degree of control on the outcome, with this degree
depending on the number of stuffed votes.13
12The first result, which does not include anonymity, is a little more general and due to this,
difficult to explain concisely in an informal way.
13For an example where voters only have some degree of control over the outcome, consider
the following. In many countries, a supermajority of the parliament is required to agree with
proposed constitutional amendments, in order for these to take place. In such cases, the stuffed
votes could be though of as favoring the status-quo, i.e., no change in the constitution.
Chapter 1
Set and revealed preference axioms for
multi-valued choice
Abstract
We consider choice correspondences for arbitrary sets of alternatives, and focus on the
condition of independence of irrelevant alternatives and on a weaker version of it, as well
as on the weak axiom of revealed preference for sets. We establish connections between
these conditions and their relations with collections of choice sets, called weak and strong
sets, that partially or completely determine the choice correspondences satisfying the
above independence properties.
1.1 Introduction
1.1.1 Background
This chapter contributes to a question with a long history. For single-valued choice
functions the condition of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) requires
that if the alternative chosen from a choice set is still available in a subset, then
it should be chosen in that subset. This condition already occurs in Nash (1950)
as condition no. 7 in Nash’s axiomatic bargaining model. For collections of choice
sets that are closed under a nonempty intersection – as is the case in the present
paper – and (single-valued) choice functions IIA is equivalent to the Weak Axiom
of Revealed Preference; the latter requiring the revealed preference relation to
admit no cycles of length two. The question is how to extend the IIA condition
to (multi-valued) choice correspondences.
The probably most obvious extension was also proposed by Nash in an infor-
mal note in 1950 – see Shubik (1982, p. 420): if F is the choice correspondence
choosing a subset of every choice set, X is a choice set, and F (X) has a nonempty
intersection with Y , a subset of X, then F (Y ) should be equal to this intersection.
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This condition also appears as Postulate 6 in Chernoff (1954) and Condition C4
in Arrow (1959). The most common and obvious interpretation is that the set of
alternatives chosen by a choice correspondence should be viewed as the set of best
alternatives (in some sense or another) among the available ones: that is, each of
these alternatives is also best in any subset of available alternatives to which it
belongs.
A second possible extension would say that in such a situation, F (Y ) should at
least contain the intersection of F (X) and Y . In terms of the interpretation above,
it could be that additional best alternatives become available in the smaller set.
For instance, the first preferred choice of wine from a restaurant’s menu is no longer
available, making the second preferred choice a best alternative (additional to the
still available best menu choices). This condition was first proposed as Postulate 4
in Chernoff (1954), and has consequently been referred to as the Chernoff property
(e.g., Moulin, 1985, 1988). It appears as Property α in Sen (1971).
In a similar vein, a third extension is to require that the intersection of F (X)
and Y should contain F (Y ), hence F (Y ) is a subset of F (X). In other words,
F still chooses among the best elements, but not necessarily all available ones.
Think of choosing a committee within a society: for a subset of the society one
may need to choose a strictly smaller committee, even if more members of the
original committee are still available. Or, in terms of the restaurant’s menu choice,
the lunch menu may be a subset of the dinner menu, but also lunch itself may be
lighter than dinner: one may want to consume wine of just one brand instead of
several, even if more brands are still available. This extension appears as condition
W2 in Schwartz (1976).
In this chapter the focus is on the first and third extensions, to be called IIA
and Weak IIA (WIIA). A still weaker version of the latter condition is the following
(e.g., Fishburn, 1973) if F (X) is contained in Y , then F (Y ) should be contained
in F (X). This condition, studied in Aizerman and Malishevski (1981), is referred
to as the Aizerman condition; it is implied by Condition W3 in Schwartz (1976).
Following a tradition initiated for consumer theory by Samuelson (1938) and
Houthakker (1950), and continued for general choice problems by – among others
– Arrow (1959) and Richter (1966), most of the literature focuses on rationaliz-
ability: when does a choice correspondence always pick the set composed by those
alternatives that are maximal for some binary relation on the set of alternatives?
For instance, Arrow (1959) shows that a choice correspondence is rationalizable
by a complete and transitive binary relation if and only if it satisfies IIA. Sen
(1971) shows that a choice correspondence is rationalizable by a binary relation if
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and only if it satisfies the Chernoff condition and a condition proposed as Prop-
erty γ1 but later also referred to as the Expansion condition (e.g., Moulin, 1985).
Adding to this the condition of Aizerman results in the choice correspondence
being rationalizable by an ordering which is complete and has a transitive strict
part (Schwartz, 1976; Moulin, 1988). Finally, Aizerman and Malishevski (1981)
show that a choice correspondence satisfies both the Chernoff and the Aizerman
condition if and only if it is pseudo-rationalizable by a collection of single-valued,
complete, and transitive orderings; that is, if in each choice set, the choice corre-
spondence picks the maximal elements of all the orderings in this collection.
1.1.2 Our focus
As mentioned, we focus on IIA as initiated by Nash (Shubik, 1982) and considered
by Arrow (1959), as well as on its weaker version, WIIA, appearing as condition
W2 in Schwartz (1976). We assume no structure on the set of alternatives – it can
be any finite or infinite set, and we study IIA and WIIA choice correspondences
with respect to two closely related questions.
The first question is that of rationalizability. This concerns the existence of
a binary relation on the collection of choice sets, thus, sets of alternatives rather
than only single alternatives, which rationalizes a given choice correspondence.
The usual approach in the literature is to consider revealed preference relations on
alternatives instead of sets, with the exception of Brand and Harrenstein (2011).
Specifically, they consider set-versions of Chernoff’s and Expansion conditions 2
and obtain a characterization (their Theorem 2) of ‘set-rationalizable’ choice cor-
respondences. Their set-rationalizability condition is what we call WARP (Weak
Axiom of Revealed Preference). We characterize WARP by a different condition
and show that this condition is indeed equivalent to the condition of Brand and
Harrenstein (2011) – see Lemmas 1.1 and 1.2. We further show that WARP is
implied by WIIA if the choice correspondence F is a projection, i.e., F ◦F = F –
the latter is implied by WARP, as also observed in Brandt and Harrenstein (2011).
In Theorem 1.1 we characterize IIA by WARP combined with another axiom on
the revealed preference relation (‘Preference Axiom’, PA); this is in contrast to the
single-valued choice case, where IIA and WARP are equivalent. Finally, we show
that IIA implies that the revealed preference relation on choice sets is transitive
1Property γ: for all choice sets X and Y , the intersection of F (X) and F (Y ) is contained in
F (X ∪ Y ).
2Note that Brand and Harrenstein (2011) use the nomenclature of Sen (1971), i.e., α- and
γ-properties instead of Chernoff’s and Expansion conditions respectively.
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and therefore, in view of WARP, acyclic.
The second question is that of identifying collections of choice sets that, as
much as possible, determine the choice correspondence satisfying WIIA or IIA.
Given a choice correspondence F , a choice set S is called a ‘weak set’ if, for every
choice set X, it contains F (X) whenever F (X) has a nonempty intersection with
it, and is equal to F (X) whenever S ⊆ X. Our main result here is that if F satisfies
WIIA and is a projection, then these weak sets partition the sets of alternatives
and the restriction of the revealed preference relation to the weak sets is complete
and acyclic (Theorem 1.3). A choice set S is called a ‘strong set’ if F (X) is equal
to the intersection of X and S whenever F (X) has a nonempty intersection with
S. Here, we show that if F satisfies IIA, then these strong sets partition the sets
of alternatives and the restriction of the revealed preference relation to the strong
sets is complete and acyclic (Theorem 1.4). In this case, the strong sets determine
a unique IIA choice correspondence.
In Section 1.2, we introduce the model and the three main conditions on a
choice correspondence that we consider (WARP, WIIA, and IIA), establishing
relations or lack thereof between them. Section 1.3 introduces the collections of
weak sets and strong sets, and establishes some properties of these collections.
In Section 1.4 we derive Theorems 1.3 and 1.4 mentioned above. Section 1.5
concludes with a summary of the results of the paper.
1.2 Model and properties
1.2.1 Model and basic definitions
Let A be a finite or infinite set of alternatives and let A denote the class of its
nonempty subsets, i.e., A = 2A\{∅}. A choice correspondence is a map F : A → A
such that F (X) ⊆ X for every X ∈ A. A choice correspondence F induces an
irreflexive binary relation RF ⊆ A×A by
(X, Y ) ∈ RF ⇔ there exist Z ∈ A with X = F (Z) and Y ⊆ Z
for all distinct X, Y ∈ A. In this case we say that X is revealed preferred to Y by
F and call RF the revealed preference relation of F .
Later on we also use the following definitions and notations. A binary relation
R on a set Ω is transitive if (ω1, ω2), (ω2, ω3) ∈ R implies (ω1, ω3) ∈ R for all
distinct ω1, ω2, ω3 ∈ Ω. The binary relation R has a cycle of length n, where
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n ∈ N \ {1}, if there are ω1, . . . , ωn ∈ Ω such that (ωi, ωi+1) ∈ R for all i ∈
{1, . . . , n− 1} and (ωn, ω1) ∈ R; R is acyclic if it has no cycles of any length.
For a choice correspondence F , we use the notation F n(X) as shorthand for
F ◦ (F ◦ (. . . (F (X)))), that is, the n-fold composition of F with itself.
In the sequel, we denote a generic choice correspondence by F and conse-
quently, its revealed preference relation by RF .
1.2.2 Weak axiom of revealed preference
The following definition is the standard notion of revealed preference adapted to
our model.
Weak axiom of revealed preference (WARP). For all X, Y ∈ A, if (X, Y ) ∈
RF , then (Y,X) 6∈ RF .
In conformity with the literature, in the revealed preference relation, WARP
excludes cycles of length two but not longer cycles (among others, Rose, 1958;
Peters and Wakker, 1994; Bossert and Peters, 2009). For completeness, we pro-
vide the following example, which contains a cycle of length three, but cycles of
arbitrary length can be easily constructed in similar examples.
Example 1.1. Let A = {a, b, c} and define F by
F (X) =

{a, b, c} if X = {a, b, c}
{a} if X ∈ {{a, b}, {a}}
{b} if X ∈ {{b, c}, {b}}
{c} if X ∈ {{a, c}, {c}}.
Since F (a, b, c) = {a, b, c}, it follows that for all X ( {a, b, c}, ({a, b, c}, X) ∈
RF . Moreover, F (a, b) = F (a) = {a} implies that ({a}, {a, b}), ({a}, {b}) ∈
RF , F (b, c) = F (b) = {b} implies that ({b}, {b, c}), ({b}, {c}) ∈ RF , and
finally F (a, c) = F (c) = {c} implies that ({c}, {a, c}), ({c}, {a}) ∈ RF .
Therefore, F satisfies WARP but RF contains a cycle of length three, i.e.,
({a}, {b}), ({b}, {c}), ({c}, {a}) ∈ RF .
The following lemma characterizes WARP.
Lemma 1.1. F satisfies WARP if and only if for all X, Y ∈ A such that Y ⊆ X,
F (X) = F (Y ∪ F (X)).
6 CHAPTER 1: PREFERENCE AXIOMS FOR MULTI-VALUED CHOICE
Proof. Let F satisfy WARP and let X, Y ∈ A with Y ⊆ X. Suppose that
F (X) 6= F (Y ∪ F (X)). Since F (Y ∪ F (X)) ⊆ X, the definition of RF im-
plies (F (X), F (Y ∪ F (X))) ∈ RF ; and since F (X) ⊆ Y ∪ F (X), we simi-
larly obtain (F (Y ∪ F (X)), F (X)) ∈ RF . This violates WARP, and therefore,
F (X) = F (Y ∪ F (X)).
Next, let for all X ∈ A and all Y ⊆ X, F (X) = F (Y ∪ F (X)). Let distinct
V,W ∈ A such that (V,W ), (W,V ) ∈ RF . We derive a contradiction as follows.
Since (V,W ) ∈ RF , there exists Z ∈ A such that F (Z) = V andW ⊆ Z. Similarly,
since (W,V ) ∈ RF , there exists Z ′ ∈ A, such that F (Z ′) = W and V ⊆ Z ′.
Therefore, W ⊆ Z and V ⊆ Z ′ imply F (Z) = F (W ∪ F (Z)) = F (W ∪ V ) =
F (F (Z ′) ∪ V ) = F (Z ′); thus V = W , a contradiction.
An immediate consequence of Lemma 1.1 is that if F satisfies WARP then it
is a projection, a fact also established in Brand and Harrenstein (2011).
Corollary 1.1. Let F satisfy WARP. Then, for all X ∈ A, F 2(X) = F (X).
Proof. By Lemma 1.1, for all pairs X, Y ∈ A such that Y ⊆ X, F (X) = F (Y ∪
F (X)). Choosing Y = F (X) implies F 2(X) = F (X).
Notice that the reverse is not true, as illustrated in the following example.
Example 1.2. Let A = [0, 1] and define F as follows.
F (X) =
{1} if X = [0, 1]X otherwise.
Clearly F 2(X) = F (X). Next, consider sets [0, 1] and
[
1
2
, 1
]
. Since
[
1
2
, 1
] ⊆
[0, 1] and F ([0, 1]) = {1}, ({1} , [1
2
, 1
]) ∈ RF ; in addition, since {1} ⊆ [12 , 1] and
F
([
1
2
, 1
])
=
[
1
2
, 1
]
,
([
1
2
, 1
]
, {1}) ∈ RF . Therefore, F violates WARP. Note that a
similar example with a finite A can easily be constructed.
Brand and Harrenstein (2011) use the expression ‘set-rationalizablity’ instead
of WARP and show that this is equivalent to a set-valued version of Chernoff’s
condition, which we now define.
Condition αˆ. For all X, Y ∈ A, if F (X ∪Y ) ⊆ X ∩Y , then F (X ∪Y ) = F (X).
It follows that condition αˆ is equivalent to the condition in Lemma 1.1. This
is not hard to show directly, witnessing the following lemma, which together with
Lemma 1.1 provides an alternative proof of Theorem 2 in Brand and Harrenstein
(2011).
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Lemma 1.2. F satisfies condition αˆ if and only if for all X, Y ∈ A such that
Y ⊆ X, F (X) = F (Y ∪ F (X)).
Proof. Let F satisfy condition αˆ and X, Y ∈ A with Y ⊆ X. Let X ′ = X and
Y ′ = Y ∪ F (X). Then F (X ′ ∪ Y ′) = F (X) ⊆ X ′ ∩ Y ′ and condition αˆ imply
F (X ′ ∪ Y ′) = F (Y ′). Therefore, F (X) = F (Y ∪ F (X)).
Next, let X, Y ∈ A with F (X ∪ Y ) ⊆ X ∩ Y . In addition, let X ′ = X ∪ Y
and Y ′ = X \F (X ∪Y ). Then, assuming that for all X, Y ∈ A such that Y ⊆ X,
F (X) = F (Y ∪ F (X)), implies that F (X ∪ Y ) = F (X ′) = F (Y ′ ∪ F (X ′)) =
F ((X \ F (X ∪ Y )) ∪ F (X ∪ Y )) = F (X), where the last equality follows since
F (X ∪ Y ) ⊆ X ∩ Y ⊆ X. Therefore, condition αˆ is satisfied.
1.2.3 Weak independence of irrelevant alternatives
The next property requires, for each set X and for every subset of X that has a
nonempty intersection with F (X), only alternatives from F (X) to be chosen.
Weak independence of irrelevant alternatives (WIIA). For all X, Y ∈ A
such that Y ⊆ X, if F (X) ∩ Y 6= ∅, then F (Y ) ⊆ F (X).
Example 1.3 below shows that WIIA does not imply WARP. The reverse does
not hold either, as shown in Example 1.4 that follows.
Example 1.3. Let A = N and define F by
F (X) =
X if |X| = 1 or X is infiniteX \ {max(X)} if 1 < |X| <∞.
Let Y ⊆ X such that F (X) ∩ Y 6= ∅. If X is infinite, then trivially F (Y ) ⊆
X = F (X). If X is finite and |Y | = 1, then F (Y ) = Y ∩ F (X) = Y . Otherwise,
F (Y ) ⊆ Y ∩ F (X). Hence, F satisfies WIIA. However, let X = {1, 2, 3} and
Y = {1, 2}. Then F (X) = {1, 2} implies ({1, 2}, {1}) ∈ RF , while F (Y ) = {1}
implies ({1}, {1, 2}) ∈ RF . Hence, F does not satisfy WARP. Note that these
statements also hold for finite A = {1, 2, . . . , n} with n ≥ 3.
Example 1.4. Let A = [0, 1] and define F by
F (X) =
X \ {0} if X ⊆ [0, 1] with X ∩ (12 , 1] 6= ∅X otherwise.
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Then F ([0, 1]) = (0, 1] whereas F ([0, 1
2
]) = [0, 1
2
]; hence, F does not satisfy WIIA.
By using Lemma 1.1 it is straightforward that F satisfies WARP. The example
can be easily adapted to a finite A.
Thus, there is no direct logical relation between WIIA and WARP. However,
if F satisfies WIIA then the restriction of RF to singletons has no cycles of length
two. This is not surprising since WIIA reduces to the classical IIA for single-valued
choice correspondences. For completeness, we provide the simple proof. Let rF
denote this restriction, i.e., ({x}, {y}) ∈ rF for distinct x, y ∈ A if there is Z ⊆ A
such that F (Z) = {x} and y ∈ Z.
Lemma 1.3. Let F satisfy WIIA. Then rF has no cycles of length two.
Proof. Let distinct {x}, {y} ∈ A and assume that ({x}, {y}) ∈ rF and ({y}, {x}) ∈
rF to derive a contradiction. Since ({x}, {y}) ∈ rF , there exists X ∈ A such
that F (X) = {x} and y ∈ X. Similarly, there exists Y ∈ A such that x ∈ Y
and F (Y ) = {y}. Since {x, y} ⊆ X and F (X) ∩ {x, y} 6= ∅, WIIA implies
F (x, y) ⊆ F (X) ∩ {x, y} = {x}; hence, F (x, y) = {x}. Similarly, one obtains
F (x, y) = {y}. Since x 6= y this is a contradiction.
If we add the condition that F be a projection, i.e. F 2 = F , then WIIA implies
WARP.
Lemma 1.4. Let F satisfy WIIA and F 2 = F . Then, F satisfies WARP.
Proof. Let X, Y, Z, Z ′ ∈ A such that X, Y ⊆ Z, X, Y ⊆ Z ′, F (Z) = X, and
F (Z ′) = Y . By WIIA we have both F (X ∪ Y ) ⊆ F (Z ′) = Y and F (X ∪ Y ) ⊆
F (Z) = X, so that F (X ∪ Y ) ⊆ X ∩ Y . This implies X ∩ Y = F (Z) ∩ F (Z ′) 6=
∅. Hence, by Lemma 1.11, F (Z) ∪ F (Z ′) = F (F (Z) ∪ F (Z ′)), and therefore
X ∪ Y = F (X ∪ Y ) ⊆ X ∩ Y , which implies X = Y . We conclude that F satisfies
WARP.
The converse of Lemma 1.4 does not hold. If F satisfies WARP then by
Corollary 1.1 it is a projection, but Example 1.4 shows that WIIA does not have
to hold.
The following result shows that if F satisfies WIIA, then so does every n-fold
composition of F with itself. It will be useful later on.
Lemma 1.5. Let F satisfy WIIA and let n ∈ N with n ≥ 2. Then F n satisfies
WIIA.
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Proof. The proof is based on induction: F 1 = F satisfies WIIA, and assume that
F k satisfies WIIA for every k = 2, . . . , n − 1. Let X, Y ∈ A with Y ⊆ X and
F n(X) ∩ Y 6= ∅. We have to show that F n(Y ) ⊆ F n(X).
Note that for every k ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1}, F k(X) ∩ Y 6= ∅ and the induction
assumption imply that F k(Y ) ⊆ F k(X) and thus, that
F `(X) ∩ Fm(Y ) 6= ∅ for all `,m ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1}. (1.1)
We now first prove that
F n(X) ∩ F k(Y ) 6= ∅ for every k = 0, . . . , n− 1 (1.2)
where F 0(Y ) = Y . The proof of (1.2) is by induction. By assumption, F n(X) ∩
F 0(Y ) = F n(X)∩Y 6= ∅. Let 1 ≤ ` ≤ n− 1 and assume that F n(X)∩F k(Y ) 6= ∅
for every k = 1, . . . , ` − 1. We show that F n(X) ∩ F `(Y ) 6= ∅. First, since
∅ 6= F n−1(X)∩F `−1(Y ) ⊆ F n−1(X) by (1.1), and F n(X)∩(F n−1(X)∩F `−1(Y )) =
F n(X)∩F `−1(Y ) 6= ∅ by the induction assumption for this part, WIIA of F implies
F (F n−1(X) ∩ F `−1(Y )) ⊆ F n(X). (1.3)
Second, since ∅ 6= F n−1(X)∩F `−1(Y ) ⊆ F `−1(Y ) by (1.1), and F `(Y )∩(F n−1(X)∩
F `−1(Y )) = F `(Y ) ∩ F n−1(X) 6= ∅ by (1.1), WIIA of F implies
F (F n−1(X) ∩ F `−1(Y )) ⊆ F `(Y ). (1.4)
By (1.3) and (1.4), F n(X) ∩ F `(Y ) 6= ∅, which completes the proof of (1.2).
Now, since F n−1(X) ∩ Y 6= ∅, the assumed WIIA of F n−1 implies F n−1(Y ) ⊆
F n−1(X). Since by (1.2) we have F n(X) ∩ F n−1(Y ) 6= ∅, WIIA of F implies
F n(Y ) ⊆ F n(X). This completes the proof of the lemma.
If A is finite, then there exists n ∈ N such that F ` = F n for all ` ≥ n. In
this case, Lemma 1.5 implies that if F satisfies WIIA, then so does F n. If A is
infinite, such an n does not necessarily exist. However, we may define F∞ by
F∞(X) = ∩n∈NF n(X) for every X ∈ A, assuming that this set is nonempty for
every X ∈ A. The following example shows that this condition is not necessarily
satisfied if F satisfies WIIA.
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Example 1.5. Let A = [0, 1] and for every X ∈ A, let x be the maximal number
in N ∪ {0} such that X ⊆ [0, 1
2x
]. We define F by
F (X) =
X \ ( 12x+1 , 12x ] if X \ ( 12x+1 , 12x ] 6= ∅X otherwise.
It is easy to check that F satisfies WIIA. However, ∩n∈NF n(A \ {0}) =
∩n∈N(0, 12n ] = ∅.
Remark 1.1. If F satisfies WIIA and F∞ is well defined, then it follows from
Lemma 1.5 that F∞ satisfies WIIA.
1.2.4 Independence of irrelevant alternatives
The next property was first proposed by Nash (cf. Shubik, 1982), and also appears
in Chernoff (1954) and Arrow (1959).
Independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA). For all X, Y ∈ A such that
Y ⊆ X, if F (X) ∩ Y 6= ∅, then F (Y ) = F (X) ∩ Y .
For single-valued choice, IIA is equivalent to WARP as long as the domain of
choice sets is closed under intersection, more precisely, if every nonempty intersec-
tion is in the domain. In the present context, this is no longer true: IIA implies
WARP, as shown by the lemma below, but not the other way around, as shown
by the example that follows.
Lemma 1.6. Let F satisfy IIA. Then F satisfies WARP.
Proof. Let X, Y ∈ A such that (X, Y ) ∈ RF . Then there is Z ∈ A such that
F (Z) = X and Y ⊆ Z. We have to show that (Y,X) /∈ RF . This is true if
F (V ) = Y for no V ∈ A with X ⊆ V . Now suppose F (V ) = Y for some V ∈ A
with X ⊆ V . If X ⊆ V then by IIA applied to Z ∩V we have both F (Z ∩V ) = X
and F (Z ∩ V ) = Y , an impossibility since X 6= Y . Therefore, X 6⊆ V , which
completes the proof.
Example 1.6. Let A = {a, b, c} and define F by
F (X) =

{a} if X ∈ {{a, b}, {a, c}}
{b} if X = {b, c}
X otherwise.
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It can be easily checked that F satisfies WARP. However, since {a, b} ⊆ {a, b, c}
and {a, b} ∩ F ({a, b, c}) 6= ∅, it follows that F ({a, b}) = {a} violates IIA. By
partitioning a set in three nonempty subsets, the example can be easily adapted
to an infinite A.
In order to obtain a characterization of IIA we introduce the following condition
on the revealed preference relation of a choice correspondence: if X is revealed
preferred to Y , then every subset of X that includes all alternatives in X ∩ Y , is
also revealed preferred to Y .
Preference Axiom (PA) For all distinct X, Y, Z ∈ A such that X ∩ Y ⊆
Z ⊆ X, if (X, Y ) ∈ RF , then (Z, Y ) ∈ RF .
This axiom can be interpreted as expressing that what really makes X (re-
vealed) preferred to Y is the intersection of X and Y . Indeed, the axiom implies
that if X is preferred to Y then X ∩ Y , if nonempty, is preferred to Y .
We have the following characterization of IIA.
Theorem 1.1. F satisfies IIA if and only if it satisfies WARP and PA.
Proof. (only if part) Let F satisfy IIA. Then F satisfies WARP by Lemma 1.6. We
show that F satisfies PA. Let distinct X, Y, Z ∈ A such that X ∩Y ⊆ Z ⊆ X and
(X, Y ) ∈ RF . By IIA of F and (X, Y ) ∈ RF , F (X∪Y ) = X. Since Z∪Y ⊆ X∪Y
and F (X ∪ Y ) ∩ (Z ∪ Y ) = X ∩ (Z ∪ Y ) = (X ∩ Z) ∪ (X ∩ Y ) = Z 6= ∅, IIA of F
implies F (Z ∪ Y ) = Z. Therefore, (Z, Y ) ∈ RF .
(if part) Let F satisfy WARP and PA. We show that F satisfies IIA. Let
X, Y ∈ A with Y ⊆ X and F (X)∩Y 6= ∅. Suppose that F (Y ) 6= F (X)∩Y . Since
F (Y ) ⊆ Y ⊆ X, it follows that (F (X), F (Y )) ∈ RF . In addition, (F (X)∩F (Y )) ⊆
(F (X)∩Y ) ⊆ F (X), so that by PA, (F (X)∩Y, F (Y )) ∈ RF . But also, F (Y ) ⊆ Y
and F (X)∩Y ⊆ Y imply (F (Y ), F (X)∩Y ) ∈ RF . This violates WARP; therefore
F (Y ) = F (X) ∩ Y . Thus, F satisfies IIA.
In Example 1.6, F satisfies WARP but not IIA. Hence it follows from Theorem
1.1 that F does not satisfy PA either. This can also be easily established directly.
E.g., let X = {a, b, c}, Y = {b}, and Z = {a, b}, then (X, Y ) ∈ RF but (Z, Y ) /∈
RF .
The next example shows that PA does not imply IIA or WARP.
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Example 1.7. Let A = {a, b, c, d} and define F by
F (X) =

{a, b} if X = {a, b, c, d}
{a} if X ( {a, b, c, d} and a ∈ X
{b} if X ⊆ {b, c, d} and b ∈ X
{c} if X ⊆ {c, d} and c ∈ X
{d} if X = {d}.
It is straightforward to show that F satisfies PA. Since {a, b} ⊆ {a, b, c, d}, {a, b}∩
F ({a, b, c, d}) 6= ∅, and F ({a, b}) = {a}, it follows that F does not satisfy IIA and
by Theorem 1.1, it also does not satisfy WARP.
In Section 1.2.3 we have already seen that WIIA and WARP are logically
independent. The same is true for WIIA and PA since in Example 1.3, F satisfies
WIIA but not PA. The following example shows that PA does not imply WIIA.
Example 1.8. Let A = {a, b, c} and define F by
F (X) =
{a} if X = AX otherwise.
In this case, F does not satisfy WIIA since F ({a, b}) = {a, b} 6⊆ {a} = F (A) ∩
{a, b}. To show that F satisfies PA, let X, Y, Z as in the statement of PA and
V ∈ A such that F (V ) = X and Y ⊆ V . If |X| = 1 then either V = X and then
Z = X = Y , a contradiction since Z 6= Y ; or V = A, which implies X = {a} and
therefore Z = {a} = X, so that (Z, Y ) ∈ RF . If |X| = 2, then V = X and Y ⊆ X
with |Y | = 1; this implies Z = X and thus (Z, Y ) ∈ RF .
Theorem 1.2. Let F satisfy IIA. Then RF is transitive and acyclic.
Proof. By Theorem 1.1, F satisfies WARP. It is sufficient to prove that RF is
transitive, since with WARP this implies acyclicity. Let distinct X1, X2, X3 ∈ A
with (X1, X2), (X2, X3) ∈ RF . We prove that (X1, X3) ∈ RF . Let Z = X1 ∪X2 ∪
X3. We consider two cases for F (Z).
If F (Z)∩X3 = ∅ then F (Z) ⊆ X1 ∪X2. If F (Z) 6= X1 then (F (Z), X1) ∈ RF .
On the other hand, since (X1, X2) ∈ RF there is Z1 ∈ A such that F (Z1) = X1
whereas X2 ⊆ Z1; in particular, this implies (X1, F (Z)) ∈ RF , so that WARP is
violated. Hence, in this case, F (Z) = X1 and therefore (X1, X3) ∈ RF .
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If F (Z)∩X3 6= ∅ then F (X2 ∪X3) = F (Z)∩ (X2 ∪X3) by IIA, hence F (X2 ∪
X3) ∩ X3 6= ∅. This implies (F (X2 ∪ X3), X2) ∈ RF . On the other hand, by a
similar argument as in the first case, (X2, X3) ∈ RF implies (X2, F (X2∪X3)) ∈ RF ,
violating WARP. Hence, in this case, (X1, X3) ∈ RF , which concludes the proof
of the theorem.
For (single-valued) choice functions on a domain that is closed under nonempty
intersection, IIA and WARP are equivalent, but do not necessarily imply acyclic-
ity of the revealed preference relation (e.g., Gale, 1960; Peters and Wakker, 1994).3
In our case, IIA is stronger than WARP (cf. Theorem 1.1), and implies transitivity
and acyclicity of the revealed preference relation.
The converse of Theorem 1.2 does not hold: the revealed preference relation
RF of the choice correspondence F in Example 1.7 is transitive and acyclic, but
F does not satisfy IIA.
1.3 Weak and strong sets
In this section we introduce two collections of choice sets in relation to a given
choice correspondence. We will show, in this section and the next one, that these
collections are relevant for choice correspondences satisfying WIIA and IIA, re-
spectively.
1.3.1 Weak sets
A set S ∈ A is a weak set if the following holds. For all sets where some alternatives
of S are chosen, only alternatives of S are chosen; and in addition, if all alternatives
of S are available, then all alternatives of S are chosen.
Weak sets. S ∈ A is a weak set at F if for all X ∈ A for which F (X) ∩ S 6= ∅,
we have:
(i) F (X) ⊆ S
(ii) if S ⊆ X, then F (X) = S.
The set of weak sets at F is denoted by SF . By RSF = {(X, Y ) ∈ RF | X, Y ∈ SF}
we denote the restriction of RF to SF .
We show below that the elements of SF are pairwise disjoint and then, in
Lemma 1.8 which follows, that RSF behaves well if F satisfies WIIA.
3That is, they do not necessarily imply that F satisfies the so-called Strong Axiom of Revealed
Preference.
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Lemma 1.7. Let distinct S, T ∈ SF . Then, S ∩ T = ∅.
Proof. Let Z = S ∪ T . Without loss of generality assume that F (Z) ∩ S 6= ∅.
Then S ∈ SF and S ⊆ Z imply F (Z) = S. If S∩T 6= ∅, then F (Z)∩T 6= ∅; hence
T ∈ SF and T ⊆ Z imply F (Z) = T = S. This contradicts S 6= T . Consequently,
S ∩ T = ∅.
Lemma 1.8. Let F satisfy WIIA. Then RSF is complete and acyclic.
Proof. Let S, T ∈ SF with S 6= T . By the definition of SF , F (S ∪ T ) ∈ {S, T};
hence, RSF is complete. Without loss of generality assume that F (S ∪ T ) = S.
We show that (T, S) /∈ RSF , which implies that RSF has no cycles of length 2. To
show this, let Z ∈ A with S ∪ T ⊆ Z. If (S ∪ T ) ∩ F (Z) 6= ∅, then by WIIA,
S = F (S ∪T ) ⊆ (S ∪T )∩F (Z). Since S ∈ SF , this implies that F (Z) = S. Since
Z was arbitrary, we have (T, S) /∈ RSF .
In order to show that RSF has also no cycles of length larger than 2, let n ≥ 2
and S0, . . . , Sn ∈ SF with (Si, Si+1) ∈ RSF for each i = 0, . . . , n−1. Since RSF has
no cycles of length 2, it is sufficient to show that (S0, Sn) ∈ RSF . Since Si ∈ SF
for every i = 0, . . . , n, we have F (∪ni=0Si) = Sj for some j ∈ {0, . . . , n}. If j 6= 0,
then (Sj−1, Sj), (Sj, Sj−1) ∈ RSF , so that we have a cycle of length 2. Hence,
j = 0, which implies in particular (S0, Sn) ∈ RSF .
1.3.2 Strong sets
A set S ∈ A is a strong set (of alternatives) if the following holds. For all sets
where some alternatives of S are chosen, all the available alternatives of S are
chosen, and only these.
Strong sets. S ∈ A is a strong set at F if for all X ∈ A for which F (X)∩S 6= ∅,
we have F (X) = S ∩ X. The set of strong sets induced by F is denoted by S˜F .
By RS˜F = {(X, Y ) ∈ RF | X, Y ∈ S˜F} we denote the restriction of RF to S˜F .
Since, clearly, S˜F ⊆ SF , Lemmas 1.7 and 1.8 also hold for the set of strong
sets. For easy reference we formulate the following lemma.
Lemma 1.9. The elements of S˜F are pairwise disjoint, and RS˜F is complete and
acyclic.
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1.4 Partitions induced by WIIA and IIA
In this section we discuss partitions of the set of alternatives related to WIIA
and IIA of a choice correspondence. These are the sets of weak and strong sets
introduced in the preceding section.
1.4.1 Weak sets and WIIA
Before proceeding with our main result, we first present to lemmas that are used
in its proof. Specifically, given a choice correspondence F , Lemma 1.10 shows
some consequences for sets of choice sets (i.e., some Z ⊆ A) with common chosen
alternatives in all these choice sets, if WIIA or IIA are satisfied by F . Then,
Lemma 1.11 strengthens this result in the case where F 2 = F .
Lemma 1.10. Let F be a choice correspondence and ∅ 6= Z ⊆ A such that
∩Z∈ZF (Z) 6= ∅. Then the following statements hold:
(i) If F satisfies WIIA then ∪Z∈ZF (Z) ⊆ F (∪Z∈ZZ).
(ii) If F satisfies IIA then ∪Z∈ZF (Z) = F (∪Z∈ZZ).
Proof. (i) Let x ∈ ∩Z∈ZF (Z). Since F (∪Z∈ZZ) ⊆ ∪Z∈ZZ, there is Z ′ ∈ Z
such that Z ′ ∩ F (∪Z∈ZZ) 6= ∅, so that F (Z ′) ⊆ F (∪Z∈ZZ) by WIIA. Hence,
x ∈ F (∪Z∈ZZ), so that Z ′ ∩ F (∪Z∈ZZ) 6= ∅ for all Z ′ ∈ Z, and hence F (Z ′) ⊆
F (∪Z∈ZZ) for all Z ′ ∈ Z by WIIA. This proves part (i).
(ii) Let F satisfy IIA. Using similar arguments as in part (i) now implies that
F (Z ′) = F (∪Z∈ZZ) ∩ Z ′ for all Z ′ ∈ Z by IIA. This proves part (ii).
Lemma 1.11. Let F be a choice correspondence satisfying WIIA and F 2 = F .
Let ∅ 6= Z ⊆ A such that ∩Z∈ZF (Z) 6= ∅. Then ∪Z∈ZF (Z) = F (∪Z∈ZF (Z)).
Proof. Let x ∈ ∩Z∈ZF (Z). We first show that x ∈ F (∪Z∈ZF (Z)). Since
F (∪Z∈ZF (Z)) ⊆ ∪Z∈ZF (Z), there is a Z ′ ∈ Z such that F (Z ′)∩F (∪Z∈ZF (Z)) 6=
∅. Then WIIA and F 2 = F imply x ∈ F (Z ′) = F 2(Z ′) ⊆ F (∪Z∈ZF (Z)).
Since, thus, x ∈ F (∪Z∈ZF (Z)) it follows that F (Z ′) ∩ F (∪Z∈ZF (Z)) 6= ∅ for
all Z ′ ∈ Z and hence by WIIA and F 2 = F that F (Z ′) = F 2(Z ′) ⊆ F (∪Z∈ZF (Z))
for all Z ′ ∈ Z. Hence, ∪Z∈ZF (Z) ⊆ F (∪Z∈ZF (Z)).
Our main result follows.
Theorem 1.3. Let F satisfy WIIA and let F = F 2. Then SF is a partition of A
and RSF is complete and acyclic.
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Proof. Let x ∈ A. In view of Lemmas 1.7 and 1.8 we only still have to prove
that there is an S ∈ SF such that x ∈ S. Define Z = {Z ∈ A | x ∈ F (Z)} and
S = ∪Z∈ZF (Z). It is sufficient to prove that S ∈ SF . To this end, let X ∈ A such
that F (X) ∩ S 6= ∅. This implies, in particular, that there is Z ′ ∈ Z such that
F (X)∩F (Z ′) 6= ∅. By Lemma 1.10(i) we obtain F (X)∪F (Z ′) ⊆ F (X∪Z ′), which
implies x ∈ F (X ∪Z ′) and therefore X ∪Z ′ ∈ Z. Hence F (X) ⊆ F (X ∪Z ′) ⊆ S.
Finally, assume additionally that S ⊆ X. We show that F (X) = S, which then
completes the proof. By Lemma 1.11, S = ∪Z∈ZF (Z) = F (∪Z∈ZF (Z)) = F (S).
Since S ⊆ X and F (X) ∩ S 6= ∅, WIIA implies F (S) ⊆ F (X) and therefore
S ⊆ F (X). Together with F (X) ⊆ S, this implies F (X) = S.
Theorem 1.3 thus states that a WIIA choice correspondence that is, moreover,
a projection, induces a partition of the set of alternatives such that the alternatives
assigned to every choice set lie in exactly one element of this partition. Moreover,
if the choice set contains that partition element, then that element is assigned
completely.
However, the converse of this result does not hold. Example 1.10 exhibits a
projection F , where SF is a partition of A and RSF is complete and acyclic, that
violates WIIA.
Two particular applications that follows from Theorem 1.3 are collected in the
following corollary.
Corollary 1.2. Let F satisfy WIIA.
(i) If A is finite and m = |A| − 1, then SFm is a partition of A and RSFm is
complete and acyclic.
(ii) If F∞ is well-defined and F∞ = F∞ ◦ F∞, then SF∞ is a partition of A
and RSF∞ is complete and acyclic.
Proof. Statement (i) follows from Lemma 1.5 and Theorem 1.3. Statement (ii)
follows from Remark 1.1 and Theorem 1.3.
The condition in Corollary 1.2(ii) that F∞ is a projection is not redundant as
is illustrated by the following example.
Example 1.9. Let A = {−1, 0} ∪ { 1
2n
| n ∈ N}. Define F by
F (X) =
X \ {max{x : x ∈ X}} if |X| > 1X otherwise.
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Then F∞ is well-defined, and both F and F∞ satisfy WIIA. Since F∞(A) =
{−1, 0} and F∞({−1, 0}) = {−1}, we have F∞ ◦ F∞(A) = {−1} 6= F∞(A).
Hence, F∞ ◦ F∞ 6= F∞.
The following lemma concludes our study of WIIA in this chapter.
Lemma 1.12.
(i) For finite A, let F be a projection and satisfy WIIA, S0 = ∅, and Si =
F (A \ ∪i−1k=0Sk). Then, SF = {S1, . . . , S`} and (Sj, Si) ∈ RSF whenever j < i.
(ii) For general A, let T be a partition of A completely and acyclically ordered
by R, and suppose moreover that for every X ∈ A, the collection {S ∈ T | S∩X 6=
∅} has a maximal element SX according to R. Then, there exists a (not necessarily
unique) projection F satisfying WIIA, where SF = T and RSF = R.
Proof. We prove statement (i) as follows: we first propose a partition T of A, then
we show that SF = T , and finally we show that RSF is complete and acyclic. The
proof of statement (ii) is much simpler.
(i) Since A is finite and for all X ∈ A, F (X) ⊆ X and F (X) 6= ∅, there exists
a (finite) integer `, where S` = F (A\∪`−1k=0Sk) = A\∪`−1k=0Sk. Let T = {S1, . . . , S`};
it follows that T partitions A.
Next, since T partitions A, for all X ∈ A, there exists kˆ ∈ {1, . . . , `} such that
X ⊆ A \ ∪kˆ−1k=0Sk and X ∩ Skˆ 6= ∅; hence, WIIA implies F (X) ⊆ Skˆ. Moreover,
notice that F being a projection implies F (Skˆ) = Skˆ; hence, if in addition Skˆ ⊆ X,
then it follows by WIIA that F (X) = Skˆ. Therefore, SF = T .
Finally, since j < i ≤ ` implies that Sj = F (A \ ∪j−1k=0Sk) and Si ⊆ A \ ∪i−1k=0Sk,
it follows that (Sj, Si) ∈ RF which completes the proof.
(ii) Define F such that for all X ∈ A, F (X) = X ∩ SX . It is easy to verify
that F is a projection and satisfies WIIA (in fact it satisfies IIA). Moreover, it is
clear that SF = T and RSF = R.
1.4.2 Strong sets and IIA
The analogue of Theorem 1.3 is the following.
Theorem 1.4. Let F satisfy IIA. Then S˜F is a partition of A and RS˜F is complete
and acyclic.
Proof. Let x ∈ A. In view of Lemma 1.9 we only still have to prove that there is
an S ∈ S˜F such that x ∈ S. Define Z = {Z ∈ A | x ∈ F (Z)} and S = F (∪Z∈ZZ).
By Lemma 1.10(ii) we have S = ∪Z∈ZF (Z) 3 x, so that it is sufficient to prove
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that S ∈ S˜F . To this end, let X ∈ A such that F (X)∩ S 6= ∅, then it is sufficient
to prove that F (X) = S ∩X.
Since F (X)∩S 6= ∅, Lemma 1.10(ii) implies F (X)∪S = F (X)∪F (∪Z∈ZZ) =
F (X ∪ (∪Z∈ZZ)). In particular, this implies that F (X ∪ (∪Z∈ZZ)) ∩ X 6= ∅
so that by IIA we obtain F (X) = F (X ∪ (∪Z∈ZZ)) ∩ X. Thus, it follows that
F (X) = (F (X) ∪ S) ∩X = F (X) ∪ (S ∩X). Hence, F (X) ⊇ S ∩X. Therefore,
it is sufficient to prove that F (X) ⊆ S ∩X.
By Lemma 1.10(ii), F (X) ∩ S 6= ∅ implies F (X) ∩ (∪Z∈ZF (Z)) 6= ∅. Hence,
for some Z ′ ∈ Z, F (X) ∩ F (Z ′) 6= ∅. Thus, by Lemma 1.10(ii), F (X ∪ Z ′) =
F (X) ∪ F (Z ′). It follows that x ∈ F (X ∪ Z ′) and thus, X ∪ Z ′ ∈ Z. In addition,
since S = ∪Z∈ZF (Z), F (X ∪ Z ′) ⊆ S, and hence, F (X) ∪ F (Z ′) ⊆ S. Therefore,
F (X) ⊆ S and trivially, F (X) ⊆ S ∩X.
Remark 1.2. For finite A, if F satisfies IIA, then the set of strong sets S˜F can
be computed analogously as in Lemma 1.12(i). Conversely, for general A, let T
be a partition of A completely and acyclically ordered by R. Suppose moreover
that for every X ∈ A, the collection {S ∈ T | S ∩X 6= ∅} has a maximal element
SX according to R. Then, it is easy to verify that F (X) = X ∩ SX defines an
IIA choice correspondence with S˜F = T as the set of strong sets with ordering
RS˜F = R. The uniqueness of F can be shown easily by contradiction: assuming
that for some Y ∈ A, F (Y ) 6= Y ∩ SY , either implies that F violates IIA, or that
F (SY ) 6= SY and thus that SY 6∈ S˜F .
The logical converses of Theorems 1.3 and 1.4 do not hold. The following
example describes a projection F of which the sets of weak and strong sets coincide,
are a partition of A, and are completely and acyclically ordered by RF , but which
does not satisfy WIIA.
Example 1.10. Let F (A) ( A and for all X ∈ A define F by
F (X) =

F (A) if F (A) ⊆ X
X if X ⊆ F (A)
X \ F (A) otherwise.
It is straightforward to verify that F is a projection and SF = S˜F = {F (A), A \
F (A)}, which is a partition of A. Also, RSF = {(F (A), A \ F (A))} (in fact, it is
not difficult to show that F satisfies WARP). Let X, Y ∈ A such that F (A) ⊆ X,
Y ⊆ X, Y 6⊆ F (A), F (A) 6⊆ Y , and Y ∩ F (A) 6= ∅. Then F (X) = F (A) but
F (Y ) = Y \ F (A) 6⊆ Y ∩ F (A) = Y ∩ F (X). Hence, F does not satisfy WIIA.
1.5. SUMMARY 19
1.5 Summary
In this chapter we have established connections between the conditions of WARP,
IIA, and WIIA for choice correspondences and their relations with the collections
of weak and strong sets. The main results are summarized in Table 1.1 below.
WARP
Corollary 1.1
=⇒ F 2 = F
WIIA & F2 = F v
Lemma 1.4
=⇒ WARP
Theorem 1.3
=⇒ SF is a partition, RSF is complete and acyclic
IIA
Theorem 1.1⇐⇒ WARP & PA
Theorem 1.2
=⇒ RF is transitive and acyclic
Table 1.1: Summary of main results
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Chapter 2
Solidarity for public goods under single-
peaked preferences: Characterizing tar-
get set correspondences
Abstract
We consider the problem of choosing a set of locations of a public good on the real line
R. Similarly to Klaus and Storcken (2002), we ordinally extend the agents’ preferences
over compact subsets of R, and extend the results of Ching and Thomson (1996), Vohra
(1999), and Klaus (2001) to choice correspondences. Specifically, we show that efficiency
and either population-monotonicity or one-sided replacement-dominance characterize
the class of target set correspondences on the domains of single-peaked preferences and
symmetric single-peaked preferences.
2.1 Introduction
We study the social choice problem where a non-empty and compact set (of points)
is chosen on the real line R. We consider this (chosen) set to represent a public
good such that each point in the set represents an option for the public good
together with its location. We assume that agents have single-peaked preferences,
that is, an agent’s welfare is strictly increasing up to a certain point, his “peak”,
and is strictly decreasing beyond this point. Given a non-empty and compact set
(of points) that represents the public good’s options and their locations, an agent
-although in good knowledge of all options and their respective locations- is unable
to compute his chance of obtaining the public good at a particular location, e.g., in
the case of parking spaces along a street, an agent knows that he will (eventually)
find a parking spot somewhere along the street but he does not know where this
will be. According to the literature, we should say that the agent needs to make
a decision under ignorance (Peterson, 2009, p. 40). We therefore assume that
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agents, when comparing sets, only consider their best (most favorite) point(s) and
their worst (least favorite) point(s) in each set. Finally, we assume that the set
has adequate capacity to accommodate all agents, that is, all agents have access
to the public good but possibly at different locations.
More specifically, we look into the situation where the social planner wishes to
make a choice by providing the public good in a way that is efficient, according
to the agents’ preferences, and that satisfies some notion of solidarity between
agents towards changes in circumstances. Loosely speaking, solidarity requires
that all agents not responsible for the change should be affected in the same
direction. The changes in circumstances we study in this chapter are changes in the
agents’ population, by considering the property of population-monotonicity, and
changes in some agents’ preferences, by considering the property of replacement-
dominance. Population-monotonicity, introduced in the context of bargaining
(Thomson, 1983b,a), applies to a model with a variable population of agents and
requires that if additional agents join a population, then the agents who were
initially present should all be made at least as well off, as they were initially, or
they should all be made at most as well off. Replacement-dominance, introduced
in the context of quasi-linear binary public decision (Moulin, 1987), applies to a
model with a fixed population of agents and requires that if the preferences of an
agent change, then the other agents whose preferences remained unchanged should
all be made at least as well off, as they were initially, or they should all be made
at most as well off.
Further to the parking zone example, already briefly mentioned and further
explained in Section 3.2, another example of the described situation could be the
following. A social planner drafts an “if-needed” list of candidate locations to build
a public hospital according to the agents’ preferences. She does so in an effort to
narrow down future construction scenarios while at the same time respecting (in an
efficient sense) the agents’ preferences and adhering to some notion of solidarity,
as described above. Then, if at some future time the need to build a hospital
materializes, each location in this list is scrutinized and one of them is chosen for
the hospital to be built at, with this final verdict assumed unpredictable at the
time when the list is drafted.
Many more social choice problems can be phrased as problems of providing a
public good by choosing the location of it on the real line R or an interval of it, or
more generally, on a tree network,1 when agents have single-peaked preferences.
In these types of problems, it is very natural for changes in the population (e.g.,
1A tree network is a connected graph that contains no cycles.
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through a change in the birth or migration rate) or changes in the agents’ prefer-
ences (e.g., through the influence of public media or social networks) to arise.
Hence, the properties of population-monotonicity and replacement-dominance
have been studied, together or individually, in a variety of contexts. For the special
case where the tree network is a closed interval, the problem coincides with the
problem of providing a public good by choosing its level when agents have single-
peaked preferences (Moulin, 1980). Apart from the provision of public parking
or the provision of a hospital by choosing an “if-needed” list of locations, further
examples of providing a public good in one or more locations include the provision
of (one or more) schools, parks, or libraries on a tree network that represents an
infrastructure, e.g., the network of roads in a neighborhood.
For choice functions that assign a public good on an interval, or on a
tree network, the solidarity properties population-monotonicity and replacement-
dominance, have been considered. Specifically, for the location problem on
an interval (on a tree network), it was shown that efficiency and population-
monotonicity characterize the class of “target point functions” on the domain
of single-peaked preferences (Thomson, 1993; Ching and Thomson, 1996).2 and
for constant sets of agents efficiency and replacement-dominance characterize the
class of “target point functions” on the domains of single-peaked preferences and
symmetric single-peaked preferences (Vohra, 1999). Moreover, it turns out that
efficiency and population-monotonicity imply replacement-dominance and also,
that the former characterization also holds on the domain of symmetric single-
peaked preferences and on tree networks (Klaus, 2001). In addition, both afore-
mentioned characterizations hold under much looser assumptions on the set of
locations (alternatives) and the domain of preferences (Gordon, 2007a).3 Finally,
if the set of admissible preferences is constrained on attribute-based preference
domains,4 efficiency and either one of the two solidarity properties are only com-
patible on discrete trees, where equivalent characterizations are obtained (Gordon,
2015).
For the location problem on an interval, if the property of replacement-
2Each target point function is determined by its target point: if the target point is efficient, it
is chosen; if it is not efficient, the closest efficient point is chosen. Such functions are sometimes
called status quo rules or status quo solutions.
3The critical assumptions are: (i) the set of alternatives is fixed, (ii) the agents’ preferences
are defined over all alternatives, and (iii) the domain of preferences is common to all agents.
4Given a finite set of alternatives A, the non-empty and finite family of subsets H ⊆ 2A is an
attribute space if [for each attribute H ∈ H, H 6= ∅ and the complement HC ∈ H] and [for each
pair x, y ∈ A with x 6= y, there exists H ∈ H such that x ∈ H and y 6∈ H].
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dominance is weakened to -replacement-dominance5 the characterization of tar-
get point functions still holds for the domain of single-peaked preferences (Harless,
2015a). However, for the location problem on a circle when a constant set of agents
exists, no choice function satisfies efficiency and either replacement-dominance or
population-monotonicity on the domain of symmetric single-peaked preferences
(Gordon, 2007b).
Regarding choice correspondences, the case of providing a public good at ex-
actly two locations, when one or both of the aforementioned solidarity properties
are being considered, has been studied under different settings. On the domain
of single-peaked preferences and if the agents compare pairs of locations using
the max-extension,6 the following holds. For an interval in R and a constant
set of agents, the class of choice functions satisfying efficiency and replacement-
dominance are the “left-peaks choice function” and the “right-peaks choice func-
tion”7 (Miyagawa, 2001). However, if this model is extended to trees, then no
choice function satisfies efficiency and replacement-dominance on the symmetric
single-peaked domain (Umezawa, 2012).
For the problem of providing a public good at exactly two locations on an
interval, on the domain of single-peaked preferences and if agents compare pairs
of locations using the leximin-extension,8 the following two results have been ob-
tained that consider population-monotonicity or replacement-dominance. First,
for a constant set of agents the class of choice functions satisfying efficiency,
anonymity, and population-monotonicity is the class of “single-plateaued pref-
erence choice functions”9 (Ehlers, 2003); and second, in the same setting, the
class of choice functions satisfying efficiency and replacement-dominance is the
class of “single-peaked preference choice functions”10 (Ehlers, 2002).
5Agents’ solidarity is only required if the change in an agent’s preferences are below a certain
threshold.
6Under the max-extension, an agent prefers set X to set Y if and only if he prefers his best
point(s) in set X to his best point(s) in set Y .
7The left (right) peaks choice function chooses the two unique left-most (right-most) peaks.
8Under the leximin-extension, in the case of sets containing exactly two points, an agent
prefers set X to set Y if and only if he either [prefers his best point(s) in set X to his best
point(s) in set Y ] or [he is indifferent between his best point in set X and his best point in set
Y and prefers his second best point in set X to his second best point in set Y ].
9Each single-plateaued preference choice function is determined by fixed single-plateaued
preferences R and plateau [
¯
r, r¯]: if all the agents’ peaks lie outside of [
¯
r, r¯], then loosely speaking,
the best of the agents’ peaks and its indifferent point are chosen (according to R); otherwise,
the two locations in the convex hull of the agents’ peaks lying closest to
¯
r and r¯ respectively are
chosen.
10Each single-peaked preference choice function is essentially a single-plateaued preference
choice function determined by a fixed single-plateaued preference relation R with the plateau
being a point, i.e.,
¯
r = r¯.
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In the setting of preference aggregation problems, where agents strictly rank
a finite set of alternatives and a (not necessarily strict) social ranking over the
alternatives must be chosen, the aforementioned solidarity properties have also
been studied. It is shown that on the domain of strict rankings, efficiency and
population-monotonicity characterize the class of “strict status-quo functions”11
(Bossert and Sprumont, 2014). Moreover, in this result, population-monotonicity
can be substituted with adjacent replacement-dominance.12 Furthermore, if the
domain is enlarged to also include weak rankings, efficiency and either population-
monotonicity or adjacent replacement-dominance characterize the class of “status-
quo functions”13 (Harless, 2016).
Finally, in the binary social choice model (i.e., when there are exactly two
alternatives to choose from) and if agents can be indifferent between the two
alternatives, a choice function satisfies replacement-dominance or population-
monotonicity if and only if it is a “generalized mixed-consensus rule”14 (Harless,
2015b).
All the above mentioned work analyzes solidarity properties where at each
preference profile, either at most two alternatives are chosen or a ranking over
the alternatives is chosen. In this chapter we study a class of problems where
more than two alternatives might be chosen, which are viewed as locations to
provide a public good. This has been considered in a median voter context where
the standard choice function setup is extended to choice correspondences since
for an even number of agents or voters, a set of median voter locations exists,
hence choosing the median implies choosing a set of median points (Klaus and
Storcken, 2002). To capture the full spirit of this median voter result, Klaus and
Storcken (2002) considered choice correspondences. Our motivation for extending
11Each strict status-quo function is determined by a strict ranking R over the alternatives and
reaches a unique efficient strict ranking as follows: beginning from R it reverses the order of an
adjacently ranked pair of alternatives if all agents prefer the reverse to the initial ranking of the
pair.
12Adjacent replacement-dominance is weaker than replacement-dominance: solidarity is only
required when an agent reverses a single pair of adjacently ordered alternatives.
13Each status-quo function is determined by a ranking R¯ over the alternatives and reaches
a unique efficient ranking as follows: beginning from R¯ it reverses the order of an adjacently
ranked pair of single alternatives if all agents prefer the reverse to the initial ranking of the
pair. Moreover, it “creates” order in an indifference class (of alternatives) if all agents prefer
the alternative moved up in the order to the one (or more) alternatives moved down. Reversals
in the order between a single alternative and an indifference class or between two indifference
classes occur in a similar way.
14Each generalized mixed-consensus rule chooses for each profile either alternative a or alter-
native b. The only further requirement concerns cases where at least one agent prefers a over b
and at least one agent prefers b over a; specifically, either a is selected in all such cases or b is
selected in all such cases.
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choice from one or two locations to a set of locations is that we study situations
in which the public good is usually provided through “larger” sets of options, e.g.,
the assignment of neighborhood parking spots along a street.
On the domain of single-peaked preferences as well as the smaller domain
of symmetric single-peaked preferences, we show that the class of choice corre-
spondences satisfying efficiency and either one-sided replacement-dominance15 or
population-monotonicity, is the class of target set correspondences (Theorems 2.1
and 2.2). Each target set correspondence is determined by a target set [a, b]: if
this set is efficient, it is chosen; if it is not efficient, then its largest efficient subset
is chosen, if such a subset exists; otherwise, the closest efficient point to the target
set is chosen. We also show that efficiency and replacement-dominance character-
ize the sub-class of target set correspondences where a = b, i.e., we obtain the class
of target point functions (Corollary 2.3). Hence, we obtain corresponding results
with the literature (Thomson, 1993; Ching and Thomson, 1996; Vohra, 1999).
Our results are parallel to the case where the public good is provided via a
lottery over locations on an interval, and probabilistic target choice functions
are characterized on the basis of efficiency and either one-sided replacement-
dominance or population-monotonicity (Ehlers and Klaus, 2001).
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 explains the model and states
some preliminary results. Section 2.3 contains the definition of target set corre-
spondences. Section 2.4 contains the solidarity properties and further preliminary
results. Section 2.5 presents characterizations of target set correspondences.
2.2 The model
Denote the set of natural numbers by N. There is a grand population of “potential”
agents, indexed by P ⊆ N, where P contains at least 3 agents. We denote the class
of non-empty and finite subsets of P by P . A set of agents N ∈ P is called a
population.
Each agent i ∈ P is equipped with preferences Ri, defined on the real line
R, that are complete, transitive, and reflexive. As usual, x Ri y is interpreted
as “x is at least as desirable as y”, x Pi y as “x is preferred to y”, and x Ii y
as “x is indifferent to y”. Moreover, for preferences Ri there exists a number
p(Ri) ∈ R, called the peak (level) of agent i, with the following property: for each
15One-sided replacement-dominance is weaker than replacement-dominance: solidarity is not
required when the preferences of the agent with the unique smallest peak are changed such that
he becomes the agent with the unique largest peak, and vice-versa.
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pair x, y ∈ R such that either y < x ≤ p(Ri), or y > x ≥ p(Ri), we have x Pi y.
We call such preferences single-peaked. We denote the domain of all single-peaked
preferences on R by R. Preferences Ri are symmetric if for each pair x, y ∈ R,
|x − p(Ri)| = |y − p(Ri)| implies x Ii y. We denote the domain of all symmetric
single-peaked preferences on R by S.
For each population N ∈ P , we denote the set of (preference) profiles R =
(Ri)i∈N where for each i ∈ N , Ri ∈ R, by RN . Similarly, we denote the set of
profiles R = (Ri)i∈N , where for each i ∈ N , Ri ∈ S by SN . For each pair of
populations N,M ∈ P , with N ⊆ M , we denote the restriction (Ri)i∈N ∈ RN
of profile R ∈ RM to population N by RN . Given profile R ∈ RN , for each
pair i, j ∈ N we also use the notation R−i instead of RN\{i} and R−i,j instead of
RN\{i,j}.
In the sequel, all notation and definitions refer to single-peaked preferences but
also apply to symmetric single-peaked preferences.
Given N ∈ P and R ∈ RN , we denote the (set of) peaks in R as p(R) =
{p(Ri)}i∈N . Let the smallest peak in R be
¯
p(R) ≡ min {p(Ri)}i∈N and the largest
peak in R be p¯(R) ≡ max {p(Ri)}i∈N . Let the convex hull of the peaks in R be
Conv(p(R)) ≡ [
¯
p(R), p¯(R)].
Denote the class of non-empty and compact subsets of R by C.16 Given a set
X ∈ C, let the minimum (point) of X be
¯
X ≡ minX and the maximum (point)
of X be X¯ ≡ maxX. Given a set X ∈ C and preferences Ri ∈ R, let the set
of most preferred point(s) or best point(s) of agent i in set X be bX(Ri) ≡ {x ∈
X : for each y ∈ X, x Ri y}. Similarly, let the set of least preferred point(s) or
worst point(s) of agent i in set X be wX(Ri) ≡ {x ∈ X : for each y ∈ X, y Ri x}.
Note that by single-peakedness the set bX(Ri) might contain two elements (when
agent i’s peak is not included in set X); in this case, agent i is indifferent between
these two elements. Similarly, wX(Ri) ⊆ {
¯
X, X¯} and in the case where wX(Ri) =
{
¯
X, X¯} and
¯
X 6= X¯, agent i is again indifferent between these two elements.
Hence, with some abuse of notation, we treat sets bX(Ri) and wX(Ri) as if they
are points and for each x ∈ X, we write bX(Ri)Ri x Ri wX(Ri).
We will consider choice correspondences that assign outcomes in C with the
interpretation that any agent “knows the set of possible outcomes . . ., but has
no information about the probabilities of those outcomes or about their likelihood
ranking” (Bossert et al., 2000, p. 295). For a survey of criteria and methods
for ranking subsets of a set of outcomes under complete uncertainty we refer to
16As discussed in Remark 2.6, the requirement for sets in C to be compact is without loss of
generality.
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Barbera` et al. (2004, Section 3).
Before describing the extension of preferences over sets that we use, we first
introduce the properties of simple-monotonicity and independence that charac-
terize a small class of preference extensions over sets, albeit for a slightly different
model than ours (Bossert et al., 2000, Theorem 1). We first illustrate via two
examples why these properties are reasonable to assume in our model. Then, we
present the characterization result and finally, we discuss its consequences for our
model.
Note that below, we denote preferences defined over C by RCi (if x Pi y, then
{x} P Ci {y}).
Simple-monotonicity. Let x, y ∈ R. If x Pi y, then {x} P Ci {x, y} P Ci {y}.
Independence. Let X, Y ∈ C and z ∈ R such that z 6∈ X ∪ Y . If X P Ci Y , then
[X ∪ {z}]RCi [Y ∪ {z}].
Both examples that follow pertain to a linear city whose residents own one car
each and have single-peaked preferences over where to park.
Example 2.1 (Simple-monotonicity). All public parking is located in two
(parking) garages at x, y ∈ R, with x 6= y, that we simply refer to as zone x
and y. Neither garage’s capacity can accommodate all residents but the joint ca-
pacity is sufficient. Initially, a one-zone scheme is in place and all residents are
assigned to either zone x or zone y: residents assigned to zone x (zone y) are only
allowed to park at garage x (y), which has the capacity to accommodate them.
Later, a two-zone scheme is adopted: each resident can use either one of the two
garages. Consider a resident i of zone x who prefers x to y. Under the one-zone
scheme he always parks at x, while under the two-zone scheme he sometimes parks
at y (whenever x is full). We expect resident i to be worse off under the two-zone
scheme, that is, if x Pi y, then {x} P Ci {x, y} P Ci {y} and simple-monotonicity
holds.
Example 2.2 (Independence). Two single-zone street parking schemes, X ⊂ R
and Y ⊂ R, are being considered for adoption. Before a final decision is made,
and following a small development project on some previously unused land, an
extra single parking garage z ∈ R becomes available. Now assume that instead of
schemes X and Y , two new schemes are being considered for adoption, X ∪ {z}
and Y ∪ {z}. Suppose resident i initially prefers X to Y . Since space z was
unavailable under X and Y and is now available under both X ∪{z} and Y ∪{z},
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we expect i to find X ∪{z} at least as desirable as Y ∪{z}. That is, if z 6∈ X ∪Y ,
and X P Ci Y , then [X ∪ {z}]RCi [Y ∪ {z}] and independence holds.
The next result shows that if the two aforementioned properties are required,
an agent with linear preferences over outcomes17 only cares about his best and
worst points in each finite set.18
Bossert et al. (2000, Theorem 1). If simple-monotonicity and independence
are satisfied, then for agent i with linear preferences RLi , and each finite set X ∈ C,
X ICi {bX(RLi ), wX(RLi )}.
In light of this result, two “standard” extensions that could be considered for
our model are the min-max 19 and the max-min20 preference extensions, both of
which fit our parking example since they are “consistent with the notion of limited
rationality which is familiar in the theories of organization and bounded rationality
(e.g., March (1988); March and Simon (1958)), and which suggests that, given a
complex decision problem, the agent often seeks to simplify the problem by focusing
on only a few salient features of the complex situation” (Bossert et al., 2000, pp.
300-301). However, given the problem at hand, we prefer to “not choose sides”
by adopting either the “pessimistic” min-max extension or the “optimistic” max-
min extension. Instead, we opt for the best-worst extension of preferences that
declares a preference for a set X over a set Y if and only if this preference coincides
with the preference of both the min-max extension and the max-min extension.
Note however, as we discuss later, that this preference extension is incomplete.
Finally, it is straightforward to show that the best-worst extension satisfies, simple-
monotonicity and independence, not only when based on linear linear preferences
over outcomes but also in our setting of single-peaked preferences over outcomes
and sets of alternatives that are not always finite. In the sequel, and with a small
abuse of notation, we use the same symbols to denote preferences over points and
preferences over sets.
Specifically, under the best-worst extension of preferences over sets, when com-
paring two sets, an agent only considers his best and his worst point(s) in each
17A linear preference RL is a complete, transitive, reflexive, and antisymmetric (i.e., for each
x, y ∈ R, xIL y implies x = y) binary relation. Single-peaked preferences are not antisymmetric.
18A similar result using a stronger version of independence is shown in Barbera` et al. (1984).
19An agent prefers set X to set Y if and only if either [he prefers his worst point(s) in set X
to his worst point(s) in set Y ] or [he is indifferent between his worst point(s) in both sets and
prefers his best point(s) in set X to his best point(s) in set Y ].
20An agent prefers set X to set Y if and only if either [he prefers his best point(s) in set X to
his best point(s) in set Y ] or [he is indifferent between his best point(s) in both sets and prefers
his worst point(s) in set X to his worst point(s) in set Y ].
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of them. Given two sets X, Y ∈ C, an agent prefers X to Y if he prefers his best
point(s) in X to his best point(s) in Y and his worst point(s) in X to his worst
point(s) in Y . The following definition also covers three more cases arising if an
agent is indifferent between his best or worst point(s) in two sets.
Best-worst extension of preferences to sets. For each agent i ∈ P with
preferences Ri ∈ R and each pair of sets X, Y ∈ C, we have
X Ri Y if and only if

bX(Ri)Ri bY (Ri)
and
wX(Ri)Ri wY (Ri)
and
X Pi Y if and only if X Ri Y and

bX(Ri) Pi bY (Ri)
or
wX(Ri) Pi wY (Ri).
This extension of preferences is transitive, i.e., for each triple X, Y, Z ∈ C, if
X Ri Y and Y Ri Z, then X Ri Z. However, it is not complete: there exist sets
X, Y ∈ C such that neither X Ri Y nor Y RiX. To be more precise, we now make
the following definition.
Comparability. Sets X, Y ∈ C are comparable by agent i ∈ P with preferences
Ri ∈ R if and only if [bX(Ri)Pi bY (Ri) implies wX(Ri)RiwY (Ri)] and [wX(Ri)Pi
wY (Ri) implies bX(Ri)Ri bY (Ri)].
Regarding the best-worst extension of preferences over sets, we now de-
fine Pareto-efficiency, Pareto-dominance, and Pareto-equivalence, henceforth, ef-
ficiency, dominance, and equivalence respectively.
Efficiency (of sets). Let N ∈ P and R ∈ RN . Set X ∈ C is efficient if and only
if there is no set Y ∈ C such that for each i ∈ N , Y Ri X, and for at least one
j ∈ N , Y Pj X. We denote the class containing all efficient sets for R ∈ RN by
PE(R).
Dominance and equivalence. Let N ∈ P and R ∈ RN . Let pair X, Y ∈ C such
that for each i ∈ N , Y RiX. If for at least one j ∈ N , Y Pj X, then Y dominates
X, otherwise Y and X are equivalent.
We now proceed to characterize efficient sets.
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Proposition 2.1 (Efficient sets). For each N ∈ P and each R ∈ RN , a set
X ∈ C is efficient if and only if the following two conditions hold.
(i) X is a subset of the convex hull of the agents’ peaks. That is,
X ⊆ Conv(p(R)).
(ii) All of the agents’ peaks that lie in the convex hull of X are included in
X. That is,
Conv (X) ∩ p(R) ⊆ X.
We prove Proposition 2.1 in Appendix 2.A and illustrate it in Figure 2.1.
Rp(R1) p(R2) p(R3)
(a)
Rp(R1) p(R2) p(R3)
(b)
Rp(R1) p(R2) p(R3)
(c)
Rp(R1) p(R2) p(R3)
(d)
Figure 2.1: Let N = {1, 2, 3} with R ∈ RN and p(R) = {p(R1), p(R2), p(R3)}. Sets
under consideration are shown in bold. The set in (a) satisfies neither (i) nor (ii). The
set in (b) satisfies (i) but not (ii). The set in (c) does not satisfy (i) but it satisfies (ii).
The set in (d) satisfies both (i) and (ii), hence it is efficient.
When considering convex sets, the characterization in Proposition 2.1 simpli-
fies.
Remark 2.1 (Efficient convex sets). For each N ∈ P , each R ∈ RN , and each
convex set X = Conv(X) ∈ C, X ∈ PE(R) if and only if X ⊆ Conv(p(R)).
Further consequences of Proposition 2.1 are Corollaries 2.1 and 2.2. Essentially,
Corollary 2.1 states that given a population M with profile R, if X ∈ C is efficient,
then it is also efficient for each population N ( M such that the convex hull of
population N ’s peaks at profile RN , and that of population M ’s peaks at profile
R, are the same.
Corollary 2.1. Let M ∈ P, R ∈ RM , and X ∈ PE(R). Then, for each N ∈ P
such that N (M and Conv(p(RN)) = Conv(p(R)), X ∈ PE(RN).
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Proof. Let N,M ∈ P be such that N ( M , R ∈ RM , and X ∈ PE(R). By
Proposition 2.1 (i), X ⊆ Conv(p(R)). Since, Conv(p(R)) = Conv(p(RN)), X ⊆
Conv(p(RN)). By Proposition 2.1 (ii), Conv(X)∩p(R) ⊆ X. Since, p(RN) ( p(R),
Conv(X) ∩ p(RN) ⊆ X. By Proposition 2.1, X ∈ PE(RN).
Corollary 2.2 provides some consequences for efficient and equivalent sets.
Corollary 2.2. Let N ∈ P, R ∈ RN , and X ∈ PE(R). Then, Conv(X) is
equivalent to X. Moreover, if Y is equivalent to X, then Conv(Y ) = Conv(X).
We prove Corollary 2.2 in Appendix 2.A. Moreover, to simplify notation, in
the sequel we always represent any efficient set by its convex hull.
2.3 Choice correspondences
A choice correspondence F assigns to each N ∈ P and each R ∈ RN a set F (R) ∈
C, i.e., F : ⋃N∈P RN → C. We denote the family of choice correspondences F
by F .
In the sequel, when the properties of replacement-dominance and one-sided
replacement-dominance (defined in Section 2.4) are considered, the population
of agents does not change. For this reason, we introduce fixed-population choice
correspondences, henceforth fp-choice correspondences.
Given N ∈ P , an fp-choice correspondence F for N assigns to each R ∈ RN a
set F (R) ∈ C, i.e., F : RN → C. Let FN denote the family of fp-choice correspon-
dences for N . A choice correspondence is a collection of fp-choice correspondences
indexed by N ∈ P .
Remark 2.2 (Choice functions). Given population N ∈ P , if an fp-choice
correspondence for N assigns to each R ∈ RN a set consisting of a single point, it
is essentially an fp-choice function. Similarly, if a choice correspondence assigns
to each N ∈ P and each R ∈ RN a set consisting of a single point, it is essentially
a choice function.
We now proceed to our efficiency notion for fp-choice correspondences and
choice correspondences.
Efficiency (of choice correspondences). .
(a) Let N ∈ P and F ∈ FN be an fp-choice correspondence. For each R ∈
RN , F (R) ∈ PE(R).
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(b) Let choice correspondence F ∈ F . For each N ∈ P and each R ∈ RN ,
F (R) ∈ PE(R).
The following classes of “target (choice) correspondences” and “fp-target
(choice) correspondences” play an important role in the sequel.
Any fp-target point correspondence is determined by its fixed population and
its target point. Similarly, any target point correspondence is determined by its
target point. In both cases: if the target point is efficient, then it is chosen. If the
target point is not efficient, then the (unique) closest efficient point to it is chosen.
Target point correspondences. Let a ∈ R ∪ {−∞,∞}. We define:
(a) for population N ∈ P, the fp-target
point correspondence with target a, fa ∈
FN , such that for each R ∈ RN ,
(b) the target point correspondence with
target a, fa ∈ F , such that for each N ∈
P and each R ∈ RN ,
fa(R) =

{
¯
p(R)} if a <
¯
p(R)
{p¯(R)} if a > p¯(R)
{a} otherwise.
A (fp-)target point correspondence fa is essentially a (fp-)target point func-
tion.21
Any fp-target set correspondence is determined by its population and its non-
empty, closed, and convex target set. Similarly, any target set correspondence is
determined by its non-empty, closed, and convex target set. In both cases: if the
target set is efficient, it is chosen. If the target set is not efficient, the (unique)
maximal efficient subset of the target set is chosen, if one exists; otherwise, the
(unique) closest efficient point to the target set is chosen.
Target set correspondences. Let [a, b] ⊆ R ∪ {−∞,∞}. We define:
(a) for population N ∈ P, the fp-
target set correspondence with target
[a, b], F a,b ∈ FN , such that for each
R ∈ RN ,
(b) the target set correspondence with
target set [a, b], F a,b ∈ F , such that for
each N ∈ P and each R ∈ RN ,
F a,b(R) =

{
¯
p(R)} if b <
¯
p(R)
{p¯(R)} if a > p¯(R)
[a, b] ∩ Conv(p(R)) otherwise.
21The difference is that a (fp-)target point correspondence fa only assigns singleton sets while
the corresponding (fp-)target point function assigns the points in these sets.
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Each target set correspondence is a set of fp-target set correspondences, one for
each N ∈ P , where the target set is constant and independent of the population.
Also, each (fp-)target set correspondence with a target set [a, b] ⊆ R ∪ {−∞,∞}
such that a = b, is a (fp-)target point correspondence.
By Proposition 2.1, it follows that each (fp-)target set correspondence satisfies
efficiency.
We illustrate the concept of an fp-target set correspondence in Figure 2.2.
Since each target set correspondence is a collection of fp-target set correspondences
indexed by N ∈ P , a similar example for target set correspondences can be easily
obtained if in Figure 2.2 we allow for the population to change.
Rp(R1) p(R2) p(R3)
(a)
a b
Rp(R1) p(R2) p(R3)
(b)
a b
Rp(R1) p(R2) p(R3)
(c)
a b
Figure 2.2: Let N = {1, 2, 3} with R ∈ RN and p(R) = {p(R1), p(R2), p(R3)}. Let
F a,b ∈ FN . The chosen sets in each case are shown in bold. The target set in (a) is
efficient and is chosen. The target set in (b) is not efficient but the maximal efficient
subset exists and it is chosen. The target set in (c) is not efficient and no maximal
efficient subset exists; hence the closest efficient point is chosen.
Remark 2.3 (Properties of fp-choice correspondences extend to choice
correspondences). In Section 2.4, we introduce properties of fp-choice correspon-
dences. Since a choice correspondence is a collection of fp-choice correspondences,
these properties easily extend to choice correspondences.
2.4 Properties of choice correspondences
In the sequel, all properties and results refer to single-peaked preferences but also
apply to symmetric single-peaked preferences.
We consider two solidarity properties of choice correspondences. The first
solidarity property, expresses the solidarity among agents against changes in the
population (Thomson, 1983b,a): if agents are added to the population, the agents
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initially present should all be made at least as well off or they should all be made
at most as well off by this change.
Population-monotonicity. Let F ∈ F be a choice correspondence. For each
pair N,M ∈ P such that N ⊆M and each R ∈ RM the following holds:
for each i ∈ N, F (RN)Ri F (R) or for each i ∈ N, F (R)Ri F (RN).
Population-monotonicity implies that the chosen sets, before and after the
change in population, are comparable, and in the same way in terms of their
welfare, by all agents present before and after this change.
The next lemma states that if a choice correspondence satisfies efficiency and
population-monotonicity, then if agents are added to the population, all agents
who were initially present are at most as well off.
Lemma 2.1 (Efficiency and population-monotonicity). Let choice corre-
spondence F ∈ F satisfy efficiency and population-monotonicity. Then, for each
pair N,M ∈ P such that N ⊆M , each R ∈ RM , and each i ∈ N , F (RN)RiF (R).
In particular, if Conv(p(RN)) = Conv(p(R)), then F (RN) = F (R).
Proof. Let choice correspondence F ∈ F satisfy efficiency and population-
monotonicity. Let N,M ∈ P be such that N ⊆M . Let R ∈ RM .
By efficiency, F (R) ∈ PE(R) and F (RN) ∈ PE(RN). By population-
monotonicity, for each i ∈ N , F (R)Ri F (RN) or for each i ∈ N , F (RN)Ri F (R).
If for each i ∈ N , F (R) Ri F (RN) and since F (RN) ∈ PE(RN), then for each
i ∈ N , F (RN) Ii F (R). Therefore, for each i ∈ N , F (RN)Ri F (R).
In particular, if Conv(p(RN)) = Conv(p(R)), then by F (R) ∈ PE(R) and
Corollary 2.1, F (R) ∈ PE(RN). Since for each i ∈ N , F (RN)Ri F (R), and more-
over [F (R) ∈ PE(RN) and F (RN) ∈ PE(RN)], then for each i ∈ N , F (RN)IiF (R).
By Corollary 2.2, Conv(F (RN)) = Conv(F (R)), and since we always represent any
efficient set by its convex hull, F (RN) = F (R).
Proposition 2.2 (F a,b is population-monotonic). Each target set correspon-
dence satisfies population-monotonicity.
Proof. Let F a,b ∈ F be a target set correspondence. Let N ∈ P be such that
|N | ≥ 2 and R ∈ RN . We prove population-monotonicity of F a,b by showing
that if j ∈ N leaves all remaining agents end up at least as well off, i.e., for each
i ∈ N \ {j}, F a,b(R−j)Ri F a,b(R).
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Case 1. Conv(p(R−j)) = Conv(p(R)). Then, the chosen set remains the same,
F a,b(R−j) = F a,b(R).
Case 2. Conv(p(R−j)) 6= Conv(p(R)). Then, j has either the unique smallest
peak at R or the unique largest peak at R. By symmetry of arguments, assume
that j has the unique smallest peak at R, p(Rj) =
¯
p(R). Then,
¯
p(R) <
¯
p(R−j).
There are 3 possibilities.
(i) a, b <
¯
p(R−j). Then, F a,b(R−j) =
¯
p(R−j). Furthermore, if b ≤ p(Rj),
then F a,b(R) = p(Rj); if a ≤ p(Rj) and b > p(Rj), then F a,b(R) = [p(Rj), b]; and
if a > p(Rj), then F
a,b(R) = [a, b]. Hence, for each i ∈ N \ {j}, bFa,b(R−j)(Ri) =
wFa,b(R−j)(Ri) =
¯
p(R−j), bFa,b(R)(Ri) ∈ {p(Rj), b}, and wFa,b(R)(Ri) ∈ {p(Rj), a}.
Thus, for each i ∈ N \{j}, bFa,b(R)(Ri) < bFa,b(R−j)(Ri) ≤ p(Ri) and wFa,b(R)(Ri) <
wFa,b(R−j)(Ri) ≤ p(Ri). By single-peakedness, for each i ∈ N \ {j}, the best and
worst points are improved. Hence, F a,b(R−j) Pi F a,b(R).
(ii) a <
¯
p(R−j) and b ≥
¯
p(R−j). Then,
¯
F a,b(R) <
¯
F a,b(R−j) =
¯
p(R−j) and
F¯ a,b(R) = F¯ a,b(R−j). Thus, for each i ∈ N \ {j},
¯
F a,b(R) <
¯
F a,b(R−j) ≤ p(Ri). If
F¯ a,b(R−j) < p(Ri), then bFa,b(R)(Ri) = bFa,b(R−j)(Ri) < p(Ri) and wFa,b(R)(Ri) <
wFa,b(R−j)(Ri) < p(Ri). Hence, by single-peakedness, i’s best point is at least as
desirable and his worst point is improved. If F¯ a,b(R−j) ≥ p(Ri), then bFa,b(R)(Ri) =
bFa,b(R−j)(Ri) = p(Ri) and wFa,b(R−j)(Ri) ∈ F a,b(R−j) ⊆ F a,b(R). Thus, i’s best
and worst points are at least as desirable. Hence, for each i ∈ N \{j}, F a,b(R−j)Ri
F a,b(R).
(iii) a, b ≥
¯
p(R−j). Then, the chosen set remains the same, F a,b(R−j) =
F a,b(R).
The second solidarity property we consider expresses the solidarity among
agents against changes in preferences (Moulin, 1987): if the preferences of an
agent change, then the other agents should all be made at least as well off or they
should all be made at most as well off. We formulate this requirement for fp-
choice correspondences but as discussed in Remark 2.3, it easily extends to choice
correspondences.
Replacement-dominance. Let N ∈ P and F ∈ FN be an fp-choice correspon-
dence. For each j ∈ N , and each pair R, R¯ ∈ RN such that R−j = R¯−j the
following holds:
for each i ∈ N \ {j}, F (R)Ri F (R¯) or for each i ∈ N \ {j}, F (R¯)Ri F (R).
Replacement-dominance implies that the chosen sets, before and after the
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change in preferences of some agent, are comparable by all other agents.
Note that for a population of one or two agents, replacement-dominance im-
poses no restriction on fp-choice correspondences. Hence, for each fixed population
with one or two agents, each fp-target set correspondence satisfies replacement-
dominance. However, if the fixed population contains at least three agents, then
the target set must equal a point.
Proposition 2.3 (F [a,b] is replacement-dominant ⇔ a = b). If a population
consists of at least 3 agents, then an associated fp-target set correspondence satis-
fies replacement-dominance if and only if it is an fp-target point correspondence.
Proof. Let N ∈ P be such that |N | ≥ 3 and F a,b ∈ FN be an fp-target set
correspondence.
First, if a = b, we prove replacement-dominance of fa (F a,b, a = b) by showing
that for each pair R, R¯ ∈ RN such that R¯ ∈ RN and R−j = R¯−j, [for each
i ∈ N \ {j}, fa(R)Ri fa(R¯)] or [for each i ∈ N \ {j}, fa(R¯)Ri fa(R)].
Case 1. Conv(p(R¯)) = Conv(p(R)). Then, the set (point) chosen remains the
same, fa(R¯) = fa(R).
Case 2.1. Conv(p(R¯)) ( Conv(p(R)). Then, j has either the unique smallest
peak at R or the unique largest peak at R. By symmetry of arguments, assume
that p(Rj) =
¯
p(R). Then,
¯
p(R) <
¯
p(R¯) ≤ p¯(R) = p¯(R¯). There are 2 possibilities.
(i) a <
¯
p(R¯). Then, fa(R¯) = {
¯
p(R¯)}. Furthermore, if a ≤
¯
p(R), then
fa(R) = {
¯
p(R)} and if a >
¯
p(R), then fa(R) = {a}. Hence, for each i ∈ N \ {j},
fa(R) < fa(R¯) ≤ p(R¯i). Hence, by single-peakedness, for each i ∈ N \ {j},
fa(R¯) Pi f
a(R).
(ii) a ≥
¯
p(R¯). Then, the set (point) chosen remains the same, fa(R¯) = fa(R).
Case 2.2. Conv(p(R¯)) ) Conv(p(R)). Then, by Case 2.1 (with the roles of R
and R¯ reversed), for each i ∈ N \ {j}, fa(R)Ri fa(R¯).
Case 3. Conv(p(R¯)) 6⊆ Conv(p(R)) and Conv(p(R¯)) 6⊇ Conv(p(R)). Then, j
has either [the unique smallest peak at R and the unique largest peak at R¯] or [the
unique largest peak at R and the unique smallest peak at R¯]. By symmetry of
arguments, assume that p(Rj) =
¯
p(R) and p(R¯j) = p¯(R¯). Then,
¯
p(R) <
¯
p(R¯) ≤
p¯(R) < p¯(R¯). There are 3 possibilities.
(i) a <
¯
p(R¯). Then, as shown in Case 2.1, for each i ∈ N\{j}, fa(R¯)Pifa(R).
(ii)
¯
p(R¯) ≤ a ≤ p¯(R). Then, the set (point) chosen remains the same,
fa(R¯) = fa(R).
(iii) a > p¯(R). Then, fa(R) = {p¯(R)}. Furthermore, if a ≥ p¯(R¯), then
fa(R¯) = {p¯(R¯)} and if a < p¯(R¯), then fa(R¯) = {a}. Hence, for each i ∈ N \ {j},
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p(R¯i) ≤ fa(R) < fa(R¯). Hence, by single-peakedness, for each i ∈ N \ {j},
fa(R) Pi f
a(R¯).
Second, we prove that if a < b, then F a,b does not satisfy replacement-
dominance. Without loss of generality, assume that 1, 2, 3 ∈ N .
If a = −∞, let a¯ ∈ R be such that a¯ < b, otherwise, let a¯ = a. If b = ∞,
then let b¯ ∈ R be such that b¯ > a¯, otherwise, let b¯ = b. Hence, [a¯, b¯] ⊆ [a, b].
We divide the interval [a¯, b¯] into three equal parts and use the four points a1 = a¯,
a2 =
(
a¯+ 1
3
(b¯− a¯)), a3 = (a¯+ 23(b¯− a¯)), and a4 = b¯ to construct (symmetric)
profilesR, R¯ ∈ SN such that p(R1) = a1, p(R2) = p(R¯2) = a2, p(R3) = p(R¯3) = a3,
p(R¯1) = a4, and for each i ∈ N \ {1, 2, 3}, p(Ri) = p(R¯i) = a2. Note that
R−1 = R¯−1.
By the definition of F a,b, we have F a,b(R) = [a1, a3] and F
a,b(R¯) = [a2, a4].
Under both R and R¯, the best points of agents 2 and 3 remain the same,
bFa,b(R)(R2) = bFa,b(R¯)(R2) = p(R2) and bFa,b(R)(R3) = bFa,b(R¯)(R3) = p(R3).
However, the worst points of agent 2 and 3 change as follows. For agent 2,
wFa,b(R)(R2) = {a1, a3} and wFa,b(R¯)(R1) = {a4}. Since p(R2) = a2 < a3 < a4,
single-peakedness implies F a,b(R)P2F
a,b(R¯). For agent 3, wFa,b(R)(R3) = {a1} and
wFa,b(R¯)(R3) = {a2, a4}. Since a1 < a2 < a3 = p(R3), single-peakedness implies
F a,b(R¯) P3 F
a,b(R). This contradicts replacement-dominance.
We next introduce a property weaker than replacement-dominance in the sense
that it does not require solidarity when the preferences of the agent with the unique
smallest peak are changed such that he becomes the agent with the unique largest
peak, or vice-versa; in other words, following a change in preferences of some agent,
solidarity is required only if one side of the convex hull of the agents’ peaks has
remained the same. We formulate this requirement for fp-choice correspondences
but as discussed in Remark 2.3, it easily extends to choice correspondences.
One-sided replacement-dominance. Let N ∈ P and F ∈ FN be an fp-choice
correspondence. For each j ∈ N and each pair R, R¯ ∈ RN such that R−j = R¯−j
and Conv(p(R)) ⊆ Conv(p(R¯)) or Conv(p(R)) ⊇ Conv(p(R¯)) the following holds:
for each i ∈ N \ {j}, F (R)Ri F (R¯) or for each i ∈ N \ {j}, F (R¯)Ri F (R).
One-sided replacement-dominance implies that the chosen sets, before and
after the change in preferences of some agent, are comparable, and in the same way
in terms of their welfare, by all other agents. Moreover, replacement-dominance
implies one-sided replacement-dominance.
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The next lemma states that given a population of at least three agents
and an associated fp-choice correspondence satisfying efficiency and one-sided
replacement-dominance, if the preferences of an agent change in such a way that
the new set of peaks is a subset of the initial one, all other agents end up at least
as well off.
Lemma 2.2 (Efficiency and one-sided replacement-dominance). Let N ∈
P be such that |N | ≥ 3 and fp-choice correspondence F ∈ FN satisfy efficiency and
one-sided replacement-dominance. Then, for each j ∈ N , each pair R, R¯ ∈ RN
such that [R−j = R¯−j and Conv(p(R¯)) ⊆ Conv(p(R))], and each i ∈ N \ {j},
F (R¯)Ri F (R). In particular, if Conv(p(R¯)) = Conv(p(R)), then F (R¯) = F (R).
We prove Lemma 2.2 in Appendix 2.B. Moreover, recall that for a popula-
tion N ∈ P with one or two agents (one-sided) replacement-dominance imposes
no restriction on an associated fp-choice correspondence. The following example
illustrates why Lemma 2.2 does not hold for a population of two agents and an
associated fp-choice correspondence.
Example 2.3. Let N ∈ P be such that N = {1, 2} and F ∈ FN be an fp-choice
correspondence such that
F (R) =
p(R2) if p(R2) = 1p(R1) otherwise.
Hence, F satisfies efficiency, and since |N | = 2, it trivially satisfies (one-
sided) replacement-dominance. Let R, R¯ ∈ RN be such that p(R1) = p(R¯1) = 0,
p(R2) = 2, and p(R¯2) = 1. Hence, Conv(p(R¯)) ( Conv(p(R)). It follows, that
F (R) = 0 and F (R¯) = 1. Hence, agent 1’s peak p(R1) = F (R) < F (R¯). By
single-peakedness, F (R) P1 F (R¯).
Proposition 2.4 (F a,b is one-sided replacement-dominant). Each fp-target
set correspondence satisfies one-sided replacement-dominance.
Proof. Let N ∈ P and F a,b ∈ FN be an fp-target set correspondence. Since for
|N | ≤ 2, (one-sided) replacement-dominance imposes no restriction on fp-choice
correspondence F a,b, fix |N | ≥ 3.
We prove that F a,b satisfies one-sided replacement-dominance, i.e., we show
that for each R, R¯ ∈ RN such that R−j = R¯−j and Conv(p(R)) ⊆ Conv(p(R¯)) or
Conv(p(R¯)) ⊆ Conv(p(R)), the following holds. For each i ∈ N \ {j}, F a,b(R) Ri
F a,b(R¯) or for each i ∈ N \ {j}, F a,b(R¯)Ri F a,b(R).
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Case 1. Conv(p(R¯)) = Conv(p(R)). Then, the chosen set remains the same,
F a,b(R¯) = F a,b(R).
Case 2.1. Conv(p(R¯)) ( Conv(p(R)). Then, j has either the unique smallest
peak at R or the unique largest peak at R. By symmetry of arguments, assume
that j has the unique smallest peak at R, p(Rj) =
¯
p(R). Then,
¯
p(R) <
¯
p(R¯) ≤
p¯(R) = p¯(R¯). There are 3 possibilities.
(i) a, b <
¯
p(R¯). Then F a,b(R¯) =
¯
p(R¯). Furthermore, if a, b ≤
¯
p(R), then
F a,b(R) =
¯
p(R); if a ≤
¯
p(R) and b >
¯
p(R), then F a,b(R) = [
¯
p(R), b]; and if
a, b >
¯
p(R), then F a,b(R) = [a, b]. Hence, for each i ∈ N \ {j}, bFa,b(R¯)(Ri) =
wFa,b(R¯)(Ri) = {
¯
p(R¯)}, bFa,b(R)(Ri) ∈ {
¯
p(R), b}, and wFa,b(R)(Ri) ∈ {
¯
p(R), a}.
Thus, for each i ∈ N \ {j}, bFa,b(R)(Ri) < bFa,b(R¯)(Ri) ≤ p(Ri) and wFa,b(R)(Ri) <
wFa,b(R¯)(Ri) ≤ p(Ri). By single-peakedness, for each i ∈ N \ {j}, best and worst
points improve. Hence, F a,b(R¯) Pi F
a,b(R).
(ii) a <
¯
p(R¯) and b ≥
¯
p(R¯). Then, for the minima
¯
F a,b(R) and
¯
F a,b(R¯) we
have
¯
F a,b(R) <
¯
F a,b(R¯) =
¯
p(R¯) and for the maxima F¯ (R) and F¯ (R¯) we have
F¯ (R) = F¯ (R¯). Thus, for each i ∈ N \ {j}, minimum
¯
F a,b(R) <
¯
F a,b(R¯) ≤
p(Ri). If maximum F¯
a,b(R¯) < p(Ri), then bFa,b(R)(Ri) = bFa,b(R¯)(Ri) < p(Ri) and
wFa,b(R)(Ri) < wFa,b(R¯)(Ri) ≤ p(Ri). Hence, by single-peakedness, i’s best point is
at least as desirable and his worst point improves. If maximum F¯ a,b(R¯) ≥ p(Ri),
then bFa,b(R)(Ri) = bFa,b(R¯)(Ri) = p(Ri) and wFa,b(R¯)(Ri) ∈ F a,b(R¯) ⊆ F a,b(R).
Thus, i’s best and worst points are at least as desirable. It follows, that for each
i ∈ N \ {j}, F a,b(R¯)Ri F a,b(R).
(iii) a, b ≥
¯
p(R¯). Then, the set chosen remains the same, F a,b(R¯) = F a,b(R).
Case 2.2. Conv(p(R¯)) ) Conv(p(R)). Then, by Case 2.1 (with the roles of R
and R¯ reversed), for each i ∈ N \ {j}, F a,b(R)Ri F a,b(R¯).
The next proposition states an important relation between the two solidarity
properties we study.
Proposition 2.5 (Efficiency and population-monotonicity ⇒ one-sided
replacement-dominance). Each choice correspondence satisfying efficiency and
population-monotonicity also satisfies one-sided replacement-dominance.
We prove Proposition 2.5 in Appendix 2.C.
Finally, although the property of strategy-proofness22 is not within the scope
of this chapter, the following remark should be made.
22An agent cannot affect the chosen set in his favor by misreporting his preferences (a formal
definition in a slightly different context can be found on page 79).
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Remark 2.4 (Strategy-proofness). Each (fp-)target set correspondence is (es-
sentially) a median correspondence (defined on page 78). Specifically, an (fp-
)target set correspondence with a target set [aN , bN ], at population N , is equivalent
with a median correspondence Fα,β, where α, β ∈ A|N |+1 such that α = {−∞, aN ,
. . . , aN ,∞} and β = {−∞, bN , . . . , bN ,∞}. Therefore, it follows from The-
orems 3.4 and 3.6 that each (fp-)target set correspondence satisfies strategy-
proofness in domains R and S respectively.
2.5 Characterizing target set correspondences
In the sequel, all results presented refer to single-peaked preferences but also apply
to symmetric single-peaked preferences.
Our first theorem states that the properties of efficiency and one-sided
replacement-dominance characterize fp-target set correspondences.
Theorem 2.1 (F is efficient and one-sided replacement-dominant ⇔
F = F a,b). If a fixed population consists of at least 3 agents, then an associated
fp-choice correspondence satisfies efficiency and one-sided replacement-dominance
if and only if it is an fp-target set correspondence.
We prove Theorem 2.1 in Appendix 2.D. In addition, Corollary 2.3 that follows,
strengthens a result for choice functions by Thomson (1993).
Corollary 2.3 (F is efficient and replacement-dominant ⇔ F = fa).
If a fixed population consists of at least 3 agents, then an associated fp-choice
correspondence satisfies efficiency and replacement-dominance if and only if it is
an fp-target point correspondence.
Proof. If part. By Propositions 2.1 and 2.3, all fp-target point correspondences
satisfy efficiency and replacement-dominance.
Only if part. Let N ∈ P be such that |N | ≥ 3 and let the fp-choice correspon-
dence F ∈ FN satisfy efficiency and replacement-dominance. Then, F satisfies
one-sided replacement-dominance and by Theorem 2.1 it is an fp-target set corre-
spondence F a,b ∈ FN . By Proposition 2.3, F a,b satisfies replacement-dominance
if and only if it is an fp-target point correspondence fa ∈ FN .
We have formulated Theorem 2.1 and Corollary 2.3 for fp-choice correspon-
dences where the fixed population contains at least 3 agents. If instead we consider
choice correspondences, then efficiency and one-sided replacement-dominance
42 CHAPTER 2: SOLIDARITY FOR PUBLIC GOODS
(replacement-dominance) imply that for each population with at least 3 agents,
a different target set or target point can be chosen, while for each population
with at most 2 agents, the choice correspondence can equal any efficient fp-choice
correspondence.
Our second theorem states that the properties of efficiency and population-
monotonicity characterize target set correspondences.
Theorem 2.2 (F is efficient and population-monotonic ⇔ F = F a,b). A
choice correspondence satisfies efficiency and population-monotonicity if and only
if it is a target set correspondence.
Proof. If part. By Propositions 2.1 and 2.2, all target set correspondences
satisfy efficiency and population-monotonicity.
Only if part. Let choice correspondence F ∈ F satisfy efficiency and
population-monotonicity. By Proposition 2.5, F satisfies one-sided replacement-
dominance. Let M ∈ P be such that |M | ≥ 3. By Theorem 2.1, for each R ∈ RM ,
F = F aM ,bM ∈ FM . Define points a := aM and b := bM .
We show that for each N ∈ P and each R¯ ∈ RN , F (R¯) = F a,b(R¯). We
do so by showing that for each N ∈ P , each R¯ ∈ RN , and each R ∈ RM , if
Conv(p(R¯)) = Conv(p(R)), then F (R¯) = F a,b(R) = F a,b(R¯) (the latter equality
follows by the definition of F a,b).
Let R ∈ RM and R¯ ∈ RN . Recall that F (R) = F a,b(R). Begin from R ∈ RM
and construct R1 ∈ RM∪N by adding the population N \M with profile R¯N\M , i.e.,
R1 = (R, R¯N\M). Since Conv(R1) = Conv(p(R)), by population-monotonicity and
Lemma 2.1, F (R1) = F (R). Next, change the preferences of each i ∈ N to R¯i and
denote the new profile R2 = (R1M\N , R¯) ∈ RM∪N . Since Conv(R2) = Conv(R1),
by population-monotonicity and Lemma 2.1, F (R2) = F (R1). Finally, remove
the population M \ N and notice that the new profile R2N = R¯ ∈ RN . Since
Conv(p(R¯)) = Conv(R2), by population-monotonicity and Lemma 2.1, F (R¯) =
F (R2). Hence, F (R¯) = F a,b(R) = F a,b(R¯).
All the properties we consider are independent.
Remark 2.5 (Independence of properties). Note that the properties in all
our characterization results are independent. A constant choice correspondence
that always chooses a fixed set satisfies (one-sided) replacement-dominance and
population-monotonicity but violates efficiency. A choice correspondence that
always chooses the peak of the agent with the lowest index satisfies efficiency, but
it violates one-sided replacement-dominance and population-monotonicity.
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Finally, we comment on the validity of our results for some natural model
variations.
Remark 2.6 (Chosen sets are not necessarily compact). Although we only
study compact subsets of R, the compactness requirement is without loss of gen-
erality for the following reasons. First, the agents’ peaks being real numbers
and Proposition 2.1 (i) imply that unbounded sets are not efficient. Hence, by
Theorems 2.1 and 2.2, the two classes of correspondences we characterize satisfy
efficiency and therefore only select bounded sets. Second, concerning open (and
bounded) sets, after assuming that each agent is indifferent between a set and its
closure,23 all our results hold and the target sets of target set correspondences and
fp-target set correspondences can be open. Notice that in this case, the second
requirement for the efficiency of a set, that is, Proposition 2.1 (ii), must change
slightly to Conv(closure(X))∩ p(R) ⊆ closure(X); moreover, to accommodate for
the possible openness of sets, throughout the text and for each set X, references
to Conv(X) must be substituted with Conv(closure(X)).
Remark 2.7 (Monotonic preferences). Allowing for agents to have monotonic
preferences, i.e., have minus infinity or plus infinity as peaks, poses the following
problem. If all agents have minus infinity or all agents have plus infinity as their
peak, then by Proposition 2.1, no efficient set exists in C. Moreover, if unbounded
sets of R are considered, then in this case the only efficient sets are {−∞} (when
all agents have minus infinity as their peak) and {+∞} (when all agents have
plus infinity as their peak). However, a policy interpretation for these two sets, as
well as other unbounded sets, is not clear and we therefore do not add monotonic
preferences to our model.
Remark 2.8 (Closed interval alternative set). All our results hold if the
preferences of the agents are defined on some closed interval [a, b] ( R. In this case
and since efficiency is required, by Proposition 2.1 (i), the class of sets considered
equals the class of non-empty subsets of [a, b] and closedness is not required (see
Remark 2.6). Moreover, agents can have monotonic preferences, i.e., have a or
b as peaks, since the policy interpretation of “locating the public good at a” or
“locating the public good at b” is straightforward, in contrast to our original
model (see Remark 2.7). Finally, it should be mentioned that this restriction on
the set of alternatives facilitates our main proof (Theorem 2.1) as follows. Since
a profile with a as the minimum peak and b as the maximum peak can be chosen
23Given X ( R, the closure of X, closure(X), is defined as the union of X with all its limit /
boundary points.
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(in contrast to our original model, where a profile with −∞ as the minimum peak
and +∞ as the maximum peak is not available), the proof essentially follows from
Lemma 2.11.
Throughout the Appendices we use the domain of single-peaked preferences
R, with the exception of Lemma 2.9 (Appendix 2.D), where we use the domain
of symmetric single-peaked preferences S. All results proven for R also hold on
S; however, for Lemma 2.9, the proof for S requires a different approach (and
additional “proof steps”) that also holds on R.
2.A Proofs of Proposition 2.1 and Corollary 2.2
The following terms describe a set obtained by a truncation of a given set X ∈ C
on one side at a specific point x, which is added to the new set to ensure that this
new set is closed.
Left truncaddition (of a set at a point). Let point x ∈ R and set X ∈ C.
Then, set Y ∈ C is a left truncaddition of X at x if Y = [X ∩ (x,∞)] ∪ {x}.
Right truncaddition (of a set at a point). Let point x ∈ R and set X ∈ C.
Then, set Y ∈ C is a right truncaddition of X at x if Y = [X ∩ (−∞, x)] ∪ {x}.
Before proceeding with the proof of Proposition 2.1 we present two lemmas.
First, we describe some cases where a truncaddition of a set at a point makes an
agent weakly better off.
Lemma 2.3 (Truncadditions). Let agent i ∈ P with preferences Ri ∈ R and set
X ∈ C.
(i) Let minimum
¯
X < p(Ri), point
¯
x ∈ R such that
¯
X <
¯
x ≤ p(Ri), and set
Y = [X ∩ (
¯
x,∞)]∪{
¯
x} be a left truncaddition of set X at point
¯
x. Then, Y RiX.
Moreover, if the unique worst point wX(Ri) =
¯
X, then Y Pi X.
(ii) Let maximum X¯ > p(Ri), point x¯ ∈ R be such that X¯ > x¯ ≥ p(Ri), and
set Y = [X ∩ (−∞, x¯)] ∪ {x¯} be a right truncaddition of set X at point x¯. Then,
Y Ri X. Moreover, if the unique worst point wX(Ri) = X¯,then Y Pi X.
(iii) Let minimum
¯
X < p(Ri), maximum X¯ > p(Ri), and points
¯
x, x¯ ∈ R
be such that
¯
X <
¯
x ≤ p(Ri) ≤ x¯ < X¯, set Y = [X ∩ (
¯
x,∞)] ∪ {
¯
x} be a left
truncaddition of set X at point
¯
x, and set Z = [Y ∩ (−∞, x¯)] ∪ {x¯} be a right
truncaddition of set Y at point x¯. Then, Z Pi X.
Proof. Let agent i ∈ P with preferences Ri ∈ R and set X ∈ C.
(i) Let minimum
¯
X < p(Ri), point
¯
x ∈ R such that
¯
X <
¯
x ≤ p(Ri), truncad-
dition Y = [X ∩ (
¯
x,∞)] ∪ {
¯
x}, and Z be the set of truncated points, Z = X \ Y .
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By single-peakedness, for each z ∈ Z, agent i prefers
¯
x to z,
¯
x Pi z. Hence,
his best and worst points in Y are at least as desirable as his (respective) best
and worst points in X. It follows, that Y Ri X. If additionally his worst point
wX(Ri) =
¯
X 6∈ Y is unique, then X¯ Pi wX(Ri) and
¯
x Pi wX(Ri). Since by single-
peakedness, wY (Ri) ⊆ {
¯
x, X¯}, it follows that Y Pi X.
(ii) Symmetric proof to (i).
(iii) Let minimum
¯
X < p(Ri), maximum X¯ > p(Ri), points
¯
x, x¯ ∈ R be such
that
¯
X <
¯
x ≤ p(Ri) ≤ x¯ < X¯, truncaddition Y = [X ∩ (
¯
x,∞)] ∪ {
¯
x}, and
truncaddition Z = [Y ∩ (−∞, x¯)]∪{x¯}. By part (i), Y RiX. By part (ii), ZRi Y .
Hence, by transitivity, Z RiX. Moreover, by single-peakedness, his worst point(s)
wX(Ri) ⊆ {
¯
X, X¯} and wZ(Ri) ⊆ {
¯
x, x¯}. Since by single-peakedness
¯
x Pi wX(Ri)
and x¯ Pi wX(Ri), his worst point(s) improves. It follows that Z Pi X.
Second, adding a closed interval to a set, without changing its convex hull,
makes an agent indifferent, unless his best point improves, in which case he is
better off. Furthermore, removing an open interval from a set, without changing
its convex hull, makes an agent indifferent, unless his best point worsens, in which
case he is worse off.
Lemma 2.4. Let agent i ∈ P with preferences Ri ∈ R and set X ∈ C.
(i) Let closed interval [x, y] ⊆ Conv(X) and set Y = X ∪ [x, y]. Then, Y IiX
unless agent i’s best point(s) improves, i.e., bY (Ri)PibX(Ri), in which case, Y PiX.
(ii) Let open interval (x, y) ( Conv(X) and set Y = X \ (x, y). Then, X Ii Y
unless agent i’s best point(s) worsens, i.e., bX(Ri)PibY (Ri), in which case, XPiY .
Proof. Let agent i ∈ P with preferences Ri ∈ R and set Y ∈ C.
(i) Let [x, y] ⊆ Conv(X) and Y = X ∪ [x, y]. By single-peakedness, agent
i’s worst point(s) does not change, wX(Ri) = wY (Ri) ⊆ {
¯
X, X¯}. If for his best
point(s) we have bX(Ri) Ii bY (Ri), then bX(Ri) ⊆ bY (Ri) and Y Ii X. Otherwise,
bX(Ri) 6⊆ bY (Ri), his best point(s) improves, bY (Ri) Pi bX(Ri), and Y Pi X.
(ii) Let (x, y) ( Conv(X) and Y = X \ (x, y). By single-peakedness, agent
i’s worst point(s) does not change, wX(Ri) = wY (Ri) ⊆ {
¯
X, X¯}. If for his best
point(s) we have bX(Ri) Ii bY (Ri), then bX(Ri) ⊇ bY (Ri) and Y Ii X. Otherwise,
bX(Ri) 6⊇ bY (Ri), his best point(s) worsens, bX(Ri) Pi bY (Ri), and X Pi Y .
Proof of Proposition 2.1. Let population N ∈ P , profile R ∈ RN , and set
X ∈ C. Without loss of generality, assume that N = {1, . . . , n} and
¯
p(R) =
p(R1) ≤ . . . ≤ p(Rn) = p¯(R). The proof follows in three steps.
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Step 1. We show that if set X ∈ PE(R) then condition (i) holds, that is,
X ⊆ Conv(p(R)).
Let set X ∈ PE(R). Assume by contradiction that X 6⊆ Conv(p(R)). Then,
minimum
¯
X < p(R1) or maximum X¯ > p(Rn). By symmetry of arguments,
assume that
¯
X < p(R1).
Case 1. Let maximum X¯ > p(Rn). Then, for each i ∈ N , minimum
¯
X <
p(R1) ≤ p(Ri) ≤ p(Rn) < X¯. Let Y = [X ∩ (p(R1),∞)] ∪ {p(R1)} be a left
truncaddition of X at p(R1), and Z = [Y ∩ (−∞, p(Rn))] ∪ {p(Rn)} be a right
truncaddition of Y at p(Rn). Therefore, by Lemma 2.3 (iii), for each i ∈ N , ZPiX.
Hence, X 6∈ PE(R); a contradiction.
Case 2. Let maximum X¯ ≤ p(Rn). Then, for each i ∈ N , minimum
¯
X <
p(R1) ≤ p(Ri). Let Y = [X ∩ (p(R1),∞)] ∪ {p(R1)} be a left truncaddition of
X at p(R1). By Lemma 2.3 (i), for each i ∈ N , Y Ri X. Furthermore, agent n’s
worst point wX(Rn) =
¯
X is unique. Therefore, by Lemma 2.3 (i), Y PnX. Hence,
X 6∈ PE(R); a contradiction.
Step 2. We show that if set X ∈ PE(R) then condition (ii) holds, that is,
(Conv(X) ∩ p(R)) ⊆ X.
Let set X ∈ PE(R). By Step 1, X ⊆ Conv(p(R)). Assume by contradiction
that (Conv(X) ∩ p(R)) 6⊆ X. Then, there exists agent j ∈ N such that p(Rj) ∈
Conv(X) and p(Rj) 6∈ X.
Let set Y = X ∪{p(Rj)}. By Lemma 2.4 (i), for each i ∈ N , Y RiX. Further-
more, agent j’s best point bY (Rj) = p(Rj)Pj bX(Rj). Therefore, by Lemma 2.4 (i),
Y Pj X. Hence, X 6∈ PE(R); a contradiction.
Step 3. We show that if conditions (i) and (ii) hold for set X ∈ C, then
X ∈ PE(R).
Let set X ∈ C be such that X ⊆ Conv(p(R)) and (Conv(X) ∩ p(R)) ⊆ X.
Assume by contradiction that X 6∈ PE(R). Hence, there exists a set Y ⊆ R that
dominates set X, i.e., for each agent i ∈ N , Y Ri X, and for at least one agent
j ∈ N , Y Pj X.
Case 1. Let agent j’s peak p(Rj) ∈ Conv(X). By condition (ii), p(Rj) ∈ X.
Agent j’s best point bX(Rj) = p(Rj) ∈ X cannot be improved. By single-
peakedness, agent j’s worst point(s) wX(Rj) ⊆ {
¯
X, X¯}; if his worst point(s)
wY (Rj) Pj wX(Rj), by single-peakedness, minimum
¯
X <
¯
Y or maximum X¯ > Y¯ .
By symmetry of arguments, assume minimum
¯
X <
¯
Y . Consider agent 1; by
condition (i), his peak p(R1) ≤
¯
X <
¯
Y . By single-peakedness, his best point
bX(R1) P1 bY (R1). It follows that for agent 1 set Y is not at least as desirable as
set X. Hence, set Y does not dominate set X; a contradiction.
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Case 2. Let agent j’s peak p(Rj) /∈ Conv(X). Then, either p(Rj) <
¯
X or
p(Rj) > X¯. By symmetry of arguments, assume that p(Rj) > X¯. By single-
peakedness, agent j’s best point bX(Rj) = X¯ and agent j’s worst point wX(Rj) =
¯
X. If his best point(s) bY (Rj)Pj bX(Rj), by single-peakedness, maximum X¯ < Y¯ .
If his worst point(s) wY (Rj) Pj wX(Rj), by single-peakedness, minimum
¯
X <
¯
Y .
Consider now agent 1. By condition (i), his peak p(R1) ≤
¯
X ≤ X¯. By single-
peakedness, his best and worst point(s) are bX(R1) =
¯
X and wX(R1) = X¯. If
minimum
¯
X <
¯
Y , by single-peakedness, bX(R1) P1 bY (R1). If maximum X¯ < Y¯ ,
by single-peakedness, wX(R1) P1 wY (R1). It follows that for agent 1 set Y is
not at least as desirable as set X. Hence, set Y does not dominate set X; a
contradiction.
Proof of Corollary 2.2. Let population N ∈ P , profile R ∈ RN , and set X ∈
PE(R).
First, we show that Conv(X) and X are equivalent sets. By single-peakedness,
for each agent i ∈ N such that p(Ri) ∈ Conv(X), the best point bConv(X)(Ri) =
p(Ri) and by Proposition 2.1 (ii), (Conv(X) ∩ p(R)) ⊆ X. Hence, the best point
bConv(X)(Ri) = bX(Ri). By single-peakedness, for each agent i ∈ N such that
p(Ri) 6∈ Conv(X), the best point bConv(X)(Ri) ∈ {
¯
X, X¯}. Since {
¯
X, X¯} ⊆ X, the
best point bConv(X)(Ri) = bX(Ri). Moreover, since Conv(X) is a closed interval
and (trivially) Conv(X) = X ∪Conv(X), by Lemma 2.4 (i), for each agent i ∈ N ,
Conv(X) Ii X.
Second, we show that if X and Y are equivalent sets, then Conv(X) =
Conv(Y ). Let Y ∈ C be an equivalent set to X ∈ PE(R). Let agent 1 ∈ N
have the smallest peak at profile R, p(R1) =
¯
p(R). By Proposition 2.1 (i),
X, Y ⊆ Conv(p(R)), hence, p(R1) ≤
¯
X ≤ X¯ and p(R1) ≤
¯
Y ≤ Y¯ . By single-
peakedness, for agent 1, [best points are bX(R1) =
¯
X and bY (R1) =
¯
Y ] and [worst
points are wX(R1) = X¯ and wY (R1) = Y¯ ]. Since X I1 Y , bX(R1) = bY (R1) and
wX(R1) = wY (R1). Therefore, Conv(X) = Conv(Y ).
2.B Proof of Lemma 2.2
Before proceeding with the proof of Lemma 2.2, we first prove an implication of
efficiency and (one-sided) replacement-dominance.
An fp-choice correspondence satisfies extreme-peaks-onliness if the chosen set
only depends on the convex hull of the peaks of the profile. We formulate extreme-
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peaks-onliness for fp-choice correspondences but as discussed in Remark 2.3, it
easily extends to choice correspondences.
Extreme-peaks-onliness. Let fixed population N ∈ P and fp-choice correspon-
dence F ∈ FN . For each pair of profiles R, R¯ ∈ RN , if Conv(p(R)) = Conv(p(R¯)),
then F (R) = F (R¯).
Notice that extreme-peaks-onliness not only implies the properties of
anonymity24 and peaks-onliness,25 but since it only depends on the extreme agents’
peaks, it is a much stronger property.
Lemma 2.5 (Efficiency and one-sided replacement-dominance ⇒ ex-
treme-peaks-onliness). If a fixed population consists of at least 3 agents,
then each associated fp-choice correspondence satisfying efficiency and one-sided
replacement-dominance also satisfies extreme-peaks-onliness.
Proof. Let fixed population N ∈ P be such that |N | ≥ 3 and fp-choice corre-
spondence F ∈ FN satisfy efficiency and one-sided replacement-dominance. Let
the pair of profiles R, R¯ ∈ RN be such that Conv(p(R)) = Conv(p(R¯)). Without
loss of generality, assume that N = {1, 2, . . . , n} and
¯
p(R) = p(R1) ≤ p(R2) ≤
. . . ≤ p(Rn) = p¯(R). In the following, we refer to agents who have neither the
unique smallest peak nor the unique largest peak as middle agents.
We prove that F (R) = F (R¯) in three steps.
Step 1. We show that if the preferences of one agent change and the convex
hull of the peaks does not change, the chosen set does not change.
Case 1.1. The preferences of a middle agent at profile R change such that the
convex hull of the peaks does not change. Let agent k ∈ N be a middle agent
at profile R and let profile R¯ ∈ RN be such that R¯−k = R−k, and Conv(p(R¯)) =
Conv(p(R)). Notice that agent k is also a middle agent at profile R¯.26
By efficiency, F (R¯) ∈ PE(R¯) and F (R) ∈ PE(R). Since agent k is a middle
agent at both profiles R and R¯, Conv(p(R¯)) = Conv(p(R)) = Conv(p(R−k)),
and by Corollary 2.1, F (R¯), F (R) ∈ PE(R−k). Since R¯−k = R−k, by one-sided
replacement-dominance, for each agent i ∈ N \ {k}, F (R¯) Ri F (R) or for each
agent i ∈ N \ {k}, F (R) Ri F (R¯). By efficiency of both sets F (R) and F (R¯)
at profile R−k, for each agent i ∈ N \ {k}, F (R) Ii F (R¯). By Corollary 2.2,
24Anonymity : the identities of the agents do not affect the chosen set.
25Peaks-Onliness: only the peaks of the agents affect the chosen set.
26Note that if agent 1 (agent n) does not have the unique smallest (largest) peak, then he is
a middle agent.
2.B. PROOF OF LEMMA 2.2 49
Conv(F (R¯)) = Conv(F (R)) and since we always represent any efficient set by its
convex hull, F (R¯) = F (R).
Case 1.2. Either the preferences of the agent with the unique smallest peak at
profiles R and R¯ change (agent 1), or the preferences of the agent with the unique
largest peak at profiles R and R¯ change (agent n), such that the convex hull of
the peaks does not change. By symmetry of arguments, assume that profile R¯ is
such that R¯−1 = R−1 and Conv(p(R¯)) = Conv(p(R)). Hence, p(R¯1) = p(R1) <
p(R2) ≤ . . . ≤ p(Rn).
Begin from profile R and construct profile R1 by changing middle agent 2’s
preferences to R12 = R1, i.e., R
1 = (R−2, R12) where Conv(R
1) = Conv(p(R)). By
Case 1.1, F (R1) = F (R). Next, change middle agent 1’s preferences to R21 = R¯1
such that the new profile is R2 = (R1−1, R
2
1) where Conv(R
2) = Conv(R1). By
Case 1.1, F (R2) = F (R1). Finally, change middle agent 2’s preferences back to
R2 and notice that the new profile (R
2
−2, R2) = R¯ where Conv(p(R¯)) = Conv(R
2).
By Case 1.1, F (R¯) = F (R2). Therefore, F (R¯) = F (R).
Step 2. We show that if two agents swap preferences, then the chosen set
does not change.
Case 2.1. At least one of the swapping agents is a middle agent at profile
R. Assume profile R¯ is obtained from profile R by agents j, k ∈ N swapping
preferences, i.e., R¯−j,k = R−j,k, R¯j = Rk, and R¯k = Rj. Let agent k ∈ N
be a middle agent at profile R. Begin from profile R and construct profile R1 by
changing agent k’s preferences to R1k = Rj, i.e., R
1 = (R−k, R1k) where Conv(R
1) =
Conv(p(R)). By Case 1.1, F (R1) = F (R). Finally, change agent j’s preferences
to R2j = Rk and notice that the new profile (R
1
−j, R
2
j ) = R¯ where Conv(p(R¯)) =
Conv(R1). By Case 1.1, F (R¯) = F (R1). Therefore, F (R¯) = F (R).
Case 2.2. None of the swapping agents is a middle agent at profile R. Hence,
p(R1) < p(R2) ≤ . . . < p(Rn). Note that in this case, R¯ ∈ RN is such that
R¯−1,n = R−1,n, R¯1 = Rn, and R¯n = R1. Begin from profile R and construct profile
R1 by swapping middle agent 2’s preferences with agent 1’s preferences, denoting
the new profile by R1. By Case 2.1, F (R1) = F (R). Next, swap middle agent
1’s preferences with agent n’s preferences, denoting the new profile by R2. By
Case 2.1, F (R2) = F (R1). Finally, swap middle agent n’s preferences with agent
2’s preferences and notice that the new profile is R¯. By Case 2.1, F (R¯) = F (R2).
Therefore, F (R¯) = F (R).
Step 3. We show how each profile R¯, where Conv(p(R¯)) = Conv(p(R)), can
be constructed from profile R by sequentially repeating the first two steps of the
proof. Let profile R¯ be such that R¯ = (R¯1¯, . . . , R¯n¯) and, without loss of generality,
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assume
¯
p(R¯) = p(R¯1¯) ≤ . . . ≤ p(R¯n¯) = p¯(R¯). Notice that set {1¯, . . . , n¯} is a
permutation of set N = {1, . . . , n}.
Begin from profile R and construct profile R1 by sequentially replacing each
agent’ preferences Ri with R¯i¯, i.e., for each i ∈ N , R1i = R¯i¯. Note that the
stepwise change of agents’ preferences never changes the convex hull of peaks and
that Conv(R1) = Conv(p(R)). By Step 1, F (R1) = F (R). Finally, permute the
agents’ preferences such that each agent i¯ obtains the preferences of agent i, i.e.,
the new profile R2 is such that for each i ∈ N , R2i¯ = R1i . Hence, for each i ∈ N ,
R2i¯ = R¯i¯ and R
2 = R¯. Since all permutations can be obtained via sequential
pairwise swaps, by Step 2, F (R¯) = F (R).
We use Lemma 2.5 in the proof of Lemma 2.2.
Proof of Lemma 2.2. Let fixed population N ∈ P be such that |N | ≥ 3 and
fp-choice correspondence F ∈ FN satisfy efficiency and one-sided replacement-
dominance. By Lemma 2.5, F satisfies extreme-peaks-onliness. Let agent j ∈ N
and the pair of profiles R, R¯ ∈ RN be such that R−j = R¯−j.
We show that if Conv(p(R¯)) ⊆ Conv(p(R)), then all remaining agents end up at
least as well off, i.e., for each i ∈ N \{j}, F (R¯)RiF (R). Without loss of generality,
assume that N = {1, 2, . . . , n} and
¯
p(R) = p(R1) ≤ p(R2) ≤ . . . ≤ p(Rn) = p¯(R).
In the following, we refer to agents who have neither the unique smallest peak nor
the unique largest peak as middle agents.
Case 1. Let Conv(p(R¯)) = Conv(p(R)). By extreme-peaks-onliness, F (R¯) =
F (R).
Case 2. Let Conv(p(R¯)) ( Conv(p(R)). Hence, at profile R, either agent
j = 1 has the unique smallest peak or agent j = n has the unique largest peak.
By symmetry of arguments, assume that j = 1 has the unique smallest peak and
profile R¯ is such that R¯−1 = R−1.
Case 2.1. Agent 1 is a middle agent at profile R¯. Then, Conv(p(R¯)) =
Conv(p(R−1)). By efficiency, F (R¯) ∈ PE(R¯) and F (R) ∈ PE(R). By Corol-
lary 2.1, F (R¯) ∈ PE(R−1).
Assume that F (R) ⊆ Conv(p(R−1)). Since F (R) ∈ PE(R), by Proposi-
tion 2.1 (ii), Conv(F (R)) ∩ p(R) ⊆ F (R). Hence, Conv(F (R)) ∩ p(R−1) ⊆ F (R)
and by Proposition 2.1, F (R) ∈ PE(R−1). Since R¯−1 = R−1 and Conv(p(R¯)) (
Conv(p(R)), by one-sided replacement-dominance, for each agent i ∈ N \ {1},
F (R¯)Ri F (R) or for each agent i ∈ N \ {1}, F (R)Ri F (R¯). By efficiency of both
sets F (R) and F (R¯) at profile R−1, for each agent i ∈ N \ {1}, F (R) Ii F (R¯).
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By Corollary 2.2, Conv(F (R¯)) = Conv(F (R)), and since we always represent any
efficient set by its convex hull, F (R¯) = F (R).
Assume that F (R) 6⊆ Conv(p(R−1)). Then, minimum
¯
F (R) <
¯
p(R−1) ≤
¯
F (R¯) ≤ p(Rn). Hence, agent n’s worst points are wF (R)(Rn) = {
¯
F (R)} and
wF (R¯)(Rn) = {¯F (R¯)}. By single-peakedness, wF (R¯)(Rn) Pn wF (R)(Rn). By one-
sided replacement-dominance, agent n is better off, F (R¯) Pn F (R). Hence, by
one-sided replacement-dominance, for each agent i ∈ N \ {1}, F (R¯)Ri F (R).
Case 2.2. Recall that Conv(p(R¯)) ( Conv(p(R)) and that agent 1 has the
unique smallest peak at profile R. In addition, let agent 1 also have the unique
smallest peak at profile R¯. Then, Conv(p(R−1)) ( Conv(p(R¯)) ( Conv(p(R)).
Hence, p(R1) < p(R¯1) < p(R2) ≤ . . . ≤ p(Rn).
Begin from profile R and construct profile R1 by changing middle agent 2’s
preferences to R12 = R¯1, i.e., R
1 = (R−2, R12). Since Conv(R
1) = Conv(p(R)),
by extreme-peaks-onliness, F (R1) = F (R). Next, change agent 1’s preferences
to R21 = R¯1 such that the new profile is R
2 = (R1−1, R
2
1). Since agent 1 has the
unique smallest peak at profile R1 and is a middle agent at profile R2, by Case
2.1, for each agent i ∈ N \ {1, 2}, F (R2) Ri F (R1). Finally, change middle agent
2’s preferences back to R2 and notice that the new profile (R
2
−2, R2) = R¯. Since
Conv(p(R¯)) = Conv(R2), by extreme-peaks-onliness, F (R¯) = F (R2). Therefore,
for each agent i ∈ N \ {1, 2}, F (R¯) Ri F (R). In particular, F (R¯) Rn F (R). Since
agent n has the largest peak, efficiency and single-peakedness imply
¯
F (R) ≤
¯
F (R¯)
and F¯ (R) ≤ F¯ (R¯). Hence, either F (R¯) = F (R) or F (R¯) Pn F (R). Then, since
Conv(p(R¯)) ( Conv(p(R)) and R¯−1 = R−1, by one-sided replacement-dominance,
for each agent i ∈ N \ {1} (including agent 2 now), F (R¯)Ri F (R).
2.C Proof of Proposition 2.5
Before proceeding with the proof of Proposition 2.5, we first prove an implication
of efficiency and population-monotonicity.
Lemma 2.6. Let choice correspondence F ∈ F satisfy efficiency and population-
monotonicity. Then, for each population N ∈ P such that |N | ≥ 3 and each
profile R ∈ RN , the following hold.
(i) Without loss of generality, let agents 1, 2 ∈ N where p(R1) =
¯
p(R) and
p(R2) =
¯
p(R−1). If maximum F¯ (R) ∈ Conv(p(R−1)) and maximum F¯ (R) ∈
wF (R)(R2), then maxima F¯ (R) = F¯ (R−1). Moreover, if F (R) ⊆ Conv(p(R−1)),
then F (R) = F (R−1).
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(ii) Without loss of generality, let agents n − 1, n ∈ N where p(Rn) = p¯(R)
and p(Rn−1) = p¯(R−n). If minimum
¯
F (R) ∈ Conv(p(R−n)) and minimum
¯
F (R) ∈
wF (R)(Rn−1), then minima
¯
F (R) =
¯
F (R−n). Moreover, if F (R) ⊆ Conv(p(R−n)),
then F (R) = F (R−n).
Proof. Let choice correspondence F ∈ F satisfy efficiency and population-
monotonicity. Let population N ∈ P be such that |N | ≥ 3 and profile R ∈ RN .
(i) Let agents 1, 2 ∈ N be such that p(R1) =
¯
p(R) and p(R2) =
¯
p(R−1).
Let maximum F¯ (R) ∈ Conv(p(R−1)) and maximum F¯ (R) ∈ wF (R)(R2). Hence,
p(R2) ≤ F¯ (R). By population-monotonicity and Lemma 2.1, for each agent i ∈
N \{1}, F (R−1)RiF (R). Let agent n ∈ N \{1, 2} have the largest peak at profile
R, i.e., p(Rn) = p¯(R) = p¯(R−1). Since agent n has the largest peak at profiles
R and R−1, F (R−1) Rn F (R) and efficiency imply
¯
F (R) ≤
¯
F (R−1) ≤ p(Rn) and
F¯ (R) ≤ F¯ (R−1) ≤ p(Rn). Since agent 2 has the smallest peak at profile R−1,
p(R2) ≤ F¯ (R), and F¯ (R) ∈ wF (R)(R2), F (R−1) R1 F (R) and efficiency imply
p(R2) ≤ F¯ (R−1) ≤ F¯ (R). Therefore, maxima F¯ (R) = F¯ (R−1).
Moreover, let F (R) ⊆ Conv(p(R−1)). Hence, p(R2) ≤
¯
F (R). Since agent 2
has the smallest peak at profile R−1 and p(R2) ≤
¯
F (R), F (R−1) R1 F (R) and
efficiency imply p(R2) ≤
¯
F (R−1) ≤
¯
F (R). Therefore, minima
¯
F (R) =
¯
F (R−1)
and thus, F (R) = F (R−n).
(ii) Symmetric proof to (i).
Proof of Proposition 2.5. Let choice correspondence F ∈ F satisfy efficiency
and population-monotonicity. Recall that for each population N ∈ P , each choice
correspondence F ∈ F specifies an fp-choice correspondence F ∈ FN . Since for
each N ∈ P such that |N | ≤ 2, (one-sided) replacement-dominance imposes no
restriction on fp-choice correspondence F ∈ FN , let N ∈ P be such that |N | ≥ 3.
We show that for each profile R ∈ RN , if the preferences of an agent j ∈ N
change, such that R−j = R¯−j and Conv(p(R¯)) ⊆ Conv(p(R)), then the other
agents whose preferences remained unchanged all end up at least as well off, as they
were initially, i.e., for each i ∈ N \{j}, F (R)RiF (R¯).27 Without loss of generality,
assume that N = {1, 2, . . . , n} and
¯
p(R) = p(R1) ≤ p(R2) ≤ . . . ≤ p(Rn) = p¯(R).
In the following, we refer to agents who have neither the unique smallest peak nor
the unique largest peak as middle agents.
Case 1. Let Conv(p(R¯)) = Conv(p(R)).
Case 1.1. Let agent j be a middle agent at both profiles R and R¯. Then,
27Notice that the roles of profiles R and R¯ can be reversed, hence the case where Conv(p(R)) ⊆
Conv(p(R¯)) is also covered.
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Conv(p(R¯)) = Conv(p(R)) = Conv(p(R−j)). Remove agent j from profile R to ob-
tain profile R−j. Since Conv(p(R−j)) = Conv(p(R)), by population-monotonicity
and Lemma 2.1, F (R−j) = F (R). Next, add agent j with preferences R¯j to ob-
tain profile R¯. Since Conv(p(R¯)) = Conv(p(R−j)), by population-monotonicity
and Lemma 2.1, F (R¯) = F (R−j). Therefore, F (R¯) = F (R).
Case 1.2. Let agent j have the unique smallest (largest) peak at both profiles
R and R¯. Hence, either agent j = 1 has the unique smallest peak at both profiles
R and R¯ or agent j = n has the unique largest peak at both profiles R and R¯. By
symmetry of arguments, assume that j = 1 and profile R¯ is such that R¯−1 = R−1.
Hence, p(R1) = p(R¯1) < p(R2) ≤ . . . ≤ p(Rn).
Begin from profile R and construct profile R1 by changing agent 2’s preferences
to R12 = R1, i.e., R
1 = (R−2, R12). Since Conv(R
1) = Conv(p(R)) and agent 2 is a
middle agent at both profiles R1 and R, by Case 1.1, F (R1) = F (R). Next, change
agent 1’s preferences to R21 = R¯1 such that the new profile is R
2 = (R1−1, R
2
1). Since
Conv(R2) = Conv(R1) and agent 1 is a middle agent at both profiles R2 and R1,
by Case 1.1, F (R2) = F (R1). Finally, change agent 2’s preferences back to R2 and
notice that the new profile (R2−2, R2) = R¯. Since Conv(p(R¯)) = Conv(R
2) and
agent 2 is a middle agent at both profiles R¯ and R2, by Case 1.1, F (R¯) = F (R2).
Therefore, F (R¯) = F (R).
Case 2. Let Conv(p(R¯)) ( Conv(p(R)). Hence, either agent j = 1 has the
unique smallest peak at profile R or agent j = n has the unique largest peak at
profile R. By symmetry of arguments, assume that j = 1 and profile R¯ is such
that R¯−1 = R−1.
Case 2.1. Let agent 1 be a middle agent at profile R¯. Then, Conv(p(R¯)) =
Conv(p(R−1)). Begin from profile R and remove agent 1 from profile R to obtain
profile R−1. By population-monotonicity and Lemma 2.1, for each agent i ∈
N\{1}, F (R−1)RiF (R). Next, add agent 1 with preferences R¯1 to obtain profile R¯.
Since Conv(p(R¯)) = Conv(p(R−1)), by population-monotonicity and Lemma 2.1,
F (R¯) = F (R−1). Therefore, for each agent i ∈ N \ {1}, F (R¯)Ri F (R).
Case 2.2. Recall that Conv(p(R¯)) ( Conv(p(R)) and let agent 1 have the
unique smallest peak at profile R. In addition, let agent 1 also have the unique
smallest peak at profile R¯. Then, Conv(p(R−1)) ( Conv(p(R¯)) ( Conv(p(R)).
Hence, p(R1) < p(R¯1) < p(R2) ≤ . . . ≤ p(Rn). The proof of this case proceeds in
two parts.
First, we show that for each agent i ∈ N \ {1, 2}, F (R¯) Ri F (R) and
F (R¯)R¯1F (R). Begin from profile R and construct profile R
1 by changing agent 2’s
preferences to R12 = R¯1, i.e., R
1 = (R−2, R12). Since Conv(R
1) = Conv(p(R)) and
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agent 2 is a middle agent at both profiles R1 and R, by Case 1.1, F (R1) = F (R).
Next, change agent 1’s preferences to R21 = R¯1 such that the new profile is R
2 =
(R1−1, R
2
1). Since agent 1 is a middle agent at profile R
2, by Case 2.1, for each agent
i ∈ N \{1}, F (R2)R1i F (R1). Hence, for each agent i ∈ N \{1, 2}, F (R2)RiF (R1)
and F (R2) R¯1 F (R
1). Finally, change agent 2’s preferences back to R2 and notice
that the new profile (R2−2, R2) = R¯. Since Conv(p(R¯)) = Conv(R
2) and agent 2 is
a middle agent at both profiles R¯ and R2, by Case 1.1, F (R¯) = F (R2). Therefore,
for each agent i ∈ N \ {1, 2}, F (R¯)Ri F (R) and F (R¯) R¯1 F (R).
Second, we prove that F (R¯) R2 F (R). Since agent n has the largest peak at
both profiles R and R¯, F (R¯)RnF (R) and efficiency imply
¯
F (R) ≤
¯
F (R¯) ≤ p(Rn)
and F¯ (R) ≤ F¯ (R¯) ≤ p(Rn). Hence, either F (R¯) = F (R) or F (R¯) Pn F (R). If
F (R¯) = F (R), then F (R¯) R2 F (R). If F (R¯) Pn F (R), then (a)
¯
F (R) <
¯
F (R¯) ≤
p(Rn) or (b) F¯ (R) < F¯ (R¯) ≤ p(Rn).
If
¯
F (R) ≥ p(R2), then F (R¯) ⊆ Conv(p(R−1)) and by Lemma 2.6 (i),
F (R¯) = F (R−1). Next, consider the change from profile R to R−1. By population-
monotonicity and Lemma 2.1, for each agent i ∈ N \{1}, F (R−1)RiF (R). There-
fore, for each agent i ∈ N \ {1} (including agent 2 now), F (R¯)Ri F (R).
The remaining case is that
¯
F (R) < p(R2). Since agent 1 has the smallest peak
at profile R¯, efficiency implies p(R¯1) ≤
¯
F (R¯) ≤ F¯ (R¯). If (a)
¯
F (R) <
¯
F (R¯), then
F (R¯) R¯1F (R) implies
¯
F (R) < p(R¯1) and if (b) F¯ (R) < F¯ (R¯), then F (R¯) R¯1F (R)
implies F¯ (R) < p(R¯1) and thus,
¯
F (R) < p(R¯1).
Hence, there are two cases (2.2.α)
¯
F (R) < p(R¯1) ≤
¯
F (R¯) < p(R2) and F¯ (R) =
F¯ (R¯) and (2.2.β)
¯
F (R) ≤ F¯ (R) < p(R¯1) ≤
¯
F (R¯) < p(R2).
Case 2.2.α. If F¯ (R) = F¯ (R¯) ≤ p(R2), then bF (R)(R2) = F¯ (R) = F¯ (R¯) =
bF (R¯)(R2) ≤ p(R2) and wF (R)(R2) = ¯F (R) < ¯F (R¯) = wF (R¯)(R2) < p(R2). By
single-peakedness, F (R¯) P2 F (R).
If F¯ (R) = F¯ (R¯) > p(R2), then bF (R)(R2) = bF (R¯)(R2) = p(R2), wF (R)(R2) ∈
{
¯
F (R), F¯ (R)}, and wF (R¯)(R2) ∈ {¯F (R¯), F¯ (R¯)}. Then, ¯F (R) < ¯F (R¯) < p(R2) <
F¯ (R) = F¯ (R¯) and single-peakedness imply F (R¯)R2 F (R).
Case 2.2.β. Notice that bF (R)(R2) = {F¯ (R)} and wF (R)(R2) = {
¯
F (R)}.
If F¯ (R¯) ≤ p(R2), then F¯ (R¯) ∈ bF (R¯)(R2) and ¯F (R¯) ∈ wF (R¯)(R2). Since then
¯
F (R) ≤ F¯ (R) <
¯
F (R¯) ≤ F¯ (R¯) ≤ p(R2), by single-peakedness, F (R¯) P2 F (R).
If F¯ (R¯) > p(R2), then bF (R¯)(R2) = {p(R2)} and wF (R¯)(R2) ⊆ {¯F (R¯), F¯ (R¯)}.
Hence, bF (R¯)(R2)P2 bF (R)(R2). Since ¯
F (R) <
¯
F (R¯) < p(R2), by single-peakedness,
¯
F (R¯) P2
¯
F (R) = wF (R)(R2).
If
¯
F (R¯) ∈ wF (R¯)(R2), then wF (R¯)(R2) P2 wF (R)(R2) and F (R¯) P2 F (R).
Finally, if
¯
F (R¯) 6∈ wF (R¯)(R2), then wF (R¯)(R2) = {F¯ (R¯)}. Note that F¯ (R¯) ∈
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Conv(p(R−1)). By Lemma 2.6 (i), F¯ (R¯) = F¯ (R−1). Consider the change from
profile R to R−1. By population-monotonicity and Lemma 2.1, for each agent
i ∈ N \ {1}, F (R−1)Ri F (R). In particular, F (R−1)R2 F (R) and wF (R−1)(R2)R2
wF (R)(R2). Since agent 2 has the smallest peak at profile R−1, efficiency and
single-peakedness imply that F¯ (R−1) ∈ wF (R−1)(R2). Hence, F¯ (R¯) ∈ wF (R−1)(R2)
and wF (R¯)(R2) = F¯ (R¯)R2 wF (R)(R2). Therefore, F (R¯)R2 F (R).
2.D Proof of Theorem 2.1
Before proceeding with the proof of Theorem 2.1, we first prove some implications
of efficiency and (one-sided) replacement-dominance. The first implication is peak-
monotonicity, introduced by Ching (1994). The definition follows.
An fp-choice correspondence satisfies peak-monotonicity if whenever an agent’s
preferences change such that his peak moves to the left (right), the chosen set
moves to the left (right). We formulate peak-monotonicity for fp-choice correspon-
dences but as discussed in Remark 2.3, it easily extends to choice correspondences.
Peak-monotonicity. Let fixed population N ∈ P and fp-choice correspondence
F ∈ FN . For each agent j ∈ N and each pair of profiles R, R¯ ∈ RN such that
R−j = R¯−j,
if p(R¯j) ≤ p(Rj), then

minimum
¯
F (R¯) ≤
¯
F (R)
and
maximum F¯ (R¯) ≤ F¯ (R).
Lemma 2.7 (Efficiency and one-sided replacement-dominance ⇒ peak–
monotonicity). If a fixed population consists of at least 3 agents, then an associ-
ated fp-choice correspondence that satisfies efficiency and one-sided replacement-
dominance also satisfies peak-monotonicity.
Proof. Let fixed population N ∈ P such that |N | ≥ 3 and fp-choice corre-
spondence F ∈ FN satisfy efficiency and one-sided replacement-dominance. Let
agent j ∈ N and the pair of profiles R, R¯ ∈ RN be such that R−j = R¯−j and
p(R¯j) ≤ p(Rj). By efficiency, F (R) ∈ PE(R) and F (R¯) ∈ PE(R¯). In the follow-
ing, we refer to agents who have neither the unique smallest peak nor the unique
largest peak as middle agents.
Case 1. Let agent j be a middle agent or have the smallest peak at profile
R. Hence,
¯
p(R¯) ≤
¯
p(R) ≤ p¯(R¯) = p¯(R) and Conv(p(R)) ⊆ Conv(p(R¯)). By
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one-sided replacement-dominance and Lemma 2.2, for each agent i ∈ N \ {j},
F (R)RiF (R¯). Finally, let agent n ∈ N \{j} have the largest peak at profile R, i.e.,
p(Rn) = p¯(R) = p¯(R¯). By F (R) Rn F (R¯) and efficiency,
¯
F (R¯) ≤
¯
F (R) ≤ p(Rn)
and F¯ (R¯) ≤ F¯ (R) ≤ p(Rn).
Case 2. Let agent j have the unique largest peak at profile R.
Case 2.1. Let agent j have the unique largest peak at profile R and be a
middle agent at profile R¯. Hence,
¯
p(R¯) =
¯
p(R) ≤ p¯(R¯) < p¯(R). By the symmetric
argument of Case 1 (with agent n being a middle agent at profile R¯ instead of agent
1 being a middle agent at profile R, and with agent n’s peak moving to the right
instead of agent 1’s peak moving to the left),
¯
F (R¯) ≤
¯
F (R) and F¯ (R¯) ≤ F¯ (R).
Case 2.2. Let agent j have the unique largest peak at profile R and the unique
smallest peak at profile R¯. Hence,
¯
p(R¯) <
¯
p(R) ≤ p¯(R¯) < p¯(R). Begin from profile
R and construct profile R1 by changing agent j’s preferences to R1j such that his
peak p(R1j ) =
¯
p(R), i.e., R1 = (R−j, R1j ). Since agent j has the unique largest
peak at profile R and is a middle agent at profile R1, by Case 2.1,
¯
F (R1) ≤
¯
F (R)
and F¯ (R1) ≤ F¯ (R). Finally, change agent j’s preferences to R¯j and notice that
the new profile (R1−j, R¯j) = R¯. Since agent j is a middle agent at profile R
1, by
Case 1,
¯
F (R¯) ≤
¯
F (R1) ≤
¯
F (R) and F¯ (R¯) ≤ F¯ (R1) ≤ F¯ (R).
The second implication of efficiency and (one-sided) replacement-dominance
is uncompromisingness, introduced by Border and Jordan (1983). The definition
follows.
Loosely speaking, an fp-choice correspondence satisfies uncompromisingness if
whenever an agent’s preferences change such that his peaks, before and after this
change, both lie on the same side of the minimum (maximum) point chosen, the
minimum (maximum) point chosen does not change. We formulate uncompromis-
ingness –and later set-uncompromisingness– for fp-choice correspondences but as
discussed in Remark 2.3, they easily extend to choice correspondences.
Uncompromisingness. Let fixed population N ∈ P and fp-choice correspondence
F ∈ FN . For each agent j ∈ N and each pair of profiles R, R¯ ∈ RN such that
R−j = R¯−j,
if

p(Rj) <
¯
F (R) and p(R¯j) ≤
¯
F (R)
or
p(Rj) >
¯
F (R) and p(R¯j) ≥
¯
F (R),
then minima
¯
F (R) =
¯
F (R¯)
and
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if

p(Rj) > F¯ (R) and p(R¯j) ≥ F¯ (R)
or
p(Rj) < F¯ (R) and p(R¯j) ≤ F¯ (R),
then maxima F¯ (R) = F¯ (R¯).
Uncompromisingness immediately implies the following notion of set-
uncompromisingness.
Set-uncompromisingness. Let fixed population N ∈ P and fp-choice correspon-
dence F ∈ FN . For each agent j ∈ N and each pair of profiles R, R¯ ∈ RN such
that R−j = R¯−j,
if

p(Rj) <
¯
F (R) and p(R¯j) ≤
¯
F (R)
or
p(Rj) > F¯ (R) and p(R¯j) ≥ F¯ (R),
then F (R) = F (R¯).
Lemma 2.8 (Uncompromisingness ⇒ set-uncompromisingness). Each
fp-choice correspondence satisfying uncompromisingness also satisfies set-
uncompromisingness.
Proof. Follows trivially by the definitions of uncompomisingness and set-
uncompromisingness.
Before stating in Lemma 2.10 some conditions under which an fp-choice corre-
spondence satisfies uncompromisingness, we first state a result for the domain of
symmetric single-peaked preferences S (Lemma 2.9). This is the only result where
we have to change the proof technique when dealing with domain S.28 Specifi-
cally, we prove Lemma 2.9 using a so-called “leapfrogging” argument. During
each leapfrog we right (left) extend the convex hull of the peaks by some distance
and if this distance is not enough we repeat this argument as many (finite) times
as necessary. Notice that Lemma 2.9 also holds on the domain of single-peaked
preferences R.
Lemma 2.9. Let fixed population N ∈ P be such that |N | ≥ 3 and fp-choice
correspondence F ∈ FN satisfy efficiency and one-sided replacement-dominance.
For each agent j ∈ N and each pair of profiles R, R¯ ∈ RN such that R−j = R¯−j
and Conv(p(R)) ( Conv(p(R¯)),
28Recall that all steps in all other proofs are for domain R but they automatically apply to
domain S.
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(i) if minimum
¯
F (R) < p¯(R) < p(R¯j), then minima
¯
F (R¯) =
¯
F (R). More-
over, if also maximum F¯ (R) < p¯(R), then F (R¯) = F (R),
(ii) if maximum F¯ (R) >
¯
p(R) > p(R¯j), then maxima F¯ (R¯) = F¯ (R). More-
over, if also minimum
¯
F (R) >
¯
p(R), then F (R¯) = F (R).
Proof. Let fixed population N ∈ P be such that |N | ≥ 3 and fp-choice corre-
spondence F ∈ FN satisfy efficiency and one-sided replacement-dominance. By
Lemmas 2.5 (Appendix 2.B) and 2.7, F satisfies extreme-peaks-onliness and peak-
monotonicity.
Let agent j ∈ N and the pair of profiles R, R¯ ∈ RN be such that R−j = R¯−j
and Conv(p(R)) ( Conv(p(R¯)). By efficiency, F (R) ∈ PE(R). By extreme-peaks-
onliness, it is without loss of generality to assume that both profiles R and R¯ are
symmetric, i.e., R, R¯ ∈ SN .29 In the following, we refer to agents who have neither
the unique smallest peak nor the unique largest peak as middle agents. Moreover,
we only prove (i) since the proof of (ii) is symmetric.
Let minimum
¯
F (R) < p¯(R) < p(R¯j). Since p¯(R) < p(R¯j) and F (R) ∈ PE(R),
by Proposition 2.1 (i),
¯
p(R) ≤
¯
F (R) ≤ F¯ (R) ≤ p¯(R) < p(R¯j). Since also
Conv(p(R)) ( Conv(p(R¯)), agent j either [is a middle agent at profile R and
has the unique largest peak at profile R¯] or [has the unique largest peak at both
profiles R and R¯].
Case 1. Let agent j be a middle agent at profile R and have the unique largest
peak at profile R¯. Let agent n ∈ N \ {j} have the largest peak at profile R, i.e.,
p(Rn) = p¯(R). Hence, minimum
¯
F (R) < p¯(R) and efficiency imply
¯
F (R) < p(Rn)
and F¯ (R) ≤ p(Rn). By single-peakedness, bF (R)(Rn) = F¯ (R) and wF (R)(Rn) =
¯
F (R).
Let the distance between minimum
¯
F (R) and peak p(Rn) be δ0 = |
¯
F (R) −
p(Rn)|. Let point x1 ∈ R be on the right side of peak p(Rn), i.e., x1 > p(Rn) =
p¯(R), such that the distance between minimum
¯
F (R) and point x1 is δ1 = |
¯
F (R)−
x1| = 32δ0. Hence, distance |p(Rn)− x1| = |¯F (R)− x1| − |¯F (R)− p(Rn)| =
1
2
δ0 =
1
2
|
¯
F (R)− p(Rn)| and point x1 is closer to peak p(Rn) than minimum
¯
F (R) is.
Step 1. Begin from profile R and construct profile R1 by changing agent j’s
preferences to R1j ∈ S such that his peak
p(R1j ) =
p(R¯j) if p(R¯j) ≤ x1x1 otherwise,
29For each agent i ∈ N , we can replace preferences Ri, R¯i ∈ R by preferences R′i, R¯′i ∈ S such
that p(Ri) = p(R
′
i) and p(R¯i) = p(R¯
′
i). Then, by extreme-peaks-onliness, F (R) = F (R
′) and
F (R¯) = F (R¯′).
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i.e., R1 = (R−j, R1j ). Hence, R
1
−j = R−j. By efficiency and Proposition 2.1 (i),
¯
p(R) =
¯
p(R1) ≤
¯
F (R1) ≤ F¯ (R1) ≤ p¯(R1) = p(R¯j). Since p(R1j ) > p(Rj),
by peak-monotonicity, minimum
¯
F (R1) ≥
¯
F (R) and maximum F¯ (R1) ≥ F¯ (R).
Hence,
¯
F (R1) ∈ [
¯
F (R), p(R¯j)] and F¯ (R
1) ∈ [F¯ (R), p(R¯j)]. Since Conv(p(R)) (
Conv(R1), by one-sided replacement-dominance and Lemma 2.2, agent n ends
up at most as well off, F (R) Rn F (R
1). Hence, bF (R)(Rn) Rn bF (R1)(Rn) and
wF (R)(Rn)Rn wF (R1)(Rn).
If
¯
F (R1) ∈ [p(Rn), p(R¯j)], then wF (R1)(Rn) = F¯ (R1) ∈ [p(Rn), p(R¯j)]. The
distance of agent n’s worst point F¯ (R1) to peak p(Rn) is |p(Rn) − F¯ (R1)| ≤
|p(Rn)−p(R1j )| ≤ |p(Rn)−x1| = 12δ0 = 12 |¯F (R)−p(Rn)|, which is smaller than the
distance of minimum
¯
F (R) to peak p(Rn). By symmetric single-peakedness, agent
n prefers wF (R1)(Rn) = F¯ (R
1) to wF (R)(Rn) =
¯
F (R); a contradiction. Hence,
¯
F (R1) ∈ [
¯
F (R), p(Rn)) and wF (R1)(Rn) =
¯
F (R1). Since
¯
F (R1) < p(Rn), for agent
n to find wF (R)(Rn) =
¯
F (R) at least as desirable as wF (R1)(Rn) =
¯
F (R1), then
minimum
¯
F (R) ≥
¯
F (R1). Hence, minima
¯
F (R1) =
¯
F (R).
Moreover, let maximum F¯ (R) < p¯(R) = p(Rn). Then, bF (R)(Rn) = F¯ (R).
Recall that F¯ (R1) ∈ [F¯ (R), p(R¯j)]. If F¯ (R1) ∈ [p(Rn), p(R¯j)], then agent n prefers
bF (R1)(Rn) = p(Rn) to bF (R)(Rn) = F¯ (R); a contradiction. Hence, F¯ (R
1) ∈
[F¯ (R), p(Rn)) and bF (R1)(Rn) = F¯ (R
1). Since F¯ (R1) < p(Rn), for agent n to find
bF (R)(Rn) = F¯ (R) at least as desirable as bF (R1)(Rn) = F¯ (R
1), then maximum
F¯ (R) ≥ F¯ (R1). Hence, maxima F¯ (R1) = F¯ (R) and F (R1) = F (R).
If p(R1j ) = p(R¯j), then Conv(R
1) = Conv(p(R¯)) and by extreme-peaks-
onliness, F (R1) = F (R¯) and we are done. If p(R1j ) 6= p(R¯j), then note that
agent n is now a middle agent and agent j has the unique largest peak at pro-
file R1. We now explain the term “leapfrogging” in order to explain the proof
technique: in Step 1, the peak of agent j moves to the right of agent n’s peak
by figuratively leapfrogging over agent n. In Step 2, the roles of agents j and n
reverse, and agent n leapfrogs over agent j to the right, etc.
Let point x2 ∈ R be on the right side of peak p(R1j ), i.e., x2 > p(R1j ) = p¯(R1),
such that the distance between minimum
¯
F (R) and point x2 is δ2 = |
¯
F (R)−x2| =
3
2
δ1. Hence, distance |p(R1j ) − x2| = |¯F (R) − x2| − |¯F (R) − p(R
1
j )| = 12δ1 =
1
2
|
¯
F (R)− p(R1j )| and point x2 is closer to peak p(R1j ) than minimum ¯F (R) is.
Step 2. Begin from profile R1 and construct profile R2 by changing agent n’s
preferences to R2n ∈ S such that his peak
p(R2n) =
p(R¯j) if p(R¯j) ≤ x2x2 otherwise,
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i.e., R2 = (R1−n, R
2
n). Hence, R
2
−n = R
1
−n. By the arguments described in the
previous step (with profiles R and R1 replaced by profiles R1 and R2 and with
agent n in the role of agent j), minima
¯
F (R2) =
¯
F (R1) =
¯
F (R).
Moreover, let maximum F¯ (R) < p¯(R). Then, maximum F¯ (R) = F¯ (R1) <
p¯(R1) = p(R1j ) and by the arguments described in the previous step (with profiles
R and R1 replaced by profiles R1 and R2 and with agent n in the role of agent j),
F (R2) = F (R1) = F (R).
If p(R2n) = p(R¯j), then Conv(R
2) = Conv(p(R¯)) and by extreme-peaks-
onliness, F (R2) = F (R¯) and we are done. If p(R2j ) 6= p(R¯j). Then, according
to the reasoning described below, repeat the leapfrogging steps described above
ν ∈ N+ amount of times.
Recall that δ1 =
3
2
δ0 and δ2 =
3
2
δ1. Hence, δν =
3
2
δν−1 =
(
3
2
)ν
δ0 and since
δ0 6= 0, in the limit, limν→∞ δν = ∞. Thus, for each profile R¯ ∈ RN such that
R¯−j = R−j and p(R¯j) > p(Rj), there exists a finite ν ∈ N+ such that the distance
δν > |
¯
F (R) − p(R¯j)|. Therefore, for each profile R¯ ∈ RN such that R¯−j = R−j
and p(R¯j) > p(Rj), there exists a profile R
ν such that Conv(Rν) = Conv(p(R¯))
and the following holds. If minimum
¯
F (R) < p¯(R) = p(Rn) < p(R¯j), then minima
¯
F (Rν) =
¯
F (R) and moreover, if also maximum F¯ (R) < p¯(R), then F (Rν) = F (R).
Since Conv(Rν) = Conv(p(R¯)), by extreme-peaks-onliness, F (Rν) = F (R¯) and we
are done.
Case 2. Let agent j = n have the unique largest peak at profiles R and R¯.
Let agent k ∈ N \ {j} be a middle agent at profile R and construct profile R1
by changing his preferences to R1k such that his peak p(R
1
k) = p¯(R), i.e., R
1 =
(R−k, R1k). Since Conv(R
1) = Conv(p(R)), by extreme-peaks-onliness, F (R1) =
F (R). Therefore, since minimum
¯
F (R) < p¯(R) = p¯(R1) = p(R1k) < p(R¯j), by
Case 1, minima
¯
F (R¯) =
¯
F (R1) =
¯
F (R) and moreover, if also maximum F¯ (R) <
p¯(R) = p¯(R1), by Case 1, F (R¯) = F (R1) = F (R).
Lemma 2.10 (Efficiency and one-sided replacement-dominance ⇒ un-
compromisingness). If a fixed population consists of at least 3 agents, then
an associated fp-choice correspondence that satisfies efficiency and one-sided
replacement-dominance also satisfies uncompromisingness.
Proof. Let fixed population N ∈ P be such that |N | ≥ 3 and fp-choice corre-
spondence F ∈ FN satisfy efficiency and one-sided replacement-dominance. By
Lemmas 2.5 (Appendix 2.B) and 2.7, F satisfies extreme-peaks-onliness and peak-
monotonicity. Let agent j ∈ N and the pair of profiles R, R¯ ∈ RN be such that
R−j = R¯−j. In the following, we refer to agents who have neither the unique
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smallest peak nor the unique largest peak as middle agents.
(i) We show that if [p(Rj) <
¯
F (R) and p(R¯j) ≤
¯
F (R)] or [p(Rj) >
¯
F (R)
and p(R¯j) ≥
¯
F (R)], then minima
¯
F (R) =
¯
F (R¯). By efficiency, F (R) ∈ PE(R).
Hence by Proposition 2.1 (i), F (R) ⊆ Conv(p(R)). Notice that Conv(p(R¯)) ⊆
Conv(p(R)) or Conv(p(R¯)) ⊇ Conv(p(R)).
Case 1. Let p(Rj) <
¯
F (R) and p(R¯j) ≤
¯
F (R). Hence, since F (R) ⊆
Conv(p(R)), p(Rj) 6= p¯(R).
Case 1.1. Let Conv(p(R¯)) = Conv(p(R)). By extreme-peaks-onliness, F (R) =
F (R¯).
Case 1.2. Let Conv(p(R¯)) ( Conv(p(R)). Hence, agent j has the unique
smallest peak at profile R and minimum
¯
F (R) ≥ p(R¯j) ≥
¯
p(R¯) > p(Rj). Begin
from profile R and construct profile R¯ by changing agent j’s preferences to R¯j,
i.e., R¯ = (R−j, R¯j). Since p(R¯j) > p(Rj) and R¯−j = R−j, by peak-monotonicity,
minimum
¯
F (R¯) ≥
¯
F (R). If minimum
¯
F (R¯) >
¯
F (R) ≥ p(R¯j), then F (R¯) 6= F (R)
and minimum
¯
F (R¯) >
¯
p(R¯) > p(Rj). Since R¯−j = R−j, by Lemma 2.9 (ii) (with
the roles of R and R¯ reversed), F (R¯) = F (R) 6= F (R¯), a contradiction. Therefore,
minima
¯
F (R¯) =
¯
F (R).
Case 1.3. Let Conv(p(R¯)) ) Conv(p(R)). Hence, agent j has the unique
smallest peak at profile R¯ and minimum
¯
F (R) > p(Rj) ≥
¯
p(R) > p(R¯j). By
Lemma 2.9 (ii), F (R¯) = F (R).
Case 2. Let p(Rj) >
¯
F (R) and p(R¯j) ≥
¯
F (R). Hence, since F (R) ⊆
Conv(p(R)), p(Rj) 6=
¯
p(R).
Case 2.1. Let Conv(p(R¯)) = Conv(p(R)). By extreme-peaks-onliness, F (R) =
F (R¯).
Case 2.2. Let Conv(p(R¯)) ( Conv(p(R)). Hence, agent j has the unique
largest peak at profile R and minimum
¯
F (R) ≤ p(R¯j) ≤ p¯(R¯) < p(Rj). Begin
from profile R and construct profile R¯ by changing agent j’s preferences to R¯j,
i.e., R¯ = (R−j, R¯j). Since p(R¯j) < p(Rj) and R¯−j = R−j, by peak-monotonicity,
minimum
¯
F (R¯) ≤
¯
F (R). If minimum
¯
F (R¯) <
¯
F (R) ≤ p(R¯j), then minimum
¯
F (R¯) < p¯(R¯) < p(Rj). Since R¯−j = R−j, by Lemma 2.9 (i) (with the roles of
R and R¯ reversed), minimum
¯
F (R¯) =
¯
F (R) 6=
¯
F (R¯), a contradiction. Therefore,
minima
¯
F (R¯) =
¯
F (R).
Case 2.3. Let Conv(p(R¯)) ) Conv(p(R)). Hence, agent j has the unique
largest peak at profile R¯ and minimum
¯
F (R) < p(Rj) ≤ p¯(R) < p(R¯j). By
Lemma 2.9 (i), minima
¯
F (R¯) =
¯
F (R).
(ii) The proof that if [p(Rj) > F¯ (R) and p(R¯j) ≥ F¯ (R)] or [p(Rj) < F¯ (R)
and p(R¯j) ≤ F¯ (R)], then maxima F¯ (R) = F¯ (R¯) is symmetric to the proof of
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(i).
The next result is crucial in the proof of Theorem 2.1.
Lemma 2.11. Let fixed population N ∈ P be such that |N | ≥ 3 and fp-choice
correspondence F ∈ FN satisfy efficiency and one-sided replacement-dominance.
Let fp-target set correspondence F a,b ∈ FN . For each pair of profiles R, R¯ ∈ RN
such that Conv(p(R¯)) ⊆ Conv(p(R)), if F (R) = F a,b(R), then F (R¯) = F a,b(R¯).
Proof. Let fixed population N ∈ P be such that |N | ≥ 3 and fp-choice corre-
spondence F ∈ FN satisfy efficiency and one-sided replacement-dominance. Let
fp-target set correspondence F a,b ∈ FN . By Propositions 2.1 and 2.4, F a,b satisfies
efficiency and one-sided replacement-dominance. By Lemma 2.5 (Appendix 2.B),
Lemma 2.10, and Lemma ??, F and F a,b satisfy extreme-peaks-onliness, uncom-
promisingness, and set-uncompromisingness.
Let the pair of profiles R, R¯ ∈ RN be such that F (R) = F a,b(R) and
Conv(p(R¯)) ⊆ Conv(p(R)). Without loss of generality, assume that N =
{1, . . . , n} and
¯
p(R) = p(R1) ≤ · · · ≤ p(Rn) = p¯(R). We show that F (R¯) =
F a,b(R¯).
Case 1. Let Conv(p(R¯)) = Conv(p(R)). By extreme-peaks-onliness and the
definition of F a,b, F (R¯) = F (R) = F a,b(R) = F a,b(R¯).
Case 2. Let Conv(p(R¯)) ( Conv(p(R)) be such that
¯
p(R¯) >
¯
p(R) and p¯(R¯) =
p¯(R). By extreme-peaks-onliness, it is without loss of generality to assume that
at both profiles R and R¯, agent 1 has the smallest peak and all other agents
have the largest peak, i.e., R = (R1, Rn, . . . , Rn) such that p(R1) ≤ p(Rn) and
R¯ = (R¯1, Rn, . . . , Rn) such that p(R¯1) ≤ p(Rn). Hence, R−1 = R¯−1 and
¯
p(R) <
¯
p(R¯) ≤ p¯(R¯) = p¯(R). By efficiency and Proposition 2.1 (i), p(R1) =
¯
p(R) ≤
¯
F (R) ≤ F¯ (R) ≤ p¯(R) and p(R¯1) =
¯
p(R¯) ≤
¯
F (R¯) ≤ F¯ (R¯) ≤ p¯(R¯).
Case 2.1. Recall that Conv(p(R¯)) ( Conv(p(R)) is such that [
¯
p(R¯) >
¯
p(R)
and p¯(R¯) = p¯(R)] and in addition, let p(R¯1) =
¯
p(R¯) ≤
¯
F (R). Then, p(R1) =
¯
p(R) <
¯
F (R). By set-uncompromisingness, F (R¯) = F (R) = F a,b(R) and by the
definition of F a,b, point a ≥
¯
p(R¯). If point a ≤ p¯(R) = p¯(R¯), then F a,b(R) =
[a, b] ∩ Conv(p(R)) = [a, b] ∩ Conv(p(R¯)) = F a,b(R¯). If point a > p¯(R) = p¯(R¯),
then, F a,b(R) = {p¯(R)} = F a,b(R¯). Therefore, F (R¯) = F a,b(R¯).
Case 2.2. Recall that Conv(p(R¯)) ( Conv(p(R)) is such that [
¯
p(R¯) >
¯
p(R)
and p¯(R¯) = p¯(R)] and in addition, let p(R¯1) =
¯
p(R¯) >
¯
F (R) and p(R¯1) =
¯
p(R) ≤
F¯ (R). Then,
¯
F (R) 6= F¯ (R) and p(R1) < F¯ (R). By uncompromisingness, maxima
F¯ (R¯) = F¯ (R). Recall that by efficiency and Proposition 2.1 (i), minimum
¯
F (R¯) ≥
¯
p(R¯) = p(R¯1). Next, assuming that minimum
¯
F (R¯) >
¯
p(R¯) = p(R¯1) >
¯
F (R)
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results in a contradiction as follows: since p(R¯1) <
¯
F (R¯) and p(R1) <
¯
F (R¯), by
uncompromisingness, minimum
¯
F (R) =
¯
F (R¯) 6=
¯
F (R), a contradiction. Hence,
minimum
¯
F (R¯) =
¯
p(R¯) and thus, F (R¯) = [
¯
p(R¯), F¯ (R)]. Since Conv(p(R¯)) (
Conv(p(R)) and F (R) = [a, b]∩Conv(p(R)), F (R¯) = F (R)∩Conv(p(R¯)) = [a, b]∩
Conv(p(R¯)). Therefore, by the definition of F a,b, F (R¯) = [a, b] ∩ Conv(p(R¯)) =
F a,b(R¯).
Case 2.3. Recall that Conv(p(R¯)) ( Conv(p(R)) is such that [
¯
p(R¯) >
¯
p(R)
and p¯(R¯) = p¯(R)] and in addition, let p(R¯1) =
¯
p(R¯) > F¯ (R) ≥
¯
F (R). By the
definition of F a,b, points a, b <
¯
p(R¯). Next, assuming that maximum F¯ (R¯) >
¯
p(R¯) = p(R¯1) > F¯ (R) results in a contradiction as follows: since p(R¯1) < F¯ (R¯)
and p(R1) < F¯ (R¯), by uncompromisingness, maximum F¯ (R) = F¯ (R¯) 6= F¯ (R), a
contradiction. Hence, maximum F¯ (R¯) =
¯
p(R¯) and thus F (R¯) = {
¯
p(R¯)}. Since
point b <
¯
p(R¯), by the definition of F a,b, F (R¯) = {
¯
p(R¯)} = F a,b(R¯).
Case 3. Let Conv(p(R¯)) ( Conv(p(R)) be such that
¯
p(R¯) =
¯
p(R) and p¯(R¯) <
p¯(R). By a symmetric proof to Case 2, F (R¯) = F a,b(R¯).
Case 4. Let Conv(p(R¯)) ( Conv(p(R)) be such that
¯
p(R¯) >
¯
p(R) and p¯(R¯) <
p¯(R). Let profile R1 ∈ RN be such that
¯
p(R1) =
¯
p(R¯) >
¯
p(R) and p¯(R1) = p¯(R).
By Case 2, F (R1) = F a,b(R1). Next, since
¯
p(R¯) =
¯
p(R1) and p¯(R¯) < p¯(R1), by
Case 3, F (R¯) = F a,b(R¯).
Proof of Theorem 2.1. If part. By Propositions 2.1 and 2.4, each fp-target
set correspondence satisfies efficiency and one-sided replacement-dominance.
Only if part. Let fixed population N ∈ P be such that |N | ≥ 3 and fp-choice
correspondence F ∈ FN satisfy efficiency and one-sided replacement-dominance.
By Lemma 2.5 (Appendix 2.B), Lemma 2.10, and Lemma ??, F satisfies extreme-
peaks-onliness, uncompromisingness, and set-uncompromisingness.
For each pair of points α, β ∈ R such that α ≤ β, define a profile Rα,β ∈ RN
to be such that
¯
p(Rα,β) = α and p¯(Rα,β) = β. Without loss of generality, assume
that N = {1, . . . , n} and α = p(Rα,β1 ) ≤ . . . ≤ p(Rα,βn ) = β. By efficiency and
Proposition 2.1 (i), α ≤
¯
F (Rα,β) ≤ F¯ (Rα,β) ≤ β.
We prove that there exists an fp-target set correspondence F a,b ∈ FN such
that for each profile R ∈ RN , F (R) = F a,b(R).
There are four cases. Loosely speaking, in all but the last case the proof
proceeds as follows. Given a profile Rα,β ∈ RN and for each profile R ∈ RN
we select a profile such that the convex hull of its peaks is a superset of both
Conv(Rα,β) and Conv(p(R)) and then, we apply Lemma 2.11 to show that F (R) =
F a,b(R).
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Case 1. There exist α, β ∈ R such that for Rα,β ∈ RN , α <
¯
F (Rα,β) ≤
F¯ (Rα,β) < β. Define points a :=
¯
F (Rα,β) and b := F¯ (Rα,β). Since F (Rα,β) =
[a, b] = [a, b] ∩ Conv(Rα,β), by the definition of F a,b, F (Rα,β) = F a,b(Rα,β). Let
R ∈ RN . Begin from profile Rα,β and construct profile R1 by changing agent 1’s
preferences to R11 such that his peak
p(R11) =
p(R
α,β
1 ) if p(R
α,β
1 ) ≤
¯
p(R)
¯
p(R) otherwise,
i.e., R1 = (Rα,β−1 , R
1
1). Since p(R
α,β
1 ) < ¯
F (Rα,β) and p(R11) < ¯
F (Rα,β), by set-
uncompromisingness, F (R1) = F (Rα,β) = [a, b]. Then, change agent n’s prefer-
ences to R2n such that his peak
p(R2n) =
p(R1n) if p(R1n) ≥ p¯(R)p¯(R) otherwise,
i.e., R2 = (R1−n, R
2
n). Since p(R
1
n) > F¯ (R
1) and p(R2n) > F¯ (R
1), by set-
uncompromisingness, F (R2) = F (R1) = [a, b]. Since F (R2) = [a, b] = [a, b] ∩
Conv(R2), by the definition of F a,b, F (R2) = F a,b(R2). Since, F (R2) = F a,b(R2)
and Conv(p(R)) ⊆ Conv(R2), by Lemma 2.11, F (R) = F a,b(R).
Case 2. There exist α, β ∈ R such that for Rα,β ∈ RN , α =
¯
F (Rα,β) ≤
F¯ (Rα,β) < β, and for each α¯ ≤ α and its associated Rα¯,β ∈ RN , α¯ =
¯
F (Rα¯,β) ≤
F¯ (Rα¯,β) < β.
Case 2.1. There exist α, β ∈ R as specified in Case 2 and in addition, α =
¯
F (Rα,β) < F¯ (Rα,β) < β. Define points a := −∞ and b := F¯ (Rα,β). Since
F (Rα,β) = [
¯
p(Rα,β), b] = [a, b] ∩ Conv(Rα,β), by the definition of F a,b, F (Rα,β) =
F a,b(Rα,β). Let R ∈ RN . Begin from profile Rα,β and construct profile R1 by
changing agent 1’s preferences to R11 such that his peak
p(R11) =
p(R
α,β
1 ) if p(R
α,β
1 ) ≤
¯
p(R)
¯
p(R) otherwise,
i.e., R1 = (Rα,β−1 , R
1
1). Since
¯
p(R1) ≤ α and p¯(R1) = β, as specified in Case 2
and by extreme-peaks-onliness,
¯
p(R1) =
¯
F (R1). Since p(Rα,β1 ) < F¯ (R
α,β) and
p(R11) < F¯ (R
α,β), by uncompromisingness, maxima F¯ (R1) = F¯ (Rα,β) = b. Hence,
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F (R1) = [
¯
p(R1), b]. Then, change agent n’s preferences to R2n such that his peak
p(R2n) =
p(R1n) if p(R1n) ≥ p¯(R)p¯(R) otherwise,
i.e., R2 = (R1−n, R
2
n). Since p(R
1
n) > F¯ (R
1) and p(R2n) > F¯ (R
1), by set-
uncompromisingness, F (R2) = F (R1) = [
¯
p(R2), b]. Since F (R2) = [
¯
p(R2), b] =
[a, b] ∩ Conv(R2), by the definition of F a,b, F (R2) = F a,b(R2). Since F (R2) =
F a,b(R2) and Conv(p(R)) ⊆ Conv(R2), by Lemma 2.11, F (R) = F a,b(R).
Case 2.2. There exist α, β ∈ R, as specified in Case 2 and in addition, α =
¯
F (Rα,β) = F¯ (Rα,β) < β, and for each α¯ ≤ α and its associated Rα¯,β ∈ RN ,
α¯ =
¯
F (Rα¯,β) = F¯ (Rα¯,β) < β. Define points a, b := −∞. Since b <
¯
p(Rα,β)
and F (Rα,β) = {
¯
p(Rα,β)}, by the definition of F a,b, F (Rα,β) = F a,b(Rα,β). Let
R ∈ RN . Begin from profile Rα,β and construct profile R1 by changing agent 1’s
preferences to R11 such that his peak
p(R11) =
p(R
α,β
1 ) if p(R
α,β
1 ) ≤
¯
p(R)
¯
p(R) otherwise,
i.e., R1 = (Rα,β−1 , R
1
1). Since
¯
p(R1) ≤ α and p¯(R1) = β, as specified in this case and
by extreme-peaks-onliness, F (R1) = {
¯
p(R1)}. Then, change agent n’s preferences
to R2n such that his peak
p(R2n) =
p(R1n) if p(R1n) ≥ p¯(R)p¯(R) otherwise,
i.e., R2 = (R1−n, R
2
n). Since p(R
1
n) > F¯ (R
1) and p(R2n) > F¯ (R
1), by set-
uncompromisingness, F (R2) = F (R1) = {
¯
p(R2)}. Since b <
¯
p(R2), by the def-
inition of F a,b, F (R2) = F a,b(R2). Since F (R2) = F a,b(R2) and Conv(p(R)) ⊆
Conv(R2), by Lemma 2.11, F (R) = F a,b(R).
Case 3. There exist α, β ∈ R such that for Rα,β ∈ RN , α <
¯
F (Rα,β) ≤
F¯ (Rα,β) = β, and for each β¯ ≥ β and its associated Rα,β¯ ∈ RN , α <
¯
F (Rα,β¯) ≤
F¯ (Rα,β¯) = β¯. The proof of this case is symmetric to Case 2.
Case 4. For each α, β ∈ R such that α ≤ β and its associated Rα,β ∈ RN ,
α =
¯
F (Rα,β) ≤ F¯ (Rα,β) = β. Define points a := −∞ and b := ∞. Since for
each α, β ∈ R and its associated Rα,β ∈ RN , α =
¯
F (Rα,β) ≤ F¯ (Rα,β) = β, by
extreme-peaks-onliness, for each R ∈ RN , F (R) = Conv(p(R)). Therefore, since
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a <
¯
p(R) and b > p¯(R), by the definition of F a,b, F (R) = F a,b(R).
Chapter 3
On strategy-proofness and single-
peakedness: median-voting over intervals
Abstract
We study correspondences that choose an interval of alternatives when agents have
single-peaked preferences. Similar to Klaus and Storcken (2002), we ordinally extend
these preferences over intervals. Loosely speaking, we extend the results of Moulin (1980)
to our setting and show that the results of Ching (1997) cannot always be similarly ex-
tended. Our main results are the following. First, strategy-proofness and peaks-onliness
characterize the class of generalized median correspondences. Second, we characterize
the anonymous sub-class of generalized median correspondences, the class of median
correspondences. Third, although peaks-onliness cannot be replaced by the “weaker”
property of continuity in the aforementioned results -as is the case in Ching (1997)-
this equivalence is achieved when voter-sovereignty is also required, in the characteriza-
tions of the classes of efficient generalized median correspondences and efficient median
correspondences. Finally, when preferences are symmetric and single-peaked, only the
characterizations for the classes of efficient generalized median correspondences and effi-
cient median correspondences can be extended; moreover, in these results the properties
of peaks-onliness and continuity are unnecessary.
3.1 Introduction
We study the problem where an interval of alternatives is chosen on the interval
[0, 1] based on the preferences of a finite number of agents. This interval can
be considered as the political spectrum, while the chosen interval can in turn be
considered as the legislative constitution or the governmental coalition (in the
sense that some “extreme” views are not accounted for by the constitution or are
not represented by any member(s) of the governmental coalition). We assume
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that agents have single-peaked preferences defined over all alternatives on [0, 1];
that is, an agent’s welfare is strictly increasing up to his “peak” (his favorite
alternative), and is strictly decreasing thereafter. These agents, when comparing
two intervals, only consider their best (most favorite) alternative and their worst
(least favorite) alternative(s) on each interval. Moreover, we look into the situation
where the voting mechanism choosing the interval of alternatives guarantees that
the agents announce their true preferences; in other words, we are interested in
voting mechanisms -which we call (choice) correspondences- that are strategy-proof.
Although the classic result of Gibbard and Satterthwaite establishes that on
the full domain of preferences -with more than two alternatives available- strategy-
proofness and non-dictatorship are incompatible (Gibbard, 1973; Satterthwaite,
1975), this is not true for the domain of single-peaked preferences, the domain of
interest in this paper.
This compatibility between the two aforementioned properties has been well
studied in the context of (choice) functions and for infinite sets of alternatives,
where following the announcement of the agents’ (single-peaked) preferences one
alternative is chosen. Specifically, it has been shown that strategy-proofness and
peaks-onliness (the agents only announce their peak) characterize the class of
generalized median rules (described in Section 3.3.1) (Moulin, 1980). Moreover,
when also requiring the property of either efficiency (in the Pareto sense), or
anonymity (the names of the agents don’t matter), or both to be satisfied, the
sub-classes of either efficient generalized median rules (Section 3.3.1), or median
rules (Section 3.3.2), or efficient median rules (Section 3.3.2) are characterized
(Moulin, 1980). A similar result also holds for the one-dimensional case, when the
range of the function is closed and not connected (Barbera` and Jackson, 1994).
In addition, on the smaller domain of quadratic and separable preferences1 and on
dimensions equal or larger to 1, peaks-onliness can be substituted by unanimity
(when a common best alternative exists, it is chosen) (Border and Jordan, 1983);
furthermore, it turns out that in these results two of the required properties can be
weakened; specifically, peak-onliness and efficiency can be substituted by continu-
ity (a small change in the announced preferences does not change the outcome a
lot) and voter-sovereignty (no alternative is a priori excluded from being chosen)
respectively (Ching, 1997).2 Finally, a measure of manipulability was recently
1In this domain, an agent’s welfare depends on the distance of the alternative chosen from
his peak, projected in every dimension. Specifically, the larger the sum of all such projected
distances, the smaller the welfare gained.
2Although technically continuity is not weaker than peaks-onliness, loosely speaking, it im-
poses fewer restrictions on the result.
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proposed, that can be used to compare two generalized median rules (via some
necessary and sufficient conditions) (Arribillaga and Masso´, 2016).
For the case where a single alternative is chosen among a finite set (of alter-
natives), strategy-proofness and voter-sovereignty characterize, on the domain of
strict preferences, a class of functions similar to the class of efficient generalized
median rules (Barbera` et al., 1993). Moreover, the admissible preferences of all
agents being top-connected3 characterize the maximal domain in which (i) every
strategy-proof and unanimous function is a generalized median rule, and (ii) every
generalized median rule is strategy-proof (Achuthankutty and Roy, 2017).
When departing from the setting where agents have single-peaked preferences
and only one alternative is chosen, a few more results should be mentioned. First,
in the case of probabilistic functions,4 where the agents’ single-peaked preferences
are ordinarily extended over probability distributions via first-order stochastic
dominance, similar results to Moulin’s results (1980) were achieved (Ehlers et al.,
2002). Next, if agents have single-dipped preferences,5 strategy-proofness and una-
nimity characterize the class of collections of 0-decisive sets with a tie-breaker 6
(Manjunath, 2014). Last but not least, we must mention the two following results
where the agents’ preferences are single-peaked and two alternatives can be chosen,
with the agents comparing different pairs of alternatives using the max-extension.7
(i) Strategy-proofness, continuity, anonymity, and users-only8 characterize
the class of double median functions9 (Heo, 2013).
(ii) Efficiency and replacement-dominance10 characterize the class of rules
3For every agent and every pair of “neighboring” alternatives (a, b) there exist admissible
preferences such that a is the most favorite alternative and b is the second most favorite alter-
native.
4Given the agents’ preferences, a probability distribution over all alternatives is chosen.
5An agent’s welfare is strictly decreasing up to his “dip” (his least favorite alternative), and
is strictly increasing thereafter.
6Each such function chooses either the minimum or the maximum alternative. Loosely speak-
ing, if all agents are indifferent between the two alternatives the choice depends on the preference
profile (over all other alternatives). Otherwise, the choice depends on the number of agents pre-
ferring the minimum over the maximum alternative, their identities, and their preferences.
7When comparing two pairs of alternatives X = {x1, x2} and Y = {y1, y2}, an agent first
locates in each pair the alternative he ranks higher, say x∗ and y∗. If he prefers x∗ to y∗, then
he also prefers X to Y . If he is indifferent between x∗ and y∗, then he is also indifferent between
X and Y .
8For each pair of chosen alternatives (a, b), the choice of a depends only on agents preferring
a over b.
9A double median function can be decomposed into two median rules, where for each prefer-
ence profile each one selects one alternative.
10If the preferences of an agent change, then the other agents should all be made at least as
well off or they should all be made at most as well off. See page 36 for a formal definition.
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comprised of the left-peaks function and the right-peaks function11 Miyagawa
(2001).
The above two results are -loosely speaking- similar to the results of this paper;
in Section 3.5.5 we discuss them and compare them with the results of this paper.
In line with most of the related literature, our main results also make use of
either the property of peaks-onliness or a version of continuity adapted for our
context (i.e., where an interval of alternatives is chosen). In addition, we also study
the sub-cases where correspondences are either efficient, or anonymous, or both.
Concisely, our results are the following. First, in the domain of single-peaked pref-
erences, strategy-proofness and peaks-onliness characterize the class of generalized
median correspondences (Theorem 3.1); and if anonymity is also required, then
the sub-class of median correspondences is characterized (Theorem 3.2). Second,
neither of these results holds in the domain of symmetric and single-peaked pref-
erences, nor can in these results continuity substitute peaks-onliness (the counter-
example on page 84). Third, in the domain of single-peaked preferences, strategy-
proofness, voter-sovereignty, and either peaks-onliness or continuity characterize
the class of efficient generalized median correspondences (Theorem 3.3); and if
anonymity is also required, then the sub-class of efficient median correspondences
is characterized (Theorem 3.4). Finally, in the domain of symmetric and single-
peaked preferences, the classes of efficient generalized median correspondences
and efficient median correspondences can be similarly characterized with one dif-
ference; due to peaks-onliness being inherent in the domain, continuity plays no
role.
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 explains the model and states
a preliminary result. Section 3.3 includes the definitions of choice functions and
correspondences, as well as the definition of the classes of such functions and cor-
respondence we characterize. Section 3.4 contains the properties we are interested
in and some further preliminary results. Finally, Section 3.5 contains all main
results and characterizations, as well as a table summarizing our results.
3.2 The model
Consider a coalition (of agents) N ≡ {1, . . . , n}, such that n ≥ 2, and a set
of alternatives A ≡ [0, 1].12 We denote generic agents by i and j, and generic
11The left (right) peaks function chooses the two unique left-most (right-most) peaks.
12The set of alternatives is chosen without loss of generality. Essentially, our results hold for
any closed interval in R.
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alternatives by x and y. Each i is equipped with preferences Ri, defined over
A, that are complete, transitive, and reflexive. As usual, x Ri y is interpreted as
“x is at least as desirable as y”, x Pi y as “x is preferred to y”, and x Ii y as
“x is indifferent to y”. Moreover, for preferences Ri there exists an alternative
pi ∈ A, called the peak of i, with the following property: if either y < x ≤ pi or
y > x ≥ pi, we have x Pi y. We call such preferences single-peaked and denote the
domain of single-peaked preferences by R. Furthermore, if for preferences Ri ∈ R,
|x− pi| = |y − pi| implies x Ii y, then we say these preferences are symmetric and
denote the domain of symmetric preferences by S.
In the sequel, all notation and definitions refer to domain R but also apply to
domain S. Moreover, all results presented in this section hold in both domains.
Let RN be the set of profiles R ≡ (Ri)i∈N such that for each i ∈ N , Ri ∈ R.
Given R ∈ RN and j ∈ N , we also use R and (R−j, Rj) interchangeably. For each
R ∈ RN , we denote the vector of peaks of R by p ≡ (pi)i∈N . Let the smallest peak
in R be
¯
p ≡ min({pi}i∈N) and the largest peak in R be p¯ ≡ max({pi}i∈N). Finally,
let the convex hull of peaks in R be Conv(p) ≡ [
¯
p, p¯].
Let the class of closed intervals in A be denoted byA. We denote generic sets in
A by X and Y . We denote the minimum of X by
¯
X ≡ min(X) and the maximum
of X by X¯ ≡ max(X). For each Ri ∈ R, we denote the best alternative(s) of i in
X by bRi(X) ≡ {x ∈ X : for each y ∈ X, x Ri y} and the worst alternative(s) of i
in X by wRi(X) ≡ {x ∈ X : for each y ∈ X, y Ri x}. Note that single-peakedness
of Ri and non-emptiness of X imply that the sets bRi(X) and wRi(X) contain
one or two elements; specifically, if bRi(X) (respectively, wRi(X)) contains two
elements, agent i is indifferent between them. It is with some abuse of notation
that we treat sets bRi(X) and wRi(X) as if they are points and for each x ∈ X,
we write bRi(X)Ri x Ri wRi(X).
We extend all preferences Ri ∈ R, defined over A, to preferences defined over
A according to the “best-worst” extension of preferences characterized by Barbera`
et al. (1984).13 Specifically, when comparing two sets, an agent only considers his
best and his worst point(s) in each of them. Therefore, an agent prefers X to Y if
he prefers his best point(s) in X to his best point(s) in Y and his worst point(s)
in X to his worst point(s) in Y . The following definition also covers three more
cases arising when an agent is indifferent between his best or worst point(s) in the
13Preferences RAi defined over A satisfy weak-dominance (xPAi y implies {x}PAi {x, y}PAi {y})
and weak-independence (given triple X,Y, Z ∈ A such that [X ∩ Z] = [Y ∩ Z] = ∅, X PAi Y
implies [X ∪ Z] RAi [Y ∪ Z]) if and only if i compares sets in A according to the “best-worst”
extension of preferences. Examples illustrating the reasoning behind requiring these properties
(in a slightly different model) are provided in Klaus and Protopapas (2016).
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two sets.
With some abuse of notation, we use the same symbols to denote preferences
over alternatives and preferences over sets of alternatives.
Best-worst extension of preferences. For each i ∈ N with preferences Ri ∈ R,
and each pair X, Y ∈ A,
X Ri Y if and only if

bRi(X)Ri bRi(Y )
and
wRi(X)Ri wRi(Y ).
and
X Pi Y if and only if X Ri Y and

bRi(X) Pi bRi(Y )
or
wRi(X) Pi wRi(Y ).
This extension of preferences is transitive: for each triple X, Y, Z ∈ A, if XRiY
and Y Ri Z, then X Ri Z. However, it is not complete: there exist X, Y ∈ A such
that neither X Ri Y nor Y Ri X. To be precise, we now introduce the following
definition.
Comparability. Given preferences Ri ∈ R, sets X, Y ∈ A are comparable if and
only if [bRi(X)Pi bRi(Y ) implies wRi(X)RiwRi(Y )] and [wRi(X)PiwRi(Y ) implies
bRi(X)Ri bRi(Y )].
Based on the best-worst extension of preferences, we now define (Pareto) effi-
cient sets.
Efficient sets. Given profile R ∈ RN , set X ∈ A is efficient if and only if there
is no set Y ∈ A such that for each i ∈ N , Y Ri X, and for at least one j ∈ N ,
Y Pj X; we denote the class containing all efficient sets at R by E(R).
We now present a characterization of efficient sets in this setting that follows
from Klaus and Protopapas (2016). Note that the original result is a little more
complicated since it holds for all compact sets.
Proposition 3.1 (Klaus and Protopapas (2016)). At profile R ∈ RN , a closed
interval is efficient if and only if it is a subset of the convex hull of peaks in R.
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3.3 Choice functions and correspondences
In the sequel, all notation and definitions refer to domain R but also apply to
domain S. Moreover, all results presented in this section hold in both domains.
Each i ∈ N , announces preferences Vi ∈ R with associated announced peak
vi ∈ A. Given (true) profile R ∈ RN , if Vi = Ri, we say that i is sincere;
otherwise, if Vi 6= Ri, we say that i deviates. All terminology, notation, and
results of Section 3.2, defined for preferences Ri ∈ R, are carried over to announced
preferences Vi ∈ R by replacing R and p by V and v respectively, and adding the
term “announced” as necessary. For example, since in profile R ∈ RN the smallest
peak is denoted by
¯
p ≡ min({pi}i∈N), in announced profile VN ∈ RN the smallest
announced peak is denoted by
¯
v ≡ min({vi}i∈N).
A (choice) correspondence F assigns to each V ∈ RN a set F (V ) ∈ A, i.e.,
F : RN → A. Given V ∈ RN , let the minimum of F (V ) be
¯
F (V ) ≡ min{F (V )}
and the maximum of F (V ) be F¯ (V ) ≡ max{F (V )}. We denote the family of
correspondences by F . Moreover, if a correspondence F ∈ F assigns to each
V ∈ RN an interval consisting of a single point we will refer to it as a function
and use notation f ∈ f, i.e., f : RN → A.
Before defining in Sections 3.3.1 and 3.3.2 two classes of functions and corre-
spondences that our results revolve around, the following definition is necessary:
for each odd and positive integer k, and each vector T ∈ Rk, label the coordi-
nates of T such that t1 ≤ · · · ≤ tk; we define the median (coordinate) of T by
med(T ) ≡ t k+1
2
Finally, we (would like the reader to notice) that the classes of generalized
median rules and correspondences, defined in Section 3.3.1, are as the name sug-
gests, a generalization of the classes of median rules and correspondences, defined
in Section 3.3.2. Loosely speaking, this generalization boils down to the agents
influencing the chosen interval non-symmetrically. This is discussed in Remark 3.3
(Section 3.3.2). The reason behind this sequencing is simple: our results for the
classes of generalized median rules and correspondences can be easily shown to
hold for the subclasses of median rules and correspondences respectively.
3.3.1 Generalized median rules and correspondences
The first class of functions we consider was introduced under the name
strategy-proof voting schemes and characterized by strategy-proofness14 and peaks-
14No agent gains by deviating.
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onliness15 (Moulin, 1980, Proposition 3). It was later shown that peaks-onliness
can be substituted with the “weaker” property of continuity16 (Ching, 1997, Theo-
rem). In order to provide a useful intuition in understanding this class, we present
an example inspired by the one provided in Arribillaga and Masso´ (2016, p. 564).
Example 3.1. Consider the two agent case, i.e., N = {1, 2} and choose a 4-
dimensional vector α = (α∅, α{1}, α{2}, αN) such that αN ≤ α{1} ≤ α{2} ≤ α∅.
Next, define the function fα ∈ f as follows. For each V ∈ RN , if v1 ≤ v2,
choose α˜v = (α∅, α{1}, αN) and set fα(V ) = med(α˜v, v), and if v1 > v2, choose
α˜v = (α∅, α{2}, αN) and set fα(V ) = med(α˜v, v).
Notice that if α{1} 6= α{2}, then the agents have asymmetric power in influenc-
ing the chosen alternative. Before discussing further this asymmetry, in an effort
to shed more light on the behavior of fα, we first provide a second definition of it.
For each V ∈ RN , fα(V ) =

αN if v1, v2 ≤ αN
v2 if v1 ≤ αN ≤ v2 ≤ α{1}
α{1} if v1 ≤ αN ≤ α{1} ≤ v2
med(v1, v2, α{1}) if αN ≤ v1 ≤ α{1}
v1 if α{1} ≤ v1 ≤ α{2}
med(v1, v2, α{2}) if α{2} ≤ v1 ≤ α∅
α{2} if v2 ≤ α{2} ≤ α∅ ≤ v1
v2 if α{2} ≤ v2 ≤ α∅ ≤ v1, and
α∅ if α∅ ≤ v1, v2.
It is easy to see from this second definition that the range of fα equals [αN , α∅].
Hence, this function can be interpreted as one assigning to agents 1 and 2 the
power to choose an alternative from the interval [αN , α∅]. Furthermore, as already
briefly discussed, this power is not symmetric among the agents but depends on
the choice of α{1} and α{2}. For instance in this example, since α{1} ≤ α{2}, agent
1 has a greater power than agent 2 in influencing the chosen alternative. To see
this, first consider agent 1. He can make sure that the chosen alternative is not
larger than α{1} and not smaller than v1 (by announcing v1 ≤ α{1}), or that it
is not larger than v1 and not smaller than α{1} (by announcing v1 ≥ α{1}). In
15The chosen alternative only depends on the vector of announced peaks.
16If the announced preferences change a “little”, the chosen alternative does not change “a
lot”.
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addition, he is a dictator on the interval [α{1}, α{2}].
Next, consider agent 2. He only has the power to influence the chosen alterna-
tive if agent 1 “allows” him to do so. That is, if αN ≤ v1 ≤ α{1}, then agent 2 can
pinpoint the chosen alternative on the interval [v1, α{1}], and if v1 ≤ αN ≤ α{1},
then agent 2 can pinpoint the chosen alternative on the interval [αN , α{1}]. Simi-
larly, if α{2} ≤ v1 ≤ α∅, then agent 2 can pinpoint the chosen alternative on the
interval [α{2}, v1], and if α{2} ≤ α∅ ≤ v1, then agent 2 can pinpoint the chosen
alternative on the interval [α{2}, α∅].
The general n-agent case works as follows. First, take a vector α in A2
n
,
i.e., the dimension of α equals the number of all sub-coalitions in N (including
the empty set). Specifically, let α ≡ (αM)M⊆N , such that for each L ⊆ M ,
αL ≥ αM . Next, for an announced profile V with associated vector of announced
peaks v, label the agents such that v1¯ ≤ · · · ≤ vn¯.17 Finally, construct vector α˜v
in An+1 such that α˜v = (α∅, α{1¯}, α{1¯,2¯}, . . . , αN) and notice that by construction,
αN ≤ · · · ≤ α{1¯,2¯} ≤ α{1¯} ≤ α∅. The generalized median rule associated with
vector α chooses alternative med(v, α˜v).
Generalized median rules. Let vector α ∈ A2n be such that α ≡ (αM)M⊆N ,
where for each pair L,M ⊆ N with L ( M , αL ≥ αM . Also, for each V ∈ RN ,
let bijection pi : N → N be such that vpi(1) ≤ · · · ≤ vpi(n) and construct vector α˜v =
(α∅, α{pi(1)}, α{pi(1),pi(2)}, . . . , αN). We denote the generalized median rule associated
with vector α by fαG, where for each V ∈ RN , fαG(V ) ≡ med(v, α˜v). Finally, we
denote the class of generalized median rules by fG.
18
Clearly, if all agents announce different peaks, a unique ordering of them by
their announced peak exists. Moreover, for the case where some agents announce
the same peak and hence such a unique ordering does not exist, the chosen al-
ternative does not depend on the particular ordering chosen; as shown in Ching
(1997, Remark 1).
The first class of correspondences we characterize in Section 3.5 extends the
spirit of generalized median rules to correspondences. Specifically, take two vectors
α ≤ β, each of dimension 2n, such that α ≡ (αM)M⊆N and β ≡ (βM)M⊆N . Next,
for an announced profile V with associated vector of announced peaks v, label the
17Whenever two agents announce the same peak, no unique way to label the agents exists.
However, the specific choice of labels does not affect the chosen alternative (Ching, 1997, Re-
mark 1).
18It should be noted that in the literature a generalized median rule fαG ∈ fG is often described
as follows: For each V ∈ RN , fαG(V ) = min
M⊆N
max
i∈M
{vi, αM}.
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agents such that v1 ≤ · · · ≤ vn and construct vectors α˜v and β˜v, each of dimension
n + 1, such that α˜v = (α∅, α{1}, α{1,2}, . . . , αN) and β˜v = (β∅, β{1}, β{1,2}, . . . , βN).
The generalized median correspondence associated with vectors α and β chooses
the interval where the minimum alternative is med(v, α˜v) and the maximum al-
ternative is med(v, β˜v).
Generalized median correspondences. Let vectors α, β ∈ A2n be such that
α ≡ (αM)M⊆N and β ≡ (βM)M⊆N , with α ≤ β, and for each pair L,M ⊆ N ,
with L ( M , αL ≥ αM and βL ≥ βM . Also, for each V ∈ RN , let bi-
jection pi : N → N such that vpi(1) ≤ · · · ≤ vpi(n) and construct vectors α˜v =
(α∅, α{pi(1)}, α{pi(1),pi(2)}, . . . , αN) and β˜v = (β∅, β{pi(1)}, β{pi(1),pi(2)}, . . . , βN). We de-
note the generalized median correspondence associated with vectors α and β by
Fα,βG , where for each V ∈ RN , Fα,βG (V ) ≡ [med(v, α˜v),med(v, β˜v)]. Finally, we
denote the class of generalized median correspondences by FG.
Remark 3.1. By definition of FG and fG, for each profile V , Fα,βG (V ) ≡
[med(v, α˜v),med(v, β˜v)] = [f
α
G(V ), f
β
G(V )]. Therefore, a generalized median cor-
respondence Fα,βG can be decomposed into two generalized median rules f
α
G and
fβG.
The next result considers single-valued generalized median correspondences.
Lemma 3.1. A generalized median correspondence Fα,βG is single-valued if and
only if α = β. Moreover, in this case Fα,βG is essentially a generalized median
rule.19
Proof. Let Fα,βG ∈ FG and fαG, fβG ∈ fG. Let V ∈ RN . By Remark 3.1, Fα,βG (V ) =
[fαG(V ), f
β
G(V )]. If α = β, then F
α,β
G (V ) = {fαG(V )}. Hence, Fα,βG is single-valued.
If Fα,βG is single-valued, then F
α,β
G (V ) = [f
α
G(V ), f
β
G(V )] implies f
α
G(V ) = f
β
G(V ).
Assuming α 6= β results in a contradiction as follows. Since α 6= β, there exists a
coalition M ⊆ N such that αM 6= βM . Let |M | = m and specify V such that for
each agent i ∈M , vi = 0, and for each agent j ∈ N \M , vj = 1. Hence, at profile
V , the mth coordinate of vectors α˜v and β˜v will be αM and βM respectively.
Moreover, by definition of FG, αN ≤ α{1,...,n−1} ≤ · · · ≤ α{1} ≤ α∅ and βN ≤
β{1,...,n−1} ≤ · · · ≤ β{1} ≤ β∅. Thus, there are at least n+ 1−m coordinates of α˜v
not larger than αM (i.e., coordinates αM , . . . , αN) and at least m+1 coordinates of
α˜v not smaller than αM (i.e., coordinates α∅, . . . , αM). Similarly, there are at least
19To be precise, a single-valued generalized median correspondence assigns singleton sets of
alternatives while the corresponding generalized median rule assigns the alternatives contained
in these sets.
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n + 1 − m coordinates of β˜v not larger than βM and at least m + 1 coordinates
of β˜v not smaller than βM . Hence, F
α,β
G = [med(v, α˜v),med(v, β˜v)] = [αM , βM ]
contradicting that Fα,βG is single-valued. Therefore, F
α,β
G (V ) being single-valued
implies α = β.
Our results in Section 3.5 will also concern efficient generalized median corre-
spondences. Formally, given Fα,βG ∈ FG, if for each V ∈ RN , Fα,βG ∈ E(V ), we say
that Fα,βG is an efficient generalized median correspondence and denote the class
of efficient generalized median correspondences by FEG. The next result concerns
this class of correspondences.
Lemma 3.2. A generalized median correspondence Fα,βG is an efficient generalized
median correspondence if and only if vectors α, β are such that αN = βN = 0 and
α∅ = β∅ = 1.
Proof. Let Fα,βG ∈ FG. Assuming that Fα,βG ∈ FEG such that α, β are not as
described above, results in a contradiction as follows.
If αN 6= 0 or βN 6= 0, choose V ∈ RN such that v = (0, . . . , 0). By Propo-
sition 3.1, E(V ) = {0} and by the definition of FG, Fα,βG (V ) = [αN , βN ]. Hence,
Fα,βG (V ) 6∈ E(V ). Similarly, if α∅ 6= 1 or β∅ 6= 1, choose V ∈ RN such that
v = (1, . . . , 1). Again, by Proposition 3.1, E(V ) = {1} and by the definition of
FG, Fα,βG (V ) = [α∅, β∅]. Hence, Fα,βG (V ) 6∈ E(V ).
Finally, if αN = βN = 0 and α∅ = β∅ = 1, then for each V ∈ RN , med(v, α˜v) ∈
Conv(v) and med(v, β˜v) ∈ Conv(v). Hence, by the definition of FG, Fα,βG (V ) ⊆
Conv(v), and thus by Proposition 3.1, Fα,βG (V ) ∈ E(V ).
3.3.2 Median rules and correspondences
The second class of functions we consider was introduced under the name strategy-
proof and anonymous voting schemes and characterized by strategy-proofness,
peaks-onliness, and anonymity20 (Moulin, 1980, Proposition 2). As discussed in
Remark 3.3, this class of functions is a subclass of generalized median rules since
now all agents possess the same power in influencing the chosen alternative. For
the 2-agent case, it suffices to set α{1} = α{2} in Example 3.1 (page 74).
The general n-agent case works as follows. Take a vector a in An+1. For an
announced profile V with associated vector of announced peaks v, the median rule
associated with a chooses alternative med(v, a).
20The names of the agents do not affect the chosen alternative.
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Median rules. Let vector a ∈ An+1 be such that a ≡ (a1, . . . , an+1), where a1 ≤
· · · ≤ an+1. We denote the median rule associated with vector a by faM , where for
each V ∈ RN , faM(V ) ≡ med(v, a). Finally, we denote the class of median rules
by fM .
The second class of correspondences we characterize in Section 3.5 extends the
spirit of median rules to correspondences. Specifically, take two vectors a ≤ b ,
each of dimension n + 1. For an announced profile V with associated vector of
announced peaks v, the median correspondence associated with a and b chooses the
interval where the minimum alternative is med(v, a) and the maximum alternative
is med(v, b).
Median correspondences. Let vectors a, b ∈ An+1 be such that a ≡
(a1, . . . , an+1) and b ≡ (b1, . . . , bn+1), with a ≤ b, a1 ≤ · · · ≤ an+1, and
b1 ≤ · · · ≤ bn+1. We denote the median correspondence associated with vectors a
and b by fa,bM , where for each V ∈ RN , F a,bM (V ) ≡ [med(v, a),med(v, b)]. Finally,
we denote the class of median correspondences by FM .
Remark 3.2. By definition of FM and fM , for each profile V , F a,bM (V ) ≡
[med(v, a),med(v, b)] = [faM(V ), f
b
M(V )]. Therefore, a median correspondence F
a,b
M
can be decomposed into two median rules faM and f
b
M .
Remark 3.3. The class of median rules (correspondences) is a subclass of the
class of generalized median rules (correspondences). That is, given F a,bM ∈ FM , let
Fα,βG ∈ FG by choosing vectors α, β ∈ A2
n
such that the weight of each coalition
only depends on its cardinality. Specifically, for each M ⊆ N , choose αM =
an+1−|M | (i.e., choose α∅ = an+1, for each i ∈ N , choose α{i} = an, for each
i, j ∈ N with i 6= j, choose α{i,j} = an−1, and so on) and βM = bn+1−|M |. It follows
that for each V ∈ RN , α˜v = a and β˜v = b, implying F a,bM (V ) = Fα,βG (V ).
The next result considers single-valued median correspondences.
Lemma 3.3. A median correspondence F a,bM is single-valued if and only if a = b.
Moreover, in this case F a,bM is essentially a median rule.
21
Lemma 3.3 follows from Lemma 3.1 and Remark 3.3.
Our results in Section 3.5 also concern efficient median correspondences. For-
mally, given F a,bM ∈ FM , if for each V ∈ RN , F a,bM ∈ E(V ), we say that F a,bM is
an efficient median correspondence and denote the class of efficient median cor-
respondences by FEM . The next result concerns this class of correspondences.
21To be precise, a single-valued median correspondence assigns singleton sets of alternatives
while the corresponding median rule assigns the alternatives contained in these sets.
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Lemma 3.4. A median correspondence F a,bM is an efficient median correspondence
if and only if vectors a, b are such that a1 = b1 = 0 and an+1 = bn+1 = 1.
Lemma 3.4 follows from Lemma 3.2 and Remark 3.3.
Remark 3.4. As discussed in Section 3.5, both classes of generalized median
correspondences and median correspondences are strategy-proof 22, similar to the
results on functions by Moulin (1980). However, it should be noted that in contrast
to Moulin’s results these classes of correspondences are not group strategy-proof.23
The following example illustrates this.
Example 3.2. Let N = {1, 2, 3} and F a,b ∈ FEM such that a = {0, 0, 0, 1} and
b = {0, 0, 1, 1}. In addition, let V, V ′ ∈ S be such that v1 = v′1 = 0, v2 = 0.5,
v′2 = 0.6, and v3 = v
′
3 = 1. Then, F (V ) = [0, 0.5] and F (V
′) = [0, 0.6]. Therefore,
assuming V are the true preferences of the agents implies that although agent 2
is indifferent to deviating, by announcing V ′2 , agent 3 gains by this deviation.
3.4 Properties of correspondences
In the sequel, all properties are defined for correspondences in domain R but also
apply to correspondences in domain S. Moreover, all results presented in this
section hold in both domains.
The first two properties we consider are related; the first is our efficiency notion
for correspondences while the second, being weaker than the first, requires no
alternative in A to be a priori excluded from being selected.
Efficiency. For each V ∈ RN , F (V ) ∈ E(V ).
Voter-sovereignty. For each x ∈ A, there exists V ∈ RN such that F (V ) = {x}.
The next property, which is central in our results, requires no agent to gain by
deviating. Moreover, it implies comparability between the chosen sets before and
after an agent’s deviation.
Strategy-proofness. For each i ∈ N , each Ri ∈ R, and each V ∈ RN ,
F (V−i, Ri)Ri F (V−i, Vi).
The next property requires the chosen set to depend only on the vector of
announced peaks.
22No agent gains by deviating. See Section 3.5.1 for a formal proof.
23No group of agents can deviate such that some members of the group gain and no member
of the group loses.
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Peaks-onliness. For each pair V, V ′ ∈ RN such that v = v′, F (V ) = F (V ′).
Loosely speaking, the next property requires when the announced preferences
of an agent change “a little”, the minimum and maximum alternatives chosen to
not change “a lot”. Before describing it formally, we must first define the three
following notions. First, the “indifference relation”, which -loosely speaking- given
preferences Vi ∈ R, maps each alternative x to an alternative y, that i finds
indifferent to x, according to Vi. Formally, for each Vi ∈ R, the indifference
relation rVi : [0, 1] → [0, 1] is defined as follows. For each x ∈ [0, vi], rVi(x) = y
if y ∈ [vi, 1] exists such that y Ii x, or rVi(x) = 1 otherwise; while for each x ∈
[vi, 1], rVi(x) = y if y ∈ [0, vi] exists such that y Ii x, or rVi(x) = 0 otherwise.
Second, the distance between a pair Vi, V
′
i ∈ R, which is measured using the
indifference relation. Formally, it is defined to be d(Vi, V
′
i ) ≡ maxx∈[0,1] |rVi(x) −
rV ′i (x)|. Finally, the notion of convergence. Specifically, for k ∈ N+, a sequence
{V ki } in R converges to Vi, if k → ∞ implies the distance d(Vi, V ki ) → 0. We
denote this convergence by V ki → Vi.
Min/max continuity. For each V ∈ RN , each i ∈ N , and each {V ki } in R,
if V ki → Vi, then
¯F (V−i, V ki )→ ¯F (V ), andF¯ (V−i, V ki )→ F¯ (V ).
Notice that min/max continuity for functions is equivalent to the regular con-
tinuity property for functions (with respect to the preference profile). Moreover,
in Appendix 3.A we show the equivalence of this property with the standard
continuity properties for correspondences, upper-hemi continuity and lower-hemi
continuity.
The next property requires that the agents’ identities do not matter.
Anonymity. For each bijection σ : N → N and each pair V, V ′ ∈ RN such that
for each i ∈ N , Vi = V ′σ(i), F (V ) = F (V ′).
The last property we consider depends only on the announced peaks of the
agents. Loosely speaking, following a change in an agent’s announced preferences,
if before and after this change both announced peaks lie on the same side of the
minimum (maximum) chosen alternative, then the minimum (maximum) chosen
alternative does not change.
Uncompromisingness. For each i ∈ N and each pair V, V ′ ∈ RN such that
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V ′−i = V−i,
if
vi < ¯F (V ) and v′i ≤ ¯F (V ) orvi >
¯
F (V ) and v′i ≥ ¯F (V ),
then
¯
F (V ) =
¯
F (V ′), and
if
vi < F¯ (V ) and v′i ≤ F¯ (V ) orvi > F¯ (V ) and v′i ≥ F¯ (V ), then F¯ (V ) = F¯ (V ′).
When a correspondence does not satisfy uncompromisingness, we say that it
is compromised.
3.5 Results
We begin by presenting in Section 3.5.1 results concerning interrelations between
the properties presented in Section 3.4. Said results are then used in our char-
acterization results presented in Sections 3.5.2 and 3.5.3. Loosely speaking, in
Section 3.5.2, we extend the characterizations of Moulin (1980, Propositions 2
and 3)24 to correspondences in domain R; while in Section 3.5.3, we show which
of these characterizations can be extended in domain S. Next, in section 3.5.4 we
show that the properties in all our characterization results are independent; and
finally, in section 3.5.5 we compare these results to those of Miyagawa (2001) and
Heo (2013).
3.5.1 Interrelations between properties
Our first result in this section holds in domain S. It shows that if strategy-
proofness is satisfied, then efficiency and voter-sovereignty are equivalent.
Proposition 3.2. For strategy-proof correspondences efficiency and voter-
sovereignty are equivalent in domain S.
We prove Proposition 3.2 in Appendix 3.B. In addition, a similar equivalence
result holds in domain R, albeit slightly weaker since peaks-onliness or min/max
continuity is also required. By Proposition 3.2, this result trivially holds in domain
S as well.
24Proposition 2: A function satisfies strategy-proofness, peaks-onliness, and anonymity in R
if and only if it is a median rule. Proposition 3: A function satisfies strategy-proofness and
peaks-onliness in R if and only if it is a generalized median rule.
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Proposition 3.3. The following two statements for strategy-proof correspon-
dences hold.
(i) If peaks-onliness is satisfied, then efficiency and voter-sovereignty are equiv-
alent.
(ii) If min/max continuity is satisfied, then efficiency and voter-sovereignty
are equivalent.
We prove Proposition 3.3 in Appendix 3.B. Moreover, the next result holds only
in domain R.25 It shows that strategy-proofness and peaks-onliness are equivalent
with uncompromisingness.
Proposition 3.4. The following two statements for correspondences are equiva-
lent in domain R.
(i) Strategy-proofness and peaks-onliness are satisfied.
(ii) Uncompromisingness is satisfied.
We prove Proposition 3.4 in Appendix 3.C. Moreover, the next result is in the
spirit of Proposition 3.4 and holds in domain S.
Proposition 3.5. The following two statements for correspondences are equiva-
lent in domain S.
(i) Strategy-proofness and voter-sovereignty are satisfied.
(ii) Uncompromisingness and voter-sovereignty are satisfied.
We prove Proposition 3.5 in Appendix 3.C. Moreover, our final result also
concerns uncompromisingness. It holds in both domains R and S.
Proposition 3.6. Each correspondence satisfying strategy-proofness, min/max
continuity, and voter-sovereignty also satisfies uncompromisingness.
We prove Proposition 3.6 in Appendix 3.C.
3.5.2 Results in the single-peaked domain R
We now present our characterization results for (generalized) median correspon-
dences, as well as a counter-example justifying the absence of such results in some
cases. All results hold in domain R. The extension of these results in domain S
is discussed in Section 3.5.3.
Our first result concerns the class of generalized median correspondences.
25An example of Proposition 3.4 not holding in domain S is illustrated by the counter-example
on page 84.
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Theorem 3.1. The following three statements for a correspondence F ∈ F are
equivalent.
(i) F satisfies strategy-proofness and peaks-onliness.
(ii) F satisfies uncompromisingness.
(iii) F is a generalized median correspondence.
The equivalence of statements (i) and (ii) follows from Propostion 3.4. We
prove the equivalence of statements (ii) and (iii) in Appendix 3.D; note that this
part of the proof also holds in domain S.
Our second result concerns the class of median correspondences.
Theorem 3.2. The following three statements for a correspondence F ∈ F are
equivalent.
(i) F satisfies strategy-proofness, peaks-onliness, and anonymity.
(ii) F satisfies uncompromisingness and anonymity.
(iii) F is a median correspondence.
Proof. The equivalence of statements (i) and (ii) follows from Propostion 3.4.
We proceed by showing the equivalence of statements (ii) and (iii) in two steps;
note that this part of the proof also holds in domain S.
Step 1 - (statement (ii) implies statement (iii)): Let F ∈ F satisfy
uncompromisingness and anonymity, and V ∈ R. By Theorem 3.1, there exists
Fα,βG ∈ FG such that F (V ) = Fα,βG (V ). Moreover, anonymity implies for α, β ∈
A2
n
that for each pair L,M ⊆ N , if |L| = |M |, then αL = αM and βL = βM . Thus,
for each M ⊆ N , let an+1−|M | = αM and bn+1−|M | = βM , to effectively construct
vectors a, b ∈ An+1. Next, let F a,bM ∈ FM and notice that for each V ∈ RN ,
Fα,βG (V ) = [med(v, α˜v),med(v, β˜v)] = [med(v, a),med(v, b)] = F
a,b
M (V ).
Step 2 - (statement (iii) implies statement (ii)): Let F a,bM ∈ FM .
In addition, let Fα,βG ∈ FG by choosing vectors α, β ∈ A2
n
such that the
weight of each coalition only depends on its cardinality; specifically, for each
M ⊆ N , αM = an+1−|M | and βM = bn+1−|M |. Hence, for each V ∈ RN ,
Fα,βG (V ) = [med(v, α˜v),med(v, β˜v)] = [med(v, a),med(v, b)] = F
a,b
M (V ). There-
fore, by Theorem 3.1, F a,bM satisfies uncompromisingness and by the definition of
FM , F a,bM satisfies anonymity.
Next, we show that in Theorems 3.1 and 3.2 peaks-onliness cannot be substi-
tuted with min/max continuity. We illustrate this in the counter-example that fol-
lows by exhibiting a correspondence satisfying strategy-proofness, min/max con-
tinuity, and anonymity and violating voter-sovereignty -and more importantly-
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uncompromisingness; which, as shown in the aforementioned theorems, is satis-
fied by both classes of generalized median correspondences and median correspon-
dences. Moreover, as explained in Section 3.5.3, this example also illustrates that
the aforementioned theorems cannot be extended in domain S.
Counter-example. Let |N | ≥ 1 and define r∗V ≡ max{rVi(0)}i∈N , that is, at
announced profile V , among the indifferent announced alternatives to 0 of each
agent i ∈ N , r∗V is the largest one. Next, define F ∗ ∈ F as follows. For each
V ∈ RN , F ∗(V ) = [0, r∗V ]. By definition, it follows that F ∗ satisfies min/max
continuity and anonymity, and that it violates voter-sovereignty. We proceed in 2
steps
Step 1: We show F ∗ satisfies strategy-proofness. Let V ∈ RN (V ∈ SN) be
such that i ∈ N is sincere, i.e., Vi = Ri. Also, let V ′i ∈ R (V ′i ∈ S) be such that
V ′i 6= Vi. There are two cases.
Case 1. Let rVi(0) = r
∗
V . By single-peakedness, bRi(F
∗(V )) = {pi}, implying
i’s best point does not improve by deviating at V , and 0 ∈ wRi(F ∗(V )). By the
definition of F ∗, 0 ∈ F ∗(V−i, V ′i ), hence i’s worst point(s) does not improve by
deviating at V . Therefore, F ∗(V )Ri F ∗(V−i, V ′i ).
Case 2. Let rVi(0) < r
∗
V . By single-peakedness, bRi(F
∗(V )) = {pi}, implying
i’s best point does not improve by deviating at V , and wVi(F
∗(V )) = {r∗V }. By
the definition of F ∗, r∗V ∈ F ∗(V−i, V ′i ), hence i’s worst point does not improve by
deviating at V . Therefore, F ∗(V )Ri F ∗(V−i, V ′i ).
Step 2: We show that F ∗ can be compromised. Let N = {1, 2, 3}. Let pair
V, V ′ ∈ SN be defined as follows: v1 = 0.2, v′1 = 0.3, and v2 = v′2 = v3 = v′3 = 0.
Hence, r∗V = rV1(0) = 0.4 and r
∗
V ′ = rV ′1 (0) = 0.6. Therefore, F (V ) = [0, 0.4] and
F (V ′) = [0, 0.6]. Clearly, F is compromised.
We conclude this section by presenting the “efficient versions” of Theorems 3.1
and 3.2. Notice that now peaks-onliness and min/max continuity become substi-
tutable.
Theorem 3.3. The following four statements for a correspondence F ∈ F are
equivalent.
(i) F satisfies strategy-proofness, peaks-onliness, and voter-sovereignty.
(ii) F satisfies uncompromisingness and voter-sovereignty.
(iii) F satisfies strategy-proofness, min/max continuity, and voter-
sovereignty.
(iv) F is an efficient generalized median correspondence.
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Proof. The equivalence of statements (i) and (ii) follows from Proposition 3.4.
The equivalence of statement (ii) and (iv) is shown as follows. By Theorem 3.1,
statement (ii) implies F ∈ FG. Hence, by the definition of FG, F satisfies peaks-
onliness. Thus, Proposition 3.3 and the definition of FEG imply F ∈ FEG, i.e.,
statement (ii) implies statement (iv). Moreover, by Theorem 3.1 and FEG (
FG, statement (iv) implies F satisfies uncompromisingness; in addition, by the
definition of FEG, statement (iv) implies F satisfies efficiency and therefore voter-
sovereignty, i.e., statement (iv) implies statement (ii). Finally, notice that this
equivalence of statements (ii) and (iv) also holds in domain S.
Next, by Proposition 3.6, statement (iii) implies statement (ii). We
complete the proof by showing statement (ii) implies statement (iii). By
Step 1 of the proof of Theorem 3.1(statement (ii) implies statement (iii)) on
page 106, if F ∈ F satisfies uncompromisingness, then for V ∈ RN and
each i ∈ N the following holds. If V 0i is such that v0i = 0 and V 1i is such
that v1i = 1, then ¯
F (V ) = med(
¯
F (V ),
¯
F (V−i, V 0i ), ¯
F (V−i, V 1i )) and F¯ (V ) =
med(F¯ (V ), F¯ (V−i, V 0i ), F¯ (V−i, V
1
i )). Hence clearly statement (ii) implies F sat-
isfies min/max continuity. Finally, by the equivalence of statements (i) and (ii),
statement (ii) implies F satisfies strategy-proofness.
Theorem 3.4. The following four statements for a correspondence F ∈ F are
equivalent.
(i) F satisfies strategy-proofness, peaks-onliness, anonymity, and voter-
sovereignty.
(ii) F satisfies uncompromisingness, anonymity, and voter-sovereignty.
(iii) F satisfies strategy-proofness, min/max continuity, anonymity, and
voter-sovereignty.
(iv) F is an efficient median correspondence.
Proof. The equivalence of statements (i), (ii), and (iii) follows from Theorem 3.3.
The equivalence of statements (ii) and (iv) is shown as follows. By Theorem 3.2,
statement (ii) implies F ∈ FM . Hence, Proposition 3.3 and the definition of FEM
imply F ∈ FEM , i.e., statement (ii) implies statement (iv). Moreover, by Theo-
rem 3.2 and FEM ( FM , statement (iv) implies F satisfies uncompromisingness,
and anonymity ; in addition, by the definition of FEM , statement (iv) implies
F satisfies efficiency and therefore voter-sovereignty, i.e., statement (iv) implies
statement (ii). Finally, notice that this equivalence of statements (ii) and (iv) also
holds in domain S.
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3.5.3 Results in the single-peaked and symmetric domain
S
We now show the characterizations in domain S that are -loosely speaking- equiva-
lent to those presented in Section 3.5.2 for domainR. Specifically, the non-efficient
characterizations in domain R (Theorems 3.1 and 3.2) cannot be extended in do-
main S. This is illustrated by the counter-example presented on page 84, where
the given correspondence satisfies strategy-proofness, anonymity, and min/max
continuity in domain S but violates uncompromisingness. This violation is of im-
portance because as shown by the proof of Theorem 3.1 (statement (iii) implies
statement (ii)) on page 103 -this part of the proof also holds in domain S- both
classes of generalized median correspondences and median correspondences satisfy
uncompromisingness.
Concerning the efficient characterizations in domainR (Theorems 3.3 and 3.4),
these do extend in domain S. Moreover, since peaks-onliness is an inherent prop-
erty of domain S, min/max continuity is unnecessary in these characterizations.
Theorem 3.5. The following three statements for a correspondence F ∈ F are
equivalent.
(i) F satisfies strategy-proofness and voter-sovereignty.
(ii) F satisfies uncompromisingness and voter-sovereignty.
(iii) F is an efficient generalized median correspondence.
Proof. The equivalence of statements (i) and (ii) constitutes Proposition 3.5. The
equivalence of statements (ii) and (iii) follows from Theorem 3.3 (recall that as
noted on page 85, statements (ii) and (iv) of Theorem 3.3 are also equivalent in
domain S).
Theorem 3.6. The following three statements for a correspondence F ∈ F are
equivalent.
(i) F satisfies strategy-proofness, voter-sovereignty, and anonymity.
(ii) F satisfies uncompromisingness, voter-sovereignty, and anonymity.
(iii) F is an efficient median correspondence.
Proof. The equivalence of statements (i) and (ii) constitutes Proposition 3.5. The
equivalence of statements (ii) and (iii) follows from Theorem 3.4 (recall that as
noted on page 85, statements (ii) and (iv) of Theorem 3.4 are also equivalent in
domain S).
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3.5.4 Independence of properties
Concerning the independence of the properties used in our results, consider the
following four correspondences. First, correspondence F ∗ proposed by the counter-
example on page 84. Second, let correspondence F1 ∈ F choose the minimum
announced peak when more than two agents prefer it against the maximum an-
nounced peak, and choose the maximum announced peak otherwise; in both do-
mains R and S, it satisfies strategy-proofness, anonymity, and voter-sovereignty
but violates peaks-onliness (in domain R), min/max continuity, and uncompro-
misingness. Third, for a small and positive value ε let correspondence F2 ∈ F
choose the minimum of: (a) the minimum announced peak plus ε and (b) the maxi-
mum peak; in both domainsR and S, it satisfies all the properties we are interested
in except for strategy-proofness and uncompromisingness. Finally, let F3 ∈ F be
the “constant” correspondence always choosing 0; in both domains R and S, it
satisfies all the properties we are interested in except for voter-sovereignty.
Table 3.1 summarizes our results and also depicts that correspondences F ∗,
F 1, F 2, and F 3 suffice to show the independence of the properties used in our
results.
FG FEG FM FEM F ∗ F1 F2 F3
Domain R # À Á À Á Â À À À Á À Á Â À À
Domain S  À À À Í Î À À À Í Î
.
Strategy-proofness À À À Á À Í À À À À Á À Í À 3 3 7 3
Peaks-onliness (in R) À À À À À À À À À À À À À À 7 7 3 3
Min/max continuity À Á À À À À Á À À À 3 7 3 3
Voter-sovereignty À Á Â Í Î À Á Â Í Î 7 3 3 7
Anonymity À Á À Á Â Í Î 3 3 3 3
Uncompromisingness À Á À À Â À Î À Á À À Â À Î 7 7 7 3
The table above has a double purpose. First, columns FG, FEG, FM , and FEM , denoting the charac-
terized classes of correspondences, defined in Sections 3.3.1 and 3.3.2, summarize our characterization
results, with all results in domain R shown by circled black numbers in a white background and all
results in domain S shown by circled white numbers in a black background. For example, in the
column referring to FEG, the white circles containing number 4 show that in domain S, strategy-
proofness and voter-sovereignty characterize this class of correspondences. Second, the table shows
the independence of the properties used in each characterization result. Specifically, all combinations
of properties that must be checked are satisfied by at least one of the four non-median correspon-
dences F ∗, F1, F2, and F3, defined in Section 3.5.4 (with the exception of the combinations showing
the independence of anonymity in the characterizations of FM and FEM ; these combinations are
satisfied directly by the characterizations of FG and FEG respectively).
Table 3.1: Summary of the main results and independence of properties
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3.5.5 Discussion
The classes of generalized median correspondences and median correspondences
characterized in this chapter seem very similar to the class of double median func-
tions characterized in Heo (2013). Moreover, the reader might have noticed that
the left-peaks (right-peaks) function, characterized in Miyagawa (2001), resembles
a special case of a median correspondence. However, there are some notable dif-
ferences between these results and the results of this paper, which are summarized
in the following three points.
(i) By using the max-extension of preferences in our setting, as is the case in
the two aforementioned papers, it is straightforward to show that the only efficient
correspondence would be the one always choosing the interval of the peaks, that
is, for all V ∈ R, F (V ) = [
¯
v, v¯]. This follows from the agents only caring about
their best alternative in a set, and from our setting not limiting the number of
alternatives that may be chosen at a given profile.
(ii) Concerning the results of Heo (2013), the class of double median functions
seems to be equivalent to the class of median correspondences. Specifically, the
pair of alternatives (x1, x2) chosen by a double median function are essentially the
minimum and maximum alternatives of the interval chosen by a median correspon-
dence. However, apart from the distinction made in point (i), we should note the
following: Heo’s characterization result makes use of users-only, a property that
partitions each coalition of agents into two sub-coalitions; one preferring x1 over
x2, and everyone else, with only the first partition (second partition) influencing
the choice of alternative x1 (x2). In our setting, for each F
a,b ∈ FM , the choice of
both vectors a and b depends on the preferences of all the agents.
(iii) Concerning the results of Miyagawa (2001) and apart of the distinction
made in point (i), although the left-peaks function seems to be a special case of a
median correspondence, this is not the case; the left-peaks function always chooses
the two distinct left-most peaks, and moreover, the setting of Miyagawa requires
that at least two distinct peaks exist in each profile. In our setting, the median
correspondence that looks “similar” to the left-peaks function is F a,b ∈ F where
a = (0, . . . , 0) and b = (0, . . . , 0, 1). Although this correspondence seems to choose
the two left-most peaks, when two or more agents share the minimum peak, it only
chooses the minimum peak. Furthermore, it should be noted that in Chapter 2 the
same properties with Miyagawa (namely, efficiency and replacement-dominance)
are considered, under (almost) the same setting as in this chapter. There, it is
shown that each correspondence satisfying said properties is essentially a function,
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reconfirming the characterization of Vohra (1999) for (fixed population) target-
point functions.26 In addition, after weakening replacement-dominance to one-
sided replacement-dominance27, (fixed population) target set correspondences28 are
characterized, a sub-class of efficient median correspondences which -as discussed
above- does not include either the left-peaks rule or the right-peaks rule.
3.A On min/max continuity
In the sequel, all properties are defined for correspondences in domain R but also
apply to correspondences in domain S. Moreover, all results presented in this
section, hold in both domains.
Upper-hemi continuity. For each V ∈ RN , each i ∈ N , each {V ki } in R such
that V ki → Vi, and each {xk} in A such that xk → x, the following holds. If for
each k ∈ N+, xk ∈ F (V−i, V ki ), then x ∈ F (V ).
Lower-hemi continuity. For each V ∈ RN , each i ∈ N , and each {V ki } in R
such that V ki → Vi, the following holds. If x ∈ F (V ), then there exists {xk} in A
such that xk → x and for each k ∈ N+, xk ∈ F (V−i, V ki ).
Lemma 3.5. The following two statements for correspondences are equivalent.
(i) Min/max continuity is satisfied.
(ii) Upper-hemi continuity and lower-hemi continuity are satisfied.
Proof of Lemma 3.5. Let F ∈ F . If F satisfies upper-hemi continuity and
lower-hemi continuity then trivially, it also satisfies min/max continuity. Next,
let F satisfy min/max continuity, V ∈ RN , and {V ki } be in R. We show that F
satisfies upper-hemi continuity and lower-hemi continuity in two steps.
Step 1. We show F satisfies upper-hemi continuity. Let {xk} in A such
that xk → x and for each k ∈ N+, xk ∈ F (V−i, V ki ). Hence, for each k ∈ N+,
¯
F (V−i, V ki ) ≤ xk ≤ F¯ (V−i, V ki ). Moreover, by min/max continuity, ¯F (V−i, V
k
i ) →
¯
F (V ) and F¯ (V−i, V ki )→ F¯ (V ), which implies ¯F (V ) ≤ x ≤ F¯ (V ) since otherwise,
min/max continuity would imply that there exists k∗ ∈ N+ such that xk∗ 6∈
F (V−i, V k
∗
i ). Therefore, x ∈ F (V ).
Step 2. We show F satisfies lower-hemi continuity. Let x ∈ F (V ) and V ki →
Vi. Hence, for all k ∈ N+,
¯
F (V−i, V ki ) ≤ F¯ (V−i, V ki ) and by min/max continuity,
26Each target point function is determined by its target point: if the target point is efficient,
it is chosen; if it is not efficient, the closest efficient point is chosen.
27See page 38 for a formal definition.
28See page 33 for a formal definition.
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[
¯
F (V−i, V ki ) → ¯F (V ) and F¯ (V−i, V
k
i ) → F¯ (V )]. It follows that there exists {xk}
in A such that xk → x and for each k ∈ N+,
¯
F (V−i, V ki ) ≤ xk ≤ F¯ (V−i, V ki ).
3.B Proofs of Propositions 3.2 and 3.3
Before proceeding to the proofs of Propositions 3.2 and 3.3, we show the following.
When strategy-proofness is satisfied, voter sovereignty is equivalent with unanim-
ity ; a property stronger than voter-sovereignty but weaker than efficiency, that
requires when all agents announce the same peak, only this peak to be chosen.29
This result holds in both domains.
Lemma 3.6. For strategy-proof correspondences, voter-sovereignty and unanim-
ity are equivalent.
Proof. Let F ∈ F . Trivially, unanimity implies voter sovereignty. Hence, let F
satisfy strategy-proofness and voter-sovereignty. We show that F satisfies una-
nimity.
Let a ∈ A and R ∈ RN be such that p = (a, . . . , a). By voter-sovereignty,
there exists V ∈ RN such that F (V ) = a. Let M ⊆ N contain all the agents
in N whose announced peak at V is not a, i.e., for each i ∈ M , vi 6= a, and for
each j ∈ N \M , vj = pj = a. Without loss of generality, index the agents in N
such that M = {1, . . . ,m}. Next, consider profile V 1 = (V−1, R1). By strategy-
proofness, F (V 1) R1 F (V ). Hence, single-peakedness and F (V ) = a = p1 imply
F (V 1) = a. Finally, for each k = {2, . . . ,m} in increasing indexing order, consider
profile V k = (V k−1−k , Rk). By the arguments presented for V
1, F (V k) = F (V ) = a.
Therefore, since V m = R, F (V m) = F (R) = a.
We proceed with the proof of Proposition 3.2, which makes use of Lemma 3.6.
This proof holds only in domain S because it makes use of the inherent peaks-
onliness of this domain.
Proof of Proposition 3.2. Let F ∈ F satisfy strategy-proofness. The equiva-
lence of unanimity and voter-sovereignty follows by Lemma 3.6. In addition, it is
trivial to show that efficiency implies unanimity. Therefore, it remains to show
that unanimity implies efficiency. We do so by contradiction; specifically, we show
that if F (V ) 6∈ E(V ), then unanimity is violated.
29Formally, given F ∈ F , for each V ∈ RN such that v = (x, . . . , x), F (V ) = {x}.
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Let V ∈ SN and without loss of generality, assume v1 ≤ · · · ≤ vn. By Propo-
sition 3.1, there are two cases.
Case 1. Let v¯ < F¯ (V ). For all agents i ∈ N , define V ′i ∈ S to be such that
v′i = vn.
First, consider agent 1, where
¯
v = v1 ≤ v¯ < F¯ (V ). By single-peakedness,
either [F¯ (V ) ∈ wV1(F (V )) and thus wV1(F (V )) 6∈ E(V )] or [¯F (V ) = wV1(F (V ))
and thus v1 =
¯
v < F¯ (V ) and single-peakedness imply
¯
F (V ) <
¯
v, and there-
fore, wV1(F (V )) 6∈ E(V )]. Next, recall the indifference relation rVi and let x1 =
rV1(wV1(F (V ))).
30 If F¯ (V ) ∈ wV1(F (V )), then v1 < F¯ (V ) and single-peakedness
imply x1 < v1 =
¯
v and hence, x1 6∈ E(V ). Similarly, if
¯
F (V ) = wV1(F (V )),
then
¯
F (V ) <
¯
v ≤ v¯ < F¯ (V ) and single-peakedness imply x1 > v¯ and hence,
x1 6∈ E(V ). Finally, assume R1 = V1 and consider V 1 = (V−1, V ′1). By strategy-
proofness, wR1(F (V ))R1 wR1(F (V
1)); hence, wV1(F (V )) 6∈ E(V ), x1 6∈ E(V ), and
single-peakedness implies wR1(F (V
1)) 6∈ E(V ). Then, since E(V 1) ⊆ E(V ) implies
wR1(F (V
1)) 6∈ E(V 1); and thus, F (V 1) 6∈ E(V 1).
Next, consider agent 2 at profile V 1 and recall that wR1(F (V
1)) 6∈ E(V 1) and
x1 6∈ E(V ). Let x2 = rV2(wV2(F (V 1))). If ¯F (V
1) ⊆ wR1(F (V 1)), then ¯F (V
1) <
v1; hence, v1 ≤ v2, single-peakedness, and V2 ∈ S imply
¯
F (V 1) ⊆ wV2(F (V 1))
and x2 ≥ F¯ (V ).31 Thus, wV2(F (V 1)), x2 6∈ E(V 1). If F¯ (V 1) = wR1(F (V 1)),
then v¯1 < F¯ (V 1); hence, v2 ≤ v¯1 and single-peakedness imply either [F¯ (V 1) ⊆
wV2(F (V
1)) and x2 <
¯
v1] or [
¯
F (V 1) = wV2(F (V
1)) and v¯1 < F¯ (V 1) < x2]. Thus,
wV2(F (V
1)), x2 6∈ E(V 1). Therefore, by the arguments presented for V 1, F (V 2) 6∈
E(V 2).
Finally, for each k ∈ {3, . . . , n− 1}, in increasing order, consider profile V k =
(V k−1−k , V
′
k). By the arguments presented for agents 1 and 2 above, F (V
k) 6∈ E(V k).
Therefore, at profile V n−1 where vn−1 = (vn, . . . , vn), F (V n−1) 6∈ E(V n−1) implying
F (V n−1) 6= {vn} which contradicts unanimity.
Case 2. Let
¯
v >
¯
F (V ). The proof is symmetric to Case 1.
Notice that although for didactic reasons Proposition 3.3 proceeds Proposi-
tion 3.4 in the main text, the proof of Proposition 3.3 makes use of Proposition 3.4
(proof in Appendix 3.C). Recall that this result holds in both domains.
30To be precise, if agent 1 has two worst points on F (V ), then with some abuse of notation,
assume wV1(F (V )) is the smallest of the two worst points, which implies that x1 is then the
largest of the two worst points.
31To be precise, if agent 2 has two worst points on F (V 1), then with some abuse of notation,
assume wV2(F (V
1)) is the smallest of the two worst points, which implies that x2 is then the
largest of the two worst points.
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Proof of Proposition 3.3. Let F ∈ F satisfy strategy-proofness. By
Lemma 3.6, unanimity and voter-sovereignty are equivalent. In addition, it is
easy to show that efficiency implies unanimity.
The proof proceeds in three steps. In Step 1 we show that if in addition to
strategy-proofness, F satisfies peaks-onliness and unanimity, the following holds.
Given an announced profile where an efficient set is chosen, if an agent with the
minimum -but not unique- announced peak changes his announcement by moving
his announced peak to the right, an efficient set is chosen again. Step 2 shows the
same result but for the case where in addition to strategy-proofness, F satisfies
min/max continuity and unanimity. Finally in Step 3, by unanimity and the
intermediate results of Steps 1 and 2, we show that F satisfies efficiency.
Step 1. In addition to strategy-proofness, let F satisfy peaks-onliness and
unanimity. By Proposition 3.4, F also satisfies uncompromisingness. Let V ∈ RN
and i ∈ N be such that F (V ) ∈ E(V ) and vi =
¯
v but where i does not have
the unique minimum peak. Hence, by Proposition 3.1, F (V ) ⊆ Conv(v). In
addition, let V ′i ∈ R be such that v′i ≥ v¯. Assuming ¯F (V−i, V
′
i ) < ¯
v implies
¯
F (V−i, V ′i ) < vi ≤ v′i. Hence, by uncompromisingness, ¯F (V−i, V
′
i ) = ¯
F (V ) <
¯
v,
which contradicts F (V ) ∈ E(V ). Similarly, assuming F¯ (V−i, V ′i ) > v′i implies
F¯ (V−i, V ′i ) > v
′
i ≥ vi. Hence, by uncompromisingness, F¯ (V−i, V ′i ) = F¯ (V ) > v¯,
which contradicts F (V ) ∈ E(V ). Therefore, F (V−i, V ′i ) ∈ E(V ).
Step 2. In addition to strategy-proofness, let F satisfy min/max continuity
and unanimity. Define V ∈ RN and V ′i ∈ R as in Step 1. By single-peakedness,
wV ′i (F (V )) = ¯
F (V ). We show that F (V−i, V ′i ) ∈ E(V−i, V ′i ) by discrediting all
three cases where F (V−i, V ′i ) 6∈ E(V−i, V ′i ).
Case 1. Let
¯
F (V−i, V ′i ) < ¯
v. In addition, let Ri = V
′
i . By
single-peakedness,
¯
F (V )Pi
¯
F (V−i, V ′i ), hence wRi(F (V )) = ¯
F (V ) implies
wRi(F (V ))PiwRi(F (V−i, V
′
i )). Therefore, if at profile (V−i, V
′
i ) agent i deviates
by announcing Vi, his worst point improves. This contradicts strategy-proofness.
Case 2. Let
¯
F (V−i, V ′i ) > v
′
i. Since ¯
F (V ) ≤ F¯ (V ) ≤ v′i, by min/max continuity,
there exists some profile V ′′i ∈ R such that V ′′i 6= V ′i and v′i ∈ F (V−i, V ′′i ). Let
Ri = V
′
i ; hence, bRi(F (V−i, V
′′
i )) = v
′
i implying bRi(F (V−i, V
′′
i ))PibRi(F (V−i, V
′
i )).
Therefore, if at profile (V−i, V ′i ) agent i deviates by announcing V
′′
i , his best point
improves. This contradicts strategy-proofness.
Case 3. Let
¯
v ≤
¯
F (V−i, V ′i ) ≤ v′i and F¯ (V−i, V ′i ) > v′i. In the following, we
describe a series of actions that when performed in sequence construct -after a
finite number of “moves”- profile V ′, such that v′ = (v′i, . . . , v
′
i) and F (V
′) 6= v′i,
i.e., a profile at which unanimity is violated.
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Action 1. Let profile V 0 = (V−i, V ′i ). Let N1 ( N be such that j ∈ N1
if and only if v0j 6= v′i and v0j < ¯F (V
0). If N1 = ∅, then proceed to Ac-
tion 2. Otherewise, let j ∈ N1. By v0j < ¯F (V
0) ≤ F¯ (V 0) and single-peakedness,
bV 0j (F (V
0)) =
¯
F (V 0) and wV 0j (F (V
0)) = F¯ (V 0). Let V 1j = V
′
i and profile V
1 =
(V 0−j, V
1
j ). Assume Rj = V
0
j . By strategy-proofness, bRj(F (V
0))RjbRj(F (V
1)) and
wRj(F (V
0)) Rj wRj(F (V
1)); hence, by single-peakedness, either [
¯
F (V 0) ≤
¯
F (V 1)
and F¯ (V 0) ≤ F¯ (V 1)] or [
¯
F (V 1) ≤ F¯ (V 1) < v0j ]. However, if ¯F (V
1) ≤ F¯ (V 1) < v0j ,
then by min/max continuity there exist preference V ∗j ∈ R such that v0j ∈
F (V 0−j, V
∗
j ). This violates strategy-proofness since if at profile V
0 agent j de-
viates by announcing V ∗, his best point improves. Hence,
¯
F (V 0) ≤
¯
F (V 1) and
F¯ (V 0) ≤ F¯ (V 1). Therefore, v′i < F¯ (V 1).
Next, let N2 ( N be such that k ∈ N2 if and only if v1k 6= v′i and v1k < ¯F (V
1). If
N2 = ∅, then proceed to Action 2. Otherwise, let k ∈ N2. In addition, let V 2k = V ′i
and profile V 2 = (V 1−k, V
2
k ). By the process described in the previous paragraph
for agent j, v′i < F¯ (V
2).
Finally, repeat this process µ times (where µ is smaller than the number of
agents, µ ≤ n − 1) until the following holds. Set Nµ ( N , constructed similarly
to N1 and N2, is empty. When this occurs, proceed to Action 2.
Action 2. Let profile V¯ 0 = V µ−1. Let N¯1 ( N be such that j ∈ N¯1 if and only
if v¯0j 6= v′i and F¯ (V¯ 0) ⊆ wV¯ 0j (F (V¯ 0)). Recall that F¯ (V¯ 0) > v′i. If N¯1 = ∅, then
proceed to Action 3. Otherwise, let j ∈ N¯1 and notice that by Nµ = ∅ (as defined
in Action 1), the choice of N¯1 implies
¯
F (V¯ 0) ≤ v¯0j < F¯ (V¯ 0). Define V¯ 1j ∈ R such
that v¯1j = v
′
i and wV¯ 1j (F (V¯
0)) =
¯
F (V¯ 0), and let profile V¯ 1 = (V¯ 0−j, V¯
1
j ). Assume
that Rj = V¯
0
j . By strategy-proofness, wRj(F (V¯
0)) Rj wRj(F (V¯
1)); hence, by
single-peakedness, F¯ (V¯ 0) ≤ F¯ (V¯ 1) and perhaps,
¯
F (V¯ 0) >
¯
F (V¯ 1). Assume that
Rj = V¯
1
j . If ¯
F (V¯ 1) <
¯
F (V¯ 0) < v¯1j , then single-peakedness implies wRj(F (V¯
0)) Pj
wRj(F (V¯
1)). This violates strategy-proofness since if at profile V¯ 1 agent j deviates
by announcing V¯ 0j , his worst point improves. Therefore, F¯ (V¯
0) ≤ F¯ (V¯ 1) and
¯
F (V¯ 0) ≤
¯
F (V¯ 1). Hence, v′i < F¯ (V¯
1).
Next, if
¯
F (V¯ 0) <
¯
F (V¯ 1), perhaps there exist some agents j¯ ∈ N such that
vj¯ < ¯
F (V¯ 1) ≤ F¯ (V¯ 1). If this is the case, then repeat the process described in
Action 1 and denote the resulting profile (again) by V¯ 1. If no such agents exist,
then V¯ 1 is the profile constructed in the end of the previous paragraph.
Following this, let N¯2 ( N be such that k ∈ N¯2 if and only if v¯1k 6= v′i and
F¯ (V¯ 1) ⊆ wV¯ 1k (F (V¯ 1)), where F¯ (V¯ 1) > v′i. If N¯2 = ∅, then proceed to Action 3.
Otherwise, let k ∈ N¯2 and notice that either by Nµ = ∅ (as defined in Action 1),
or by Action 1 being repeated in the previous paragraph, the choice of N¯2 implies
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¯
F (V¯ 1) ≤ v¯1k < F¯ (V¯ 1). Define V¯ 2k ∈ R such that v¯2k = v′i and wV¯ 2k (F (V¯ 1)) = ¯F (V¯
1),
and let profile V¯ 2 = (V¯ 1−k, V¯
2
k ). By the process described above for agent j,
F¯ (V¯ 1) ≤ F¯ (V¯ 2) and
¯
F (V¯ 1) ≤
¯
F (V¯ 2). Moreover, if
¯
F (V¯ 1) <
¯
F (V¯ 2), perhaps
Action 1 needs to be repeated as explained in the previous paragraph. In this
case, V¯ 2 is the resulting profile after repeating Action 1, otherwise, V¯ 2 remains
unchanged. In both cases, v′i < F¯ (V¯
2).
Finally, repeat this process for a finite integer µ (where µ is smaller than the
number of agents, µ ≤ n− 1) until the following holds. Set N¯µ ( N , constructed
similarly to N¯1 and N¯2, is empty. Notice that v
′
i < F¯ (V¯
µ−1) and proceed to
Action 3.
Action 3. Let profile Vˆ 0 = V¯ µ−1 and recall that v′i < F¯ (Vˆ
0). Let Nˆ (
N be such that j ∈ Nˆ if and only if vˆ0j 6= v′i and wVˆ 0j (F (V¯
0)) =
¯
F (Vˆ 0). Let
j ∈ Nˆ and notice that by vˆ0j < v′i < F¯ (Vˆ 0) and single-peakedness, ¯F (Vˆ
0) <
vˆ0j < F¯ (Vˆ
0). Define Vˆ 1j ∈ R such that vˆ1j = v′i and wVˆ 1j (F (Vˆ
0)) = F¯ (Vˆ 0),
and let profile Vˆ 1 = (Vˆ 0−j, Vˆ
1
j ). Assume that Rj = Vˆ
0
j . By strategy-proofness,
wRj(F (Vˆ
0))Rj wRj(F (Vˆ
1)); hence, by single-peakedness, either [
¯
F (Vˆ 0) ≥
¯
F (Vˆ 1)]
or [
¯
F (Vˆ 0) <
¯
F (Vˆ 1) and F¯ (Vˆ 0) < F¯ (Vˆ 1)].
Next, assume that Rj = Vˆ
1
j . If F¯ (Vˆ
1) > F¯ (Vˆ 0) > vˆ1j , then single-
peakedness implies wRj(F (Vˆ
0)) Pj wRj(F (Vˆ
1)). This violates strategy-proofness
since if at profile Vˆ 1 agent j deviates by announcing Vˆ 0j , his worst point im-
proves. In addition, if F¯ (Vˆ 1) < vˆ1j = bRj(F (Vˆ
0)), then single-peakedness im-
plies bRj(F (Vˆ
0)) Pj bRj(F (Vˆ
1)). This violates strategy-proofness since if at pro-
file Vˆ 1 agent j deviates by announcing Vˆ 0j , his best point improves. Therefore,
¯
F (Vˆ 0) ≥
¯
F (Vˆ 1) and in addition, v′i ≤ F¯ (Vˆ 1) ≤ F¯ (Vˆ 0). Hence, v′i > ¯F (Vˆ
1).
Finally, notice that by single-peakedness,
¯
F (Vˆ 0) ≥
¯
F (Vˆ 1) and v′i ≤ F¯ (Vˆ 1) ≤
F¯ (Vˆ 0) the following holds; for each agent k ∈ Nˆ , wVˆ 0k (F (V¯
0)) =
¯
F (Vˆ 0) implies
wVˆ 1k
(F (V¯ 1)) =
¯
F (Vˆ 1). Hence, by the process described above for agent j, the
announced peaks of all agents k ∈ Nˆ , such that k 6= j, can be sequentially changed
to v′i and profile Vˆ
|Nˆ | can be constructed. Therefore, since vˆ|Nˆ | = (v′i, . . . , v
′
i),
Vˆ |Nˆ | = V ′, and hence, v′i > ¯
F (V ′) implies unanimity is violated.
Step 3. Let V ∈ RN . Without loss of generality, index the agents in N such
that v1 ≤ · · · ≤ vn. Let V ′ ∈ RN be such that V ′ = (V1, . . . , V1). By unanimity,
F (V ′) = v1, hence by Proposition 3.1, F (V ′) ∈ E(V ′). Next, consider profile
V 2 = (V ′−2, V2) where v2 ≥ v′2 = v1, ¯v
2 =
¯
v′, and v¯2 ≥ v¯′. Step 1 or Step 2,
and F (V ′) ∈ E(V ′) imply F (V 2) ∈ E(V 2). Finally, for each k = {3, . . . , n}, in
increasing order, consider profile V k = (V k−1−k , Vk). By the arguments presented
for V 2, F (V k) ∈ E(V k). Therefore, since V n = V , F (V ) ∈ E(V ).
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3.C Proofs of Propositions 3.4, 3.5, and 3.6
Before proceeding to the proof of Proposition 3.4 we present a lemma that holds
only in domainR32 and concerns strategy-proof correspondences satisfying peaks-
onliness. Loosely speaking, following an agent’s announcement change, there are
restrictions on the chosen set.
Lemma 3.7. For each F ∈ F satisfying strategy-proofness and peaks-onliness,
each i ∈ N , and each pair V, V ′ ∈ RN such that V−i = V ′−i, the following hold.
(i) If vi < F¯ (V ), then F¯ (V ) ≤ F¯ (V ′), and if in addition vi <
¯
F (V ), then
¯
F (V ) ≤
¯
F (V ′).
(ii) If vi >
¯
F (V ), then
¯
F (V ) ≥
¯
F (V ′), and if in addition vi > F¯ (V ), then
F¯ (V ) ≥ F¯ (V ′).
Proof. We prove statement (i), the proof of statement (ii) is symmetric. Let
F ∈ F satisfy strategy-proofness and peaks-onliness. Let pair V, V ′ ∈ RN and
i ∈ N be such that V−i = V ′−i and vi < F¯ (V ).
Suppose Ri is such that pi = vi and 0Pi F¯ (V ). By peaks-onliness, F (V−i, Ri) =
F (V ). Hence, by single-peakedness and the choice of Ri, wRi(F (V−i, Ri)) = F¯ (V ).
Thus, since V ′ = (V−i, V ′i ), strategy-proofness implies F¯ (V )RiwRi(F (V
′)). There-
fore, single-peakedness, the choice of Ri, and 0 ≤ vi < F¯ (V ) imply wRi(F (V ′)) ≥
F¯ (V ), and hence, F¯ (V ′) ≥ F¯ (V ).
If in addition vi <
¯
F (V ), then by single-peakedness, bRi(F (V−i, Ri)) = ¯
F (V ).
Thus, since V ′ = (V−i, V ′i ), strategy-proofness implies ¯
F (V )Ri bRi(F (V
′)). There-
fore, single-peakedness, F¯ (V ′) ≥ F¯ (V ), and vi <
¯
F (V ) imply
¯
F (V ′) ≥
¯
F (V ).
The proof of Proposition 3.4 follows and holds only in domain R because it
makes use of Lemma 3.7.
Proof of Proposition 3.4. The proof is split in two parts.
Part 1: We show that strategy-proofness and peaks-onliness imply uncom-
promisingness.
Let F ∈ F satisfy strategy-proofness and peaks-onliness. Let pair V, V ′ ∈ RN
and i ∈ N be such that V−i = V ′−i. If vi = v′i, then peaks-onliness implies
uncompromisingness. Hence, let vi 6= v′i, and by symmetry of arguments, let
vi < v
′
i. There are four cases. Notice that Case 1.1 overlaps with Case 2.1, while
Case 1.2 overlaps with Cases 2.1 and 2.2.
32It does not hold in domain S because the proof makes use of non-symmetrical single-peaked
preferences.
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Case 1.1. Let vi < v
′
i ≤ ¯F (V ). By Lemma 3.7(i), ¯F (V ) ≤ ¯F (V
′). Moreover,
assuming
¯
F (V ) <
¯
F (V ′) results in a contradiction as follows. Since v′i < ¯
F (V ′),
Lemma 3.7(i) implies
¯
F (V ′) ≤
¯
F (V ). Therefore,
¯
F (V ) =
¯
F (V ′).
Case 1.2. Let
¯
F (V ) < vi < v
′
i. By Lemma 3.7(ii), ¯
F (V ′) ≤
¯
F (V ). Hence,
¯
F (V ′) < v′i, and by Lemma 3.7(ii), ¯
F (V ) ≤
¯
F (V ′). Therefore,
¯
F (V ) =
¯
F (V ′).
Case 2.1. Let vi < v
′
i ≤ F¯ (V ). By Lemma 3.7(i), F¯ (V ) ≤ F¯ (V ′). Moreover,
assuming F¯ (V ) < F¯ (V ′) results in a contradiction as follows. Since v′i < F¯ (V
′),
Lemma 3.7(i) implies F¯ (V ′) ≤ F¯ (V ) < F¯ (V ′). Therefore, F¯ (V ) = F¯ (V ′).
Case 2.2. Let F¯ (V ) < vi < v
′
i. By Lemma 3.7(ii), F¯ (V
′) ≤ F¯ (V ). Hence,
F¯ (V ′) < v′i, and by Lemma 3.7(ii), F¯ (V ) ≤ F¯ (V ′). Therefore, F¯ (V ) = F¯ (V ′).
Part 2: We show that uncompromisingness implies strategy-proofness and
peaks-onliness. Notice that this part of the proof also hold in domain S.
Let F ∈ F satisfy uncompromisingness. Let i ∈ N and pair V, V ′ ∈ RN be
such that V−i = V ′−i and Vi 6= V ′i . We proceed in two steps.
Step 1. We show that F satisfies peaks-onliness.
Let vi = v
′
i. If vi = ¯
F (V ), then assuming
¯
F (V ′) 6=
¯
F (V ) results in a contra-
diction, since v′i = vi 6= ¯F (V
′) and uncompromisingness imply
¯
F (V ) =
¯
F (V ′).
Similarly, if vi = F¯ (V ), then assuming F¯ (V
′) 6= F¯ (V ′) results in a contradiction,
since v′i = vi 6= F¯ (V ′) and uncompromisingness imply F¯ (V ) = F¯ (V ′). Finally, if
vi 6=
¯
F (V ) and vi 6= F¯ (V ), then by uncompromisingness, F (V ) = F (V ′). There-
fore, F satisfies peaks-onliness.
Step 2. We show that F satisfies strategy-proofness. Recall that Vi 6= V ′i
and by symmetry of arguments, let vi ≤ v′i. By Step 1, F satisfies peaks-onliness,
hence, if vi = v
′
i, then strategy-proofness is satisfied. By symmetry of arguments,
let vi < v
′
i. We proceed in two stages.
Stage 1. We show that
¯
F (V ) ≤
¯
F (V ′) and F¯ (V ) ≤ F¯ (V ′). There are 3 cases.
Case 1. Let vi <
¯
F (V ). If vi < v
′
i ≤ ¯F (V ), then by uncompromisingness,
¯
F (V ) =
¯
F (V ′). Otherwise, if
¯
F (V ) < v′i, then consider the following. Assuming
¯
F (V ′) <
¯
F (V ) results in a contradiction as follows. Let V 1i be such that v
1
i =
¯
F (V ′). Since vi <
¯
F (V ) and v1i < ¯
F (V ), by uncompromisingness,
¯
F (V−i, V 1i ) =
¯
F (V ). However, since
¯
F (V ′) < v′i and v
1
i = ¯
F (V ′), by uncompromisingness,
¯
F (V ′−i, V
1
i ) = ¯
F (V ′). Hence,
¯
F (V ) ≤
¯
F (V ′).
Case 2. Let vi =
¯
F (V ) < v′i. Assuming ¯
F (V ′) <
¯
F (V ) results in a contradic-
tion as follows. Since
¯
F (V ′) < vi < v′i, by uncompromisingness, ¯
F (V ′) =
¯
F (V ).
Hence,
¯
F (V ) ≤
¯
F (V ′).
Case 3. Let vi >
¯
F (V ). Since vi < v
′
i, by uncompromisingness, ¯
F (V ) =
¯
F (V ′).
Stage 2. By Stage 1,
¯
F (V ) ≤
¯
F (V ′) and F¯ (V ) ≤ F¯ (V ′). We show that F
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satisfies strategy-proofness. Let Ri = Vi. There are five cases.
Case 1. Let pi <
¯
F (V ). By peaks-onliness, bRi(F (V )) = ¯
F (V ), wRi(F (V )) =
F¯ (V ), bRi(F (V
′)) =
¯
F (V ′), and wRi(F (V
′)) = F¯ (V ′). Hence, by single-
peakedness, i’s best and worst points do not improve by deviating at V . Therefore,
F (V )Ri F (V
′).
Case 2. Let pi =
¯
F (V ). By peaks-onliness, bRi(F (V )) = pi and wRi(F (V )) =
F¯ (V ), implying i can’t improve on his best point. Regarding his worst point, since
F¯ (V ) ≤ F¯ (V ′), by peaks-onliness, wRi(F (V ))Ri F¯ (V ′). Therefore, F (V )RiF (V ′).
Case 3. Let
¯
F (V ) < pi < F¯ (V ). By peaks-onliness, bRi(F (V )) = pi
and wRi(F (V )) ⊆ {¯F (V ), F¯ (V )}, implying agent i can’t improve on his best
point. Regarding his worst point(s), since
¯
F (V ) < pi ≤ v′i, by uncompro-
misingness,
¯
F (V ) =
¯
F (V ′). Since also F¯ (V ) ≤ F¯ (V ′), by peaks-onliness,
wRi(F (V ))Ri wRi(F (V
′)). Therefore, F (V )Ri F (V ′).
Case 4. Let pi = F¯ (V ). By peaks-onliness, bRi(F (V )) = pi and wRi(F (V )) =
¯
F (V ), implying i can’t improve on his best point. Regarding his worst point, if
¯
F (V ) < F¯ (V ), then since
¯
F (V ) < pi ≤ v′i, and by uncompromisingness, ¯F (V ) =
¯
F (V ′). Hence, F¯ (V ) ≤ F¯ (V ′) implies wRi(F (V )) Ri wRi(F (V ′)). Otherwise, if
¯
F (V ) = F¯ (V ), then wRi(F (V )) = pi, implying i can’t improve on his worst point.
Therefore, in both cases F (V )Ri F (V
′).
Case 5. Let pi > F¯ (V ). Since F¯ (V ) < pi ≤ v′i, by uncompromisingness,
F (V ) = F (V ′). Therefore, F (V ) Ii F (V ′).
Before proceeding to the proof of Proposition 3.5 we present two lemmata
that hold only in domain S (because they make use of Proposition 3.2) and con-
cern strategy-proof correspondences satisfying voter-sovereignty. Loosely speak-
ing, both show cases where following a change in the preferences of some agents,
there are restrictions in the minimum and maximum chosen alternatives.
Lemma 3.8. For each F ∈ F satisfying strategy-proofness and voter-sovereignty,
each V ∈ SN , and each x ∈ A the following hold.
(i) Let V ′ ∈ SN be as follows. For each each i ∈ N , if vi ≤ x, then v′i = x,
otherwise v′i = vi. Then, x ≤ F¯ (V ) implies F¯ (V ) ≤ F¯ (V ′); in addition, x ≤ ¯F (V )
implies
¯
F (V ) ≤
¯
F (V ′).
(ii) Let V ′ ∈ SN be as follows. For each i ∈ N , if vi ≥ x, then v′i = x,
otherwise v′i = vi. Then, x ≥ ¯F (V ) implies ¯F (V ) ≥ ¯F (V
′); in addition, x ≥ F¯ (V )
implies F¯ (V ) ≥ F¯ (V ′).
Proof. We prove statement (i), the proof of statement (ii) is symmetric. Let
F ∈ F satisfy strategy-proofness and voter-sovereignty. By Proposition 3.2, F also
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satisfies efficiency. Let V ∈ SN and x ∈ A be such that x ≤ F¯ (V ); and without
loss of generality, let v1 ≤ · · · ≤ vn. Moreover, let V ′ ∈ SN be defined as follows.
For each i ∈ N , if vi ≤ x, then v′i = x, otherwise v′i = vi. Let M = {1, . . . ,m} ⊆ N
be such that i ∈M implies v′i = x. Hence, V ′ = (Vx, . . . , Vx, Vm+1, . . . , Vn), where
Vx ∈ S and vx = x.
Begin from profile V . By efficiency and Proposition 3.1, F (V ) ⊆ Conv(V ).
Let R1 = V1, hence v1 ≤ x ≤ F¯ (V ) implies wR1(F (V )) = F¯ (V ). Next, let V 11 = Vx
and consider profile V 1 = (V−1, V 11 ). By efficiency and Proposition 3.1, F (V
1) ⊆
Conv(V 1), and by strategy-proofness, wR1(F (V )) R1 wR1(F (V
1)). Therefore, by
single-peakedness, v1 ≤ F¯ (V ) ≤ F¯ (V 1). If V 1 = V ′, then we are done. Otherwise,
for each k ∈ {2, . . . ,m}, in increasing order, consider profile V k = (V k−1−k , V kk ). By
the arguments presented for V 1, F¯ (V k−1) ≤ F¯ (V k). Therefore, V m = V ′ implies
F¯ (V ) ≤ F¯ (V ′).
If in addition x ≤
¯
F (V ), then bR1(F (V )) = ¯
F (V ). In this case, begin from
profile V and construct profile V ′ as shown above. By the same arguments to the
ones presented above, but expressed for the best alternative instead of the worst,
it follows that
¯
F (V ) ≤
¯
F (V ′).
Lemma 3.9. For each F ∈ F satisfying strategy-proofness and voter-sovereignty,
and each V ∈ SN the following hold.
(i) Let M ⊆ N be such that i ∈M implies vi =
¯
v. Let V ′ ∈ SN be as follows.
For each i ∈ N , if i ∈M , then v′i ≤ vi, otherwise v′i = vi. Then, ¯v < F¯ (V ) implies
F¯ (V ) ≤ F¯ (V ′); in addition,
¯
v <
¯
F (V ) implies
¯
F (V ) ≤
¯
F (V ′).
(ii) Let M ⊆ N be such that i ∈M implies vi = v¯. Let V ′ ∈ SN be as follows.
For each i ∈ N , if i ∈M , then v′i ≥ vi, otherwise v′i = vi. Then, v¯ > ¯F (V ) implies
¯
F (V ) ≥
¯
F (V ′); in addition, v¯ > F¯ (V ) implies F¯ (V ) ≥ F¯ (V ′).
Proof. We prove statement (i), the proof of statement (ii) is symmetric. Let
F ∈ F satisfy strategy-proofness and voter-sovereignty, and V ∈ SN be such that
¯
v < F¯ (V ). By Proposition 3.2, F also satisfies efficiency ; hence, Proposition 3.1
implies
¯
v < F¯ (V ) ≤ v¯. In addition, let M ⊆ N be such that i ∈M implies vi =
¯
v,
and without loss of generality, let M = (1, . . . ,m); hence,
¯
v < v¯ implies M ( N .
Moreover, let V ′ ∈ SN be as follows. For each i ∈ N , if i ∈ M , then v′i ≤ vi,
otherwise v′i = vi. Finally, without loss of generality, let v
′
1 ≤ · · · ≤ v′m < v′m+1 ≤
· · · ≤ v′n.
Begin from profile V and let δ = |¯v − F¯ (V )| > 0. Assume R1 = V1. By
single-peakedness, wR1(F (V )) = F¯ (V ). Change the announced preferences of
agent 1 to V 11 ∈ S as follows. If |v′m − ¯v| < δ, then set v
1
1 = v
′
m, otherwise, set
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v11 = ¯
v − δ
2
. By efficiency and Proposition 3.1, F (V−1, V 11 ) ⊆ Conv(V−1, V 11 ). By
strategy-proofness, wR1(F (V ))R1wR1(F (V−1, V
1
1 )). Therefore, |v11−¯v| < δ implies
(in domain S) that F¯ (V ) ≤ F¯ (V−1, V 11 ). Following this, sequentially repeat this
process for all agents i ∈ {2, . . . ,m} (if such agents exist) and construct profile
V 1 = (V 11 , . . . , V
1
m, Vm+1, . . . , Vn), where F¯ (V ) ≤ F¯ (V 1). If v11 = v′m, proceed to the
next paragraph. Otherwise, let δ1 = |¯v1−F¯ (V 1)| > 0, assume R1 = V 11 , and repeat
the process to construct profile V 2, where F¯ (V ) ≤ F¯ (V 2). If v21 = v′m, proceed
to the next paragraph. Otherwise, keep repeating this process until the profile
V¯ m = (V ′m, . . . , V
′
m, Vm+1, . . . , Vn) has been constructed, where F¯ (V ) ≤ F¯ (V¯ m).
Next, repeat the process described above for all agents i ∈
{1, . . . ,m − 1} (if such agents exist) and construct profile V¯ m−1 =
(V ′m−1, . . . , V
′
m−1, V
′
m, Vm+1, . . . , Vn), where F¯ (V ) ≤ F¯ (V¯ m−1).
Finally, continue repeating this whole process until the profile V¯ 1 = V ′ =
(V ′1 , . . . , V
′
m, Vm+1, . . . , Vn) has been constructed, where F¯ (V ) ≤ F¯ (V ′).
If in addition,
¯
v <
¯
F (V ), begin from profile V , let δ = |¯v −
¯
F (V )| > 0, and
construct profile V ′ as shown above. By the same arguments to the ones presented
above, but expressed for the best alternative instead of the worst, it follows that
¯
F (V ) ≤
¯
F (V ′).
We now proceed with the proof of Proposition 3.5 that holds only in domain
S because it makes indirect use of Proposition 3.2 through Lemmas 3.8 and 3.9.
Proof of Proposition 3.5. Let F ∈ F . Part 2 of Proposition 3.4 on page 96
(which also holds in S) shows that if F satisfies uncompromisingness then it also
satisfies strategy-proofness. Hence, it follows that statement (ii) implies statement
(i). Next, we show that statement (i) implies statement (ii).
Let F satisfy strategy-proofness and voter-sovereignty. Let i ∈ N and pair
V, V ′ ∈ SN be such that V−i = V ′−i. Without loss of generality, assume v1 ≤ · · · ≤
vn. Since vi = v
′
i trivially satisfies uncompromisingness in domain S, let vi 6= v′i.
There are six cases.
Case 1.1. Let v′i < vi ≤ ¯F (V ). Since vi = ¯F (V ) = F¯ (V ) trivially satisfies
uncompromisingness, let vi < F¯ (V ). In addition, let M ( N be such that j ∈M
if and only if vj ≤ vi. Begin from profile V and consider profile V 1 to be such
that V−M = V 1−M and where each agent j ∈ M announces preferences V 1j = Vi.
By construction of V 1 and Lemma 3.8(i),
¯
F (V 1) ≥
¯
F (V ) and F¯ (V 1) ≥ F¯ (V ).
Moreover, begin from profile V 1 and consider profile V . Since for each j ∈M , vj ≤
v1j = ¯
v1, and for each k ∈ N \M , vk = v1k > ¯v
1, by Lemma 3.9(i), F¯ (V ) ≥ F¯ (V 1)
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and in addition, if vi <
¯
F (V ), then
¯
F (V ) ≥
¯
F (V 1). Therefore,
¯
F (V 1) =
¯
F (V )
and F¯ (V 1) = F¯ (V ).
Next, begin from profile V 1 and consider profile V ′. Since for each j ∈M , v′j ≤
v1j = ¯
v1, and for each k ∈ N \M , v′k = v1k > ¯v
1, by Lemma 3.9(i), F¯ (V ′) ≥ F¯ (V 1),
and in addition, if vi <
¯
F (V 1) =
¯
F (V ), then
¯
F (V ′) ≥
¯
F (V 1). Finally, begin from
profile V ′ and consider profile V 1. Since for each j ∈M , v′j ≤ v1j = v′i, and for each
k ∈ N \M , v′k = v1k > v′i, by Lemma 3.8(i), F¯ (V 1) ≥ F¯ (V ′) and ¯F (V
1) ≥
¯
F (V ′).
Therefore, F¯ (V 1) = F¯ (V ) = F¯ (V ′) and
¯
F (V 1) =
¯
F (V ) =
¯
F (V ′).
Case 1.2. Let v′i > vi ≥ F¯ (V ). The proof is symmetric to Case 1.1.
Case 2.1. Let vi ≤
¯
F (V ) and vi < v
′
i. If v
′
i > F¯ (V ), then uncompromisingness
is trivially satisfied; hence, let v′i ≤ F¯ (V ). In addition, let M ( N be such that
j ∈ M if and only if vj ≤ v′i. Begin from profile V and consider profile V 1 to
be such that V−M = V 1−M and where each agent j ∈ M announces preferences
V 1j = V
′
i . By construction of V
1 and Lemma 3.8(i), F¯ (V 1) ≥ F¯ (V ) and in
addition, if v′i ≤ ¯F (V ), then ¯F (V
1) ≥
¯
F (V ). Moreover, begin from profile V 1 and
consider profile V . Since for each j ∈ M , vj ≤ v1j = ¯v
1, and for each k ∈ N \M ,
vk = v
1
k > ¯
v1, by Lemma 3.9(i), if vi < F¯ (V
1), then F¯ (V ) ≥ F¯ (V 1) and in
addition, if vi <
¯
F (V 1), then
¯
F (V ) ≥
¯
F (V 1). Therefore, F¯ (V 1) = F¯ (V ) and in
addition, if v′i ≤ ¯F (V ), then ¯F (V
1) =
¯
F (V ). There are three sub-cases.
(i) Let v′i = F¯ (V ). Assume Ri = V
′
i . Hence, bRi(F (V )) = F¯ (V ). Since
V−i = V ′−i, by strategy-proofness, F¯ (V ) = v
′
i ∈ F (V ′). Thus, F¯ (V ′) ≥ F¯ (V ).
Moreover, begin from profile V ′ and consider profile V 1. Since for each j ∈ M ,
v′j ≤ v1j = v′i, and for each k ∈ N \M , v′k = v1k > v′i, by Lemma 3.8(i), F¯ (V 1) ≥
F¯ (V ′). Therefore, F¯ (V 1) = F¯ (V ) = F¯ (V ′).
(ii) Let v′i < F¯ (V ). Begin from profile V
1 and consider profile V ′. Since
for each j ∈ M , v′j ≤ v1j = ¯v
1, and for each k ∈ N \ M , v′k = v1k > ¯v
1, by
v′i < F¯ (V ) and Lemma 3.9(i), F¯ (V
′) ≥ F¯ (V 1), and in addition, if v′i < ¯F (V ),
then
¯
F (V ′) ≥
¯
F (V 1). Moreover, begin from profile V ′ and consider profile V 1.
Since for each j ∈ M , v′j ≤ v1j = v′i, and for each k ∈ N \M , v′k = v1k > v′i, by
v′i < F¯ (V ) and Lemma 3.8(i), F¯ (V
1) ≥ F¯ (V ′), and in addition, if v′i < ¯F (V
′),
then
¯
F (V 1) ≥
¯
F (V ′). Therefore, F¯ (V 1) = F¯ (V ′) = F¯ (V ) and in addition, if
v′i < ¯
F (V ), then
¯
F (V 1) =
¯
F (V ′) =
¯
F (V ).
(iii) Let v′i = ¯
F (V ). If v′i = ¯
F (V ) = F¯ (V ), then uncompromisingness is
trivially satisfied; hence, let v′i = ¯
F (V ) < F¯ (V ). As shown in the previous sub-
case, F¯ (V ′) = F¯ (V ). Assume Ri = Vi. Since vi < v′i, by single-peakedness,
bRi(F (V )) = ¯
F (V ) and wRi(F (V )) = F¯ (V ). Hence, V
′
−i = V−i and strategy-
proofness imply bRi(F (V )) Ri bRi(F (V
′)). Thus, by F¯ (V ′) = F¯ (V ) and single-
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peakedness, bRi(F (V )) = ¯
F (V ) ≤
¯
F (V ′). Finally, assume Ri = V ′i . Since v
′
i ≤
¯
F (V ′) ≤ F¯ (V ′), by single-peakedness, bRi(F (V ′)) = ¯F (V
′) and wRi(F (V
′)) =
F¯ (V ′). Hence, V ′−i = V−i and strategy-proofness imply bRi(F (V
′)) Ri bRi(F (V )).
Thus, by F¯ (V ′) = F¯ (V ) and single-peakedness, bRi(F (V
′)) =
¯
F (V ′) ≤
¯
F (V ).
Therefore,
¯
F (V ) =
¯
F (V ′).
Case 2.2. Let vi ≥ F¯ (V ) and vi > v′i. The proof is symmetric to Case 2.1.
Case 3.1. Let
¯
F (V ) < vi < F¯ (V ) and v
′
i > vi. In addition, let M ( N be such
that j ∈ M if and only if vj ≥ v′i. Begin from profile V and consider profile V 1
to be such that V−M = V 1−M and where each agent j ∈ M announces preferences
V 1j = V
′
i . By construction of V
1 and Lemma 3.8(ii),
¯
F (V ) ≥
¯
F (V 1). Moreover,
begin from profile V 1 and consider profile V . Since for each j ∈M , vj ≥ v1j = v¯1,
and for each k ∈ N \ M , vk = v1k < v¯1, by v′i > ¯F (V
1) and Lemma 3.9(ii),
¯
F (V 1) ≥
¯
F (V ′). Therefore,
¯
F (V ) =
¯
F (V 1).
Next, begin from profile V 1 and consider profile V ′. Since for each j ∈ M ,
v′j ≥ v1j = v¯1, and for each k ∈ N \ M , v′k = v1k < v¯1, by v¯1 > ¯F (V
1) and
Lemma 3.9(ii),
¯
F (V ′) ≤
¯
F (V 1). Finally, begin from profile V ′ and consider profile
V 1. Since for each j ∈M , v′j ≥ v1j = v′i, and for each k ∈ N \M , v′k = v1k < v′i, by
Lemma 3.8(ii),
¯
F (V 1) ≤
¯
F (V ′). Therefore,
¯
F (V 1) =
¯
F (V ) =
¯
F (V ′).
If v′i > F¯ (V ), then we are done. If v
′
i ≤ F¯ (V ), then let L ( N be such that
j ∈ L if and only if vj ≤ v′i. Begin from profile V and consider profile V 2 to be such
that V−L = V 2−L and where each agent j ∈ L announces preferences V 2j = V ′i . By
construction of V 2 and Lemma 3.8(i), F¯ (V ) ≤ F¯ (V 2). There are two sub-cases.
(i) Let v′i < F¯ (V ). Begin from profile V
2 and consider profile V . Since for
each j ∈ L, v′j ≤ v2j = ¯v
2, and for each k ∈ N \ L, v′k = v2k > ¯v
2, by
¯
v2 < F¯ (V 2)
and Lemma 3.9(i), F¯ (V 2) ≤ F¯ (V ). Therefore, F¯ (V ) = F¯ (V 2).
Next, begin from profile V ′ and consider profile V 2. Since for each j ∈ L,
v′j ≤ v2j = v′i, and for each k ∈ N \ L, v′k = v2k < v′i, by Lemma 3.8(i), F¯ (V 2) ≥
F¯ (V ′). Finally, begin from profile V 2 and consider profile V ′. Since for each
j ∈ L, v′j ≤ v2j = ¯v
2, and for each k ∈ N \ L, v′k = v2k > ¯v
2, by
¯
v2 < F¯ (V 2) and
Lemma 3.9(i), F¯ (V ′) ≥ F¯ (V 2). Therefore, F¯ (V 2) = F¯ (V ) = F¯ (V ′).
(ii) Let v′i = F¯ (V ). Assume Ri = V
′
i . By single-peakedness, bRi(F (V )) = v
′
i.
Hence, V−i = V ′−i and strategy-proofness imply v
′
i ∈ F (V ′). Thus, F¯ (V ′) ≥ F¯ (V ).
Assuming F¯ (V ′) > F¯ (V ) results in a contradiction as follows. Begin from
profile V and consider profile V 2. Since for each j ∈ L, vj ≤ v2j = v′i, and for each
k ∈ N \ L, vk = v2k > v′i, by Lemma 3.8(i), F¯ (V ) ≤ F¯ (V 2). Moreover, begin from
profile V 2 and consider profile V . Since for each j ∈ L, vj ≤ v2j = ¯v
2, and for
each k ∈ N \ L, vk = v2k > ¯v
2, by
¯
v2 < F¯ (V 2) and Lemma 3.9(i), F¯ (V ) ≥ F¯ (V 2).
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Therefore, F¯ (V ) = F¯ (V 2).
Next, begin from profile V ′ and consider profile V 2 as described in the previous
sub-case. Since for each j ∈ L, v′j ≤ v2j = v′i, and for each k ∈ N \L, v′k = v2k > v′i,
by Lemma 3.8(i), F¯ (V ′) ≤ F¯ (V 2). Finally, begin from profile V 2 and consider
profile V ′. Since for each j ∈ L, v′j ≤ v2j = ¯v
2, and for each k ∈ N \L, v′k = v2k > ¯v
2,
by
¯
v2 < F¯ (V 2) and Lemma 3.9(i), F¯ (V ′) ≥ F¯ (V 2). Therefore, F¯ (V 2) = F¯ (V ′).
Therefore, F¯ (V 2) = F¯ (V ) = F¯ (V ′).
Case 3.2. Let
¯
F (V ) < vi < F¯ (V ) and v
′
i < vi. The proof is symmetric to
Case 3.1.
Finally, we present the proof of Proposition 3.6.
Proof of Proposition 3.6. Let F ∈ F satisfy strategy-proofness, min/max
continuity, and voter-sovereignty. By Proposition 3.3, F also satisfies efficiency.
Let pair V, V ′ ∈ RN and i ∈ N be such that V−i = V ′−i. There are five cases.
Case 1.1. Let vi <
¯
F (V ) and v′i ≤ F¯ (V ). Notice that if Ri = Vi, by single-
peakedness, bRi(F (V )) = ¯
F (V ) and wRi(F (V )) = F¯ (V ).
Assuming vi ≥
¯
F (V ′) leads to a contradiction as follows. By min/max con-
tinuity, there exists V ∗i ∈ R such that ¯F (V−i, V
∗
i ) = vi. Assume Ri = Vi. By
single-peakedness, bRi(F (V−i, V
∗
i )) = vi 6∈ F (V ). Hence, if at profile V agent i
deviates by announcing V ∗i , his best point improves. This contradicts strategy-
proofness. Therefore, vi <
¯
F (V ′) ≤ F¯ (V ′).
Next, assuming
¯
F (V ′) <
¯
F (V ) or F¯ (V ′) < F¯ (V ) leads to a contradiction
as follows. Assume Ri = Vi. By vi <
¯
F (V ′) ≤ F¯ (V ′) and single-peakedness,
bRi(F (V
′))PibRi(F (V )) or wRi(F (V
′))PibRi(F (V )). Hence, if at profile V agent
i deviates by announcing V ′i , his best point or his worst point improves. This
contradicts strategy-proofness. Therefore,
¯
F (V ′) ≥
¯
F (V ) and F¯ (V ′) ≥ F¯ (V ).
Finally, assuming
¯
F (V ) <
¯
F (V ′) or F¯ (V ) < F¯ (V ′) leads to a contradiction
as follows. Assume Ri = V
′
i . By v
′
i ≤ ¯F (V ) ≤ F¯ (V ) and single-peakedness,
bRi(F (V ))PibRi(F (V
′)) or wRi(F (V ))PibRi(F (V
′)). Hence, if at profile V ′ agent
i deviates by announcing Vi, his best point or his worst point improves. This
contradicts strategy-proofness.
Therefore, F¯ (V ′) = F¯ (V ) and in addition, if v′i ≤ ¯F (V ), then ¯F (V
′) =
¯
F (V ).
Case 1.2. Let vi =
¯
F (V ) and v′i ≤ F¯ (V ). By the same arguments to the ones
presented in Case 1.1 for the maximum point chosen, it follows that F¯ (V ′) = F¯ (V ).
Case 2.1. Let vi > F¯ (V ) and v
′
i ≥ ¯F (V ). By symmetric arguments to those
presented in Case 1.1, it follows that
¯
F (V ′) =
¯
F (V ) and in addition, if v′i ≥ F¯ (V ),
then F¯ (V ′) = F¯ (V ).
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Case 2.2. Let vi = F¯ (V ) and v
′
i ≥ ¯F (V ). By symmetric arguments to those
presented in Case 1.2, it follows that
¯
F (V ′) =
¯
F (V ).
Case 3. Let
¯
F (V ) < vi < F¯ (V ). By symmetry of arguments, let vi ≥ v′i.
Without loss of generality, let v1 ≤ · · · ≤ vn and notice that by efficiency and
Proposition 3.1, F (V ) ⊆ Conv(V ); hence, agent i 6∈ {1, n}. In addition, for each
agent j ∈ N \ {i}, define preferences V¯j ∈ R be such that V¯j = V ′i .
Begin from profile V and consider profile V 1 = (V−1, V¯1). By efficiency and
Proposition 3.1, F (V ) ⊆ Conv(V ). Hence, since v1 =
¯
v, by either Case 1.1
(if v1 <
¯
F (V )) or Case 1.2 (if v1 =
¯
F (V )), F¯ (V 1) = F¯ (V ). Moreover, by ef-
ficiency and Proposition 3.1, F (V 1) ⊆ Conv(V 1); hence, v2 =
¯
v1. Next, for
agents k ∈ {2, . . . , i}, in increasing order, consider profile V k = (V k−1−k , V¯k).
By the arguments presented for V 1, F¯ (V k) = F¯ (V ). Therefore, at profile
V i = (V¯1, . . . , V¯i, Vi+1, . . . , Vn), F¯ (V
i) = F¯ (V ). Finally, begin from profile V ′.
By the same technique as the one described for profile V , change the prefer-
ences of agents k ∈ {1, . . . , i − i}, in increasing order, to again construct profile
V i = (V¯1, . . . , V¯i, Vi+1, . . . , Vn). Therefore, F¯ (V
i) = F¯ (V ′) = F¯ (V ).
Similarly, if v′i ≤ ¯F (V ), then once can show that ¯F (V
′) =
¯
F (V ), by using sym-
metrical arguments to the ones presented above. Specifically, begin from profile
V and change the preferences of agents k ∈ {i, . . . , n}, in decreasing order, and
show that
¯
F (V1, . . . , Vi−1, V¯i, . . . , V¯n) =
¯
F (V ). Finally, begin from profile V ′ and
change the preferences of agents k ∈ {i+ 1, . . . , n}, in decreasing order, and show
that
¯
F (V1, . . . , Vi−1, V¯i, . . . , V¯n) =
¯
F (V ′) =
¯
F (V ).
3.D Proof of Theorem 3.1 (equivalence of statements (ii)
and (iii))
We first show for Theorem 3.1 that statement (iii) implies statement (ii) in domain
R. Moreover, as discussed in Section 3.5.3, this result also holds in domain S.
Proof of Theorem 3.1 (statement (iii) implies statement (ii)). Let Fα,βG ∈
FG. By the definition of FG, to show that Fα,βG satisfies uncompromisingness, it
suffices to show that the minimum and maximum chosen alternatives by Fα,βG are
not compromised. Moreover, by symmetry of arguments, we only need to show
that
¯
Fα,βG (V ) is not compromised.
Let V ∈ RN and without loss of generality, let v1 ≤ · · · ≤ vn. Let i ∈ N
and V ′ ∈ RN be such that V−i = V ′−i. Moreover, let vi 6= ¯F
α,β
G (V ). Hence,
¯
Fα,βG (V ) = med(v, α˜v) and ¯
Fα,βG (V
′) = med(v′, α˜v′). There are two cases.
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Case 1. Let j ∈ N and
¯
Fα,βG (V ) = med(v, α˜v) = vj. Hence, vi 6= ¯F
α,β
G (V )
implies i 6= j. Since at V , v1 ≤ · · · ≤ vn, at least j agents announce peaks smaller
than or equal to vj and at least n − j + 1 agents announce peaks larger than
or equal to vj. Thus, since there are n agents in total and α˜v ∈ An+1, by the
median operator, vector α˜v contains at least n− j+ 1 coordinates smaller than or
equal to vj and at least j coordinates larger than or equal to vj. Therefore, since
αN ≤ · · · ≤ α∅, if j = 1, α{1} ≤ vj ≤ α∅, and otherwise, α{1,...,j} ≤ vj ≤ α{1,...,j−1}.
There are two sub-cases.
(i) Let vi <
¯
Fα,βG (V ) = vj, that is, i ∈ {1, . . . , j − 1}. This implies j ∈
{2, . . . , n} and α{1,...,j} ≤ vj ≤ α{1,...,j−1}. In addition, let v′i ≤ vj. Thus, at
profile V ′, at least j agents announce peaks smaller than or equal to vj (i.e.,
agents 1, . . . , j) and at least n − j + 1 agents announce peaks larger than or
equal to vj (i.e., agents j, . . . , n). Moreover, V−i = V ′−i and v
′
i ≤ vj imply that
v′i ≤ vj ≤ vj+1 ≤ · · · ≤ vn, that is, the agents announcing the j − 1 smallest
peaks at V (i.e., agents 1, . . . , j− 1) also announce the j− 1 smallest peaks at V ′.
Similarly, the agents announcing the j smallest peaks at V (i.e., agents 1, . . . , j)
also announce the j smallest peaks at V ′. Hence, coordinates α{1,...,j} and α{1,...,j−1}
are included in vector α˜v′ . Thus, α{1,...,j} ≤ vj ≤ α{1,...,j−1} and the definition of
FG implies that vector α˜v′ contains at least n − j + 1 coordinates smaller than
or equal to vj and at least j coordinates larger than or equal to vj. Therefore,
¯
Fα,βG (V
′) = med(v′, α˜v′) = vj =
¯
Fα,βG (V ).
(ii) Let vi >
¯
Fα,βG (V ) = vj, that is, i ∈ {j+1, . . . , n}. The proof is symmetric
to (i).
Case 2. Let M ⊆ N such that |M | = m. Let
¯
Fα,βG (V ) = med(v, α˜v) = αM , such
that for each i ∈ N , vi 6= αM . Hence, if |M | = 0, αM = α∅, and otherwise, αM =
α{1,...,m}. Since αN ≤ · · · ≤ α∅, vector α˜v contains at least n−m + 1 coordinates
smaller than or equal to αM (i.e., coordinates α{1,...,m}, . . . , αN) and at least m+ 1
coordinates larger than or equal to αM (i.e., coordinates α∅, . . . , α{1,...,m}). Thus,
since there are n agents in total and none of their announced peaks equals αM ,
by the median operator, at V , m agents announce peaks smaller than αM (i.e.,
agents 1, . . . ,m) and n − m agents announce peaks larger than αM (i.e., agents
m + 1, . . . , n). Therefore, since v1 ≤ · · · ≤ vn, if m = 0, αM = α∅ < v1, if m = n,
αM = αN > vn, and otherwise, vm < αM = α{1,...,m} < vm+1. There are four
sub-cases.
(i) Let m = 0. Hence, αM = α∅ < v1 ≤ vi. In addition, let αM =
¯
Fα,βG ≤ v′i.
Thus, at V ′, all n agents announce peaks larger than αM . In addition, since
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αN ≤ · · · ≤ α∅ = αM , vector α˜v′ contains at least n + 1 coordinates smaller than
or equal to αM (i.e., coordinates α∅, . . . , αN) and at least 1 coordinate larger than
or equal to αM (i.e., coordinate α∅). Therefore,
¯
Fα,βG (V
′) = med(v′, α˜v′) = αM =
¯
Fα,βG (V ).
(ii) Let m = n. The proof is symmetric to (i).
(iii) Let m ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1} and vi < α{1,...,m} = αM . Hence, vi ≤ vm < αM <
vm+1. In addition, let v
′
i ≤ αM . Thus, at V ′, at least m agents announce peaks
smaller than or equal to αM (i.e., agents 1, . . . ,m) and n − m agents announce
peaks larger than αM (i.e., agents m+1, . . . , n). Moreover, V−i = V ′−i and v
′
i ≤ αM
imply that v′i ≤ αM < vm+1 ≤ · · · ≤ vn, that is, the agents announcing the m
smallest peaks at V (i.e., agents 1, . . . ,m) also announce the m smallest peaks at
V ′. Hence, coordinate α{1,...,m} is included in vector α˜v′ . Thus, the definition of
FG implies that vector α˜v′ contains at least n−m+ 1 coordinates smaller than or
equal to αM and at least m+1 coordinates larger than or equal to αM . Therefore,
¯
Fα,βG (V
′) = med(v′, α˜v′) = αM =
¯
Fα,βG (V ).
(iv) Let m ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1} and vi > α{1,...,m} = αM . The proof is symmetric
to (iii).
Before showing for Theorem 3.1 that statement (ii) implies statement (iii), we
first prove the following intermediate result that holds in both domains R and S.
Lemma 3.10. Let F ∈ F satisfy strategy-proofness, peaks-onliness, and un-
compromisingness. Then, for each i ∈ N and each pair V, V ′ ∈ RN such that
V ′−i = V−i, if vi ≤ v′i, then ¯F (V ) ≤ ¯F (V
′) and F¯ (V ) ≤ F¯ (V ′).33
Proof. Let F ∈ F satisfy strategy-proofness, peaks-onliness, and uncompromis-
ingness. Let i ∈ N and pair V, V ′ ∈ RN be such that V ′−i = V−i. Since by
peaks-onliness, vi = v
′
i implies F (V ) = F (V
′), let vi < v′i. There are three cases.
Case 1. Let vi <
¯
F (V ) and vi < v
′
i. Concerning the maximum alternative
chosen, if v′i ≤ F¯ (V ), then by uncompromisingness, F¯ (V ) = F¯ (V ′). Let V 1i ∈ R
be such that v1i = F¯ (V ). Hence, by uncompromisingness, F¯ (V−i, V
1
i ) = F¯ (V ). If
v′i > F¯ (V ), then assuming F¯ (V
′) < F¯ (V ) leads to a contradiction as follows. Begin
from V ′ and let agent i change his announcement to V 1i . Since F¯ (V
′) < v1i < v
′
i,
by uncompromisingness, F¯ (V ′−i, V
1
i ) = F¯ (V
′). Thus, F¯ (V ′−i, V
1
i ) = F¯ (V−i, V
1
i )
contradicts F¯ (V ′) < F¯ (V ). Therefore, in both cases, F¯ (V ′) ≥ F¯ (V ).
33Notice that this result simply shows that strategy-proofness and uncompromisingness imply
peak-monotonicity, a property that we refrain from introducing formally since it is only used in
the “only if” part of Theorem 3.1. Loosely speaking, this property requires the following: if an
agent’s announced peak moves to the right (left), then the chosen set also moves to the right
(left).
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Concerning the minimum alternative chosen, assume Ri = Vi. Since vi <
¯
F (V )
and F¯ (V ) ≤ F¯ (V ′), if
¯
F (V ′)) <
¯
F (V ), then single-peakedness implies bRi(F (V
′)Ri
bRi(F (V )). Hence, if at profile V agent i deviates by announcing V
′
i , his best point
improves. This contradicts strategy-proofness. Therefore,
¯
F (V ′) ≥
¯
F (V )
Case 2. Let
¯
F (V ) ≤ vi < F¯ (V ) and vi < v′i. Concerning the maximum alter-
native chosen, by the arguments presented in Case 1, F¯ (V ′) ≥ F¯ (V ). Concerning
the minimum alternative chosen, if
¯
F (V ′) <
¯
F (V ), then
¯
F (V ′) < vi < v′i and un-
compromisingness imply
¯
F (V ′) =
¯
F (V ′−i, Vi) = ¯
F (V ). Therefore,
¯
F (V ′) ≥
¯
F (V ).
Case 3. Let F¯ (V ) ≤ vi and vi < v′i. Concerning the maximum alternative
chosen, if F¯ (V ′) < F¯ (V ), then F¯ (V ) ≤ vi < v′i and uncompromisingness im-
ply F¯ (V ′) = F¯ (V ′−i, Vi) = F¯ (V ). Similarly, concerning the minimum alternative
chosen, if
¯
F (V ′) <
¯
F (V ), then
¯
F (V ) ≤ vi < v′i and uncompromisingness imply
¯
F (V ′) =
¯
F (V ′−i, Vi) = ¯
F (V ).
The last part of the proof of Theorem 3.1 follows. Notice that this part holds
in both domains R and S.
Proof of Theorem 3.1 (statement (ii) implies statement (iii)). Let F ∈ F
satisfy uncompromisingness. By Proposition 3.4, F satisfies strategy-proofness
and peaks-onliness. For each i ∈ N , let pair V mini , V maxi ∈ R be such that vmini = 0
and vmaxi = 1. We proceed in three steps.
Step 1. We show that at each announced profile V ∈ RN and for each i ∈ N ,
the minimum chosen alternative is the median of: (i) the announced peak of i at
profile V (i.e., vi), (ii) the minimum chosen alternative if i changes his announce-
ment to V mini (i.e., ¯
F (V−i, V mini )), and (iii) the minimum chosen alternative if i
changes his announcement to V maxi (i.e., ¯
F (V−i, V maxi )). By symmetry of argu-
ments, we do not show the equivalent result for the maximum chosen alternative.
Let i ∈ N and V ∈ RN . Consider profiles V min = (V−i, V mini ) and V max =
(V−i, V maxi ). Since V−i = V
min
−i = V
max
−i and v
min
i ≤ vi ≤ vmaxi , by Lemma 3.10,
¯
F (V min) ≤
¯
F (V ) ≤
¯
F (V max). There are three cases.
Case 1. Let vi <
¯
F (V min) ≤
¯
F (V ). Since 0 = vmini ≤ vi < ¯F (V ), un-
compromisingness implies
¯
F (V min) =
¯
F (V ). Therefore,
¯
F (V min) =
¯
F (V ) =
med(
¯
F (V min), vi,
¯
F (V max)).
Case 2. Let vi >
¯
F (V max) ≥
¯
F (V ). Symmetric proof to Case 1.
Case 3. Let
¯
F (V min) ≤ vi ≤
¯
F (V max). Assuming vi <
¯
F (V ) and thus
¯
F (V min) <
¯
F (V ) results in a contradiction as follows. Since 0 = vmini ≤
vi <
¯
F (V ), uncompromisingness implies
¯
F (V min) =
¯
F (V ). Similarly, assuming
¯
F (V ) < vi and thus
¯
F (V ) <
¯
F (V max) results in a contradiction as follows. Since
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¯
F (V ) < vi ≤ vmaxi , uncompromisingness implies ¯F (V ) = ¯F (V
max). Therefore,
¯
F (V ) = vi = med(
¯
F (V min), vi,
¯
F (V max)).
Step 2. We construct two vectors α and β. In this step of the proof and in
contrast to the rest of the paper, we will use a different letter to label announced
profiles (U instead of V ). This is done in an attempt to facilitate the notation
used in Step 3 of the proof that follows.
For eachM ⊆ N , let UM ∈ RN be such that all agents inM announce 0 as their
peak and all other agents announce 1 as their peak, i.e., uM = (0, . . . , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
i ∈M
, 1, . . . , 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
i ∈ N \M
).
Next, let vectors α = (αM)M⊆N and β = (βM)M⊆N be such that αM =
¯
F (UM)
and βM = F¯ (U
M), hence, αM ≤ βM . Moreover, for each L,M ⊆ N such that
L ( M notice the following. For each i ∈ M \ L, uLi = 1 > 0 = uMi , and
for each j 6∈ M \ L, ULj = UMj . Begin from profile UL and consider that all
agents i (sequentially) change their announcements to UMi . Since u
L
i > u
M
i , by
(sequentially) applying Lemma 3.10,both αL ≥ αM and βL ≥ βM .
Step 3. We show that F is a generalized median correspondence associated
with vectors α and β constructed in Step 2.
Let V ∈ RN . Without loss of generality, index the agents in N such that
v1 ≤ · · · ≤ vn. Recall vectors α, β and profiles UM , for M ⊆ N , defined in
Step 2. Let vectors α˜v, β˜v ∈ An+1 be such that α˜v = (α∅, α{1}, α{1,2}, . . . , αN) and
β˜v = (β∅, β{1}, β{1,2}, . . . , βN).
Since the coordinates of α˜v are such that 0 ≤ αN ≤ · · · ≤ α∅ ≤ 1 and u∅ =
(1, . . . , 1),
¯
F (U∅) = med(u∅, α˜v) = α∅. Moreover, for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, u{1,...,i} =
( 0, . . . , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
j ∈ {1, . . . , i}
, 1, . . . , 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
j ∈ {i+ 1, . . . , n}
) implies
¯
F (U{1,...,i}) = med(u{1,...,i}, α˜v) = α{1,...,i}. Simi-
larly for β˜v, F¯ (U
∅) = β∅ and for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, F¯ (U{1,...,i}) = β{1,...,i}.
Next, for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, let V i ∈ RN be such that V i =
(V1, . . . , Vi, V
max
i+1 , . . . , V
max
n ) and notice that V
n = V . We show that F (V ) =
Fα,βG (V ) by induction, in two stages.
Stage 1. We show that F (V 1) = Fα,βG (V
1).
Consider profile V 1 = (V1, V
max
2 , . . . , V
max
n ). Recall profiles U
{1} =
(V min1 , V
max
2 , . . . , V
max
n ) and U
∅ = (V max1 , . . . , V
max
n ). Hence, U
{1} = (V 1−1, V
min
1 )
and U∅ = (V 1−1, V
max
1 ). By Step 1, ¯
F (V 1) = med(
¯
F (U{1}), v1,
¯
F (U∅)) and
F¯ (V 1) = med(F¯ (U{1}), v1, F¯ (U∅)). Hence,
¯
F (V 1) = med(α{1}, v1, α{∅}) and
F¯ (V 1) = med(β{1}, v1, β{∅}). Moreover, since αN ≤ · · · ≤ α∅ ≤ v2 = · · · = vn and
βN ≤ · · · ≤ β∅ ≤ v2 = · · · = vn,
¯
F (V 1) = med(v, α˜v1) and F¯ (V
1) = med(v, β˜v1).
Therefore, F (V 1) = Fα,βG (V
1).
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Stage 2. Let i ∈ {2, . . . , n} be such that F (V i−1) = Fα,βG (V i−1). We show
that F (V i) = Fα,βG (V
i). Notice that we only show
¯
F (V i) =
¯
Fα,βG (V
i). The proof
showing F¯ (V i) = F¯α,βG (V
i) is symmetric, that is, it can be obtained using the same
arguments but after replacing all references to the minimum chosen alternative
and α˜vi with the equivalent references to the maximum chosen alternative and β˜vi
respectively.
Recall that V i−1 = (V1, . . . , Vi−1, V maxi , . . . , V
max
n ) and V
i = (V i−1−i , Vi). There
are three cases.
Case 1. Let vi >
¯
F (V i). Since V i−1−i = V
i
−i and ¯
F (V i) < vi ≤ vmaxi , by
uncompromisingness,
¯
F (V i) =
¯
F (V i−1) = med(vi−1, α˜vi). Thus, V
i−1
−i = V
i
−i and
med(vi−1, α˜vi) < vi ≤ vmaxi implies ¯F (V
i) = med(vi, α˜vi) = ¯
Fα,βG (V
i).
Case 2. Let vi <
¯
F (V i) and recall that U{1,...,i} =
(V min1 , . . . , V
min
i , V
max
i+1 , . . . , V
max
n ). Since v1 ≤ · · · ≤ vn and vi < ¯F (V
i),
for each j ∈ {1, . . . , i}, vminj ≤ vj < ¯F (V
i); hence, by uncompromising-
ness,
¯
F (V i−j, V
min
j ) = ¯
F (V i). Therefore, beginning from profile V i and
considering that all agents j ∈ {1, . . . , i} (sequentially) change their announce-
ments to V minj , implies by (sequentially applying) uncompromisingness, that
¯
F (V i) =
¯
F (U{1,...,i}) where as shown above
¯
F (U{1,...,i}) = α{1,...,i}. There-
fore, since at profile V i, for each j ∈ {1, . . . , i}, vij < α{1,...,i}, and for each
k ∈ {i + 1, . . . , n}, vik = vmaxk = 1 ≥ α{1,...,i}, by the median operator,
¯
F (V i) = med(vi, α˜vi) = ¯
Fα,βG (V
i).
Case 3. Let vi =
¯
F (V i). Since V i−1−i = V
i
−i and vi ≤ vmaxi , by Lemma 3.10,
¯
F (V i) ≤
¯
F (V i−1). Thus, v1 ≤ · · · ≤ vn and vi =
¯
F (V i), imply vii−1 = v
i−1
i−1 ≤
¯
F (V i−1). There are two sub-cases.
(i) Let vii−1 = ¯
F (V i−1). Thus, vii−1 = vi = ¯
F (V i) =
¯
F (V i−1). Hence,
¯
F (V i−1) =
¯
Fα,βG (V
i−1) implies med(vi−1, α˜vi−1) = vi ≤ vmaxi . Therefore, by the
median operator,
¯
F (V i) = vi = med(v
i, α˜vi) = ¯
Fα,βG (V
i).
(ii) Let vii−1 < ¯
F (V i−1). Recall that at profiles U{1,...,i−1} =
(V min1 , . . . , V
min
i−1 , V
max
i , . . . , V
max
n ) and U
{1...,i} = (V {1,...,i−1}−i , V
min
i ), ¯
F (U{1,...,i−1}) =
α{1,...,i−1} and
¯
F (U{1,...,i}) = α{1,...,i}. Since vi =
¯
F (V i) ≤
¯
F (V i−1), it follows that
vi ≤ α{1,...,i−1}.
Next, begin from profile U{1,...,i} and consider that all agents j ∈ {1, . . . , i}
(sequentially) change their announcements to Vj, i.e., the final new profile is
V i = (V1, . . . , Vi, V
max
i+1 , . . . , V
max
n ). Since vj ≥ vminj , by (sequentially) apply-
ing Lemma 3.10,
¯
F (V i) ≥
¯
F (U{1,...,i}) = α{1,...,i}. Hence, vi ≥ α{1¯,...,i} and it
follows, that α{1,...,i} ≤ vi ≤ α{1,...,i−1}. Thus, since αN ≤ · · · ≤ α∅, vector
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α˜vi contains at least n + 1 − i coordinates not larger than vi (i.e., coordinates
α{1,...,i}, . . . , αN) and at least i coordinates not smaller than vi (i.e., coordinates
α∅, . . . , α{1,...,i−1}). In addition, since v1 ≤ · · · ≤ vn, at least i agents announce
peaks not larger than vi (i.e., agents 1, . . . , i) and n− i+ 1 agents announce peaks
not smaller than vi (i.e., agents i, . . . , n). Therefore, by the median operator,
¯
F (V i) = med(vi, α˜vi) = vi = ¯
Fα,βG (V
i).
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